v.
the State of Texas
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00359-CR
NATHANIEL DAVID JONES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 33rd District Court
Llano County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR7845, Honorable J. Allan Garrett, Presiding
March 20, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
In exchange for dismissal of four of five counts of possession of child pornography, Appellant, Nathaniel David Jones, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of one count.[1] Punishment was assessed at ten years’ confinement, suspended in favor of ten years’ community supervision, and a $1,000 fine.[2] In addition to the usual terms and conditions of supervision, Appellant was required to comply with supplemental terms and conditions Appellant committed multiple violations of the conditions thereof. According to her testimony, Appellant admitted to certain violations and self-reported others. The State also presented evidence of other violations, including proof of violations of some of the supplemental conditions imposed on Appellant as a sex offender.
ANALYSIS
Appellant’s sole complaint is that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to hold a preliminary hearing before the revocation hearing. We disagree.
Initially, we note that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-tier appellate court is required to address. Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A complaint of a due process violation requires preservation in the trial court lest it be forfeited on appeal. Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Vanhoose v. State, Nos. 03-17-00259-CR, 03-17-00530-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1418, at *6 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 27, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant did not object or otherwise complain during the revocation hearing that his due process rights were being violated. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Although not preserved, Appellant’s due process argument can be succinctly resolved. See Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102, 104–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (recognizing that procedure for revocation in Texas is different than in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 656 (1973), and holding due process rights were not violated where probationer did not receive a preliminary hearing). See also Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 41–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
While Appellant acknowledges the holding in Whisenant, he requests this Court overrule or modify that decision. He presents what he calls a “good faith” argument that Whisenant was wrongfully decided. He advocates, at a minimum, for a preliminary hearing in cases where the defendant suffers from a classified mental disorder, i.e., autism or bipolar disorder, before holding a revocation hearing.
Despite his argument that Whisenant was wrongfully decided, this Court has no authority to disregard precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals and is bound to follow such precedent. See Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Martinez v. State, No. 03-08-00611-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Bolen v. State, 321 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). We decline to overrule or modify Whisenant and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community supervision. See Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation). Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Alex Yarbrough Justice
Do not publish.