Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). · Go Syfert
Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

The rule of reason determines legality by whether a restraint merely regulates competition or is such as to suppress or destroy it.

A grain board adopted a rule prohibiting members from bidding on grain "to arrive" at prices other than the closing bid during certain hours. The government sued to enjoin the rule, alleging it violated antitrust laws by restraining trade. The court held that the legality of a trade regulation depends on whether the restraint merely regulates and promotes competition or suppresses and destroys it. Because the rule applied only to a small portion of grain during limited hours, created a public market, and improved market conditions for dealers and farmers without appreciably affecting general prices, it constituted a reasonable regulation rather than an illegal restraint.

3,084 citation events (416 in the last 25 years) across 127 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Malheur Forest Fairness Coalition v. Iron Triangle, LLC (ca9, 2026-01-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1919 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1919 1972 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Malheur Forest Fairness Coalition v. Iron Triangle, LLC
9th Cir. · 2026 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Federal Trade Commission v. Meta Platforms, Inc.
D.D.C. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Communications Tech. Sys. (3×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
S.D. · 1998 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
nearly every business contract eliminates competition in the sense that it prevents other parties from coming into the transaction.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Brown University in Providence in the State of Rhode Island
3rd Cir. · 1993 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Brown University In Providence In The State Of Rhode Island
3rd Cir. · 1993 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. · 1992 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. (5×) also: Cited "see"
D. Mass. · 1983 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) In Re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation (3×)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Industries Limited (3×)
2d Cir. · 2006 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Industries Ltd. (3×)
2d Cir. · 2006 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital (5×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Penn. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Microsoft Corp. (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hospital (3×)
D. Minnesota · 1998 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (3×)
D. Kan. · 1995 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
chicago board of trade
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Brown University (3×)
E.D. Pa. · 1992 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, 299 every regulation of trade, restrains; to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence
examined Cited as authority (quoted) James P. Kartell, M.D. v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., James P. Kartell, M.D. v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., Massachusetts Medical Society, Intervenors/plaintiffs, James P. Kartell, M.D. v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., Commissioner of Insurance, Intervenor/defendant (3×)
1st Cir. · 1984 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. (3×)
1st Cir. · 1984 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center (3×)
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center (3×)
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. (3×)
N.D. Cal. · 1979 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. to bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1977 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CARLA DeYOUNG, ET AL. v. GREATER BATON ROUGE ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, INC., ET AL.
M.D. La. · 2026 · confidence medium
As further discussed in the body of the Report, this Circuit has not held that conditioning MLS access on association membership is per se anticompetitive. 87 Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 88 Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 764.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Djeneba Sidibe v. Sutter Health (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972) (also listing as relevant factors “the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption”).3 It is therefore no surprise that federal model jury instructions, much like CACI, list “the history of the restraint” and “the reasons for adopting the particular practice that is alleged to be a restraint” as relevant factors in determining whether a course of conduct is reasonable or unreasonable. 3A Kevin F. 3 We do not suggest that every Suprem…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation MDL 2406
N.D. Ala. · 2022 · confidence medium
A restraint may be deemed unreasonable “either because it fits within a class of restraints that has been held to be ‘per se’ unreasonable, or because it violates what has come to be known as the ‘Rule of Reason.’” FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 , 457–58 (1986) (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amc Entertainment Holdings, Inc., Amc Entertainment, Inc., and American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Ipic-Gold Class Entertainment, LLC and Ipic Texas, Llc
Tex. · 2022 · confidence medium
But we need not make that determination because iPic did not raise the issue in its restraint, and, accordingly, is unlawful per se.” (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006))). 21 Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). 22 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 23 Id. at 145 . 24 Id. 25 Id. at 146 . 13 motion for summary judgment. 26 AMC’s motion instead focused on the remaining elements of iPic’s claim: (1) whether AMC and Regal made an agreement to “crush iPic with clearances”; and (2) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comission (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hobart-Mayfield, Inc. v. National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment
E.D. Mich. · 2021 · confidence medium
Plaintiff’s argument fails under the rule of reason inquiry as well, which provides that the “test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458 (quoting Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf International, Inc.
S.D. Tex. · 2021 · confidence medium
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), it is never “taken [as] a literal approach to [its] language.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Custom Nutrition Laboratories, LLC
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
One of the best-known explanations of the rule of reason in the Sherman Act context is found in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918): Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GIANT EAGLE, INC. v. EASTERN MUSHROOM MARKETING COOPERATIVE, INC.
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Somerville, III v. West Town Bank & Trust, a/k/a West Town Savings Bank
D. Maryland · 2019 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court long-ago explained, were the Sherman Act “to be read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it” since “[t]heoretically all manufacturers, distributors, merchants, sellers, and buyers could be considered as potential competitors of each other.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thomas Joyce
9th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 , 58–60 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health System
6th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Page 4 (2010), the Supreme Court relied on Justice Brandeis’s multi-factored test in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), to determine whether a joint venture constitutes a “combination” under Section 1: The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sanger Insurance Agency v. HUB International, Limi
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 , 203 n.10 (2010) (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Cipro Cases I & II
Cal. · 2015 · confidence medium
(See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States (1918) 246 U.S. 231, 238 [ 62 L.Ed. 683 , 38 S.Ct. 242 ] [pointing out that “[ejvery agreement concerning trade . . . restrains” (italics added)].) Instead, the Cartwright Act and Sherman Act carry forward the common law understanding that “only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited.” (Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 930 .) Under the traditional rule of reason, “inquiry is limited to whether the challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition.” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Ca…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polypore International, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 , 38 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1918)). 13 Case: 11-10375 Date Filed: 07/11/2012 Page: 14 of 22 Supreme Court in that case did not expressly invoke the presumption, and did not expressly label the acquired company as an actual competitor.8 However, a later Supreme Court case did so.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Ex Rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (providing the classic formulation of the rule of reason by Jus- tice Brandeis: “The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 687-91 (1978); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Benny Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 , 38 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1918)). 7 405 U.S. 596 , 607–08, 92 S. Ct. 1126 , 1133–34 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League (2×)
SCOTUS · 2010 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 688 (1978); see also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006) (“This Court has not taken a literal approach to this language”); cf. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the term “restraint of trade” in § 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition because “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William O. Gilley Enterprises, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Bd. of Trade of Chi- cago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
cited Cited as authority (rule) VANGUARD ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. v. Curler
Okla. Civ. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 , 38 S.Ct. at 242 (1918).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2×)
SCOTUS · 2007 · confidence medium
While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, see, e. g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918), the Court has never “taken a literal approach to [its] language,” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Expert Masonry v. Boone Cnty
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.” Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
cited Cited as authority (rule) General Gases & Supplies Corp. v. Shoring & Forming Systems, Inc.
prsupreme · 2001 · confidence medium
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
cited Cited as authority (rule) West Boylston Cinema Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2000 · confidence medium
Orson, Inc., 79 F.3d at 1367, citing Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Dental Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission (2×)
SCOTUS · 1999 · confidence medium
After all, the object of the rule of reason is to separate those restraints that “may suppress or even destroy competition” from those that “merely regulat[e] and perhaps thereby promot[e] competition.” Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Communication Technical Systems, Inc. v. Densmore (2×)
S.D. · 1998 · confidence medium
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.” Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 , 38 S.Ct. 242, 244 , 62 L.Ed. 683, 687 (1918); see also Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal.App.2d 418 , 313 P.2d 936, 951 (1957) (“[N]early every business contract eliminates competition in the sense that it prevents other parties from coming into the transaction.”); Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal.App.3d 268 , 219 Cal.Rptr. 836, 841 (1985) (“[R]easonably limited restrictions which tend more to promote than restrain trade and business do not violate the [restraint of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Natl Collegiate
3rd Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Under the "rule of reason" test, a court considers all relevant factors in determining a defendant's purpose in implementing the challenged restraint and the effect of the restraint on competition, see Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367-68 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 , 38 S.Ct. 242, 243-44 (1918)), and asks essentially whether the challenged rule promotes or hinders competition.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago Et Al.
v.
United States
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 4, 1918.
246 U.S. 231
1918 U.S. LEXIS 1538
Mr. Henry S. Robbins for appellants:, Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Todd, with whom Mr. Lincoln R. Clark was on the briefs, for the United States:
Brandéis, McReynolds.
Published
7 passages pin-cited by 15 cases
Pinpoint authority: #4,514 of 633,719
Citer courts: Second Circuit (12) · First Circuit (6) · D.C. Circuit (6) · Third Circuit (3) · N.D. California (3) · D. Kansas (3) · D. Minnesota (3)
Mr. Justice Brandéis

delivered the opinion of the court.

Chicago is the leading grain market in the world. Its Board of Trade is the commercial center through which most of the trading in grain is done. The character of the organization is described in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236. Its 1600 members include brokers, commission merchants, dealers, millers,.[*236] maltsters, manufacturers of com products and proprietors of elevators. Grains there dealt in are graded according to kind and quality and are sold usually “Chicago weight, inspection and delivery.” The standard forms of trading are: (a) Spot sales; that is, sales of grain already in Chicago in railroad cars or elevators for immediate delivery by order on carrier or transfer of warehouse receipt. (6) Future sales; that is, agreements for delivery later in the current or in some future month, (c) Sales “to arrive”; that is, agreements to deliver on arrival grain which is already in transit to Chicago or is to be shipped there within a time specified. On every business day sessions of the Board are held at which all bids and sales are publicly made. Spot sales and future sales are made at the regular sessions of the Board from 9.30 A. M. to 1.15 P. M., except on Saturdays, when the session closes at 12 M. Special sessions, termed the “Call,” are held immediately after the close of the regular session, at which sales “to arrive” are made. These sessions are not limited as to duration, but last usually about half an hour. At all these sessions transactions are between members only; but they may trade either for themselves or on behalf of others. Members may also trade privately with one another at any place, either during the sessions or after, and they may trade with non-members at any time except on the premises occupied by the Board. [1]

Purchases of grain “to arrive” are made largely from country dealers and farmers throughout the whole territory tributary to Chicago, which includes besides Illinois and Iowa, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and even South and North Dakota. The purchases are sometimes the result of bids to individual country dealers made by telegraph or telephone either during the sessions or after; but most, pur[*237] chases are made by the sending out from Chicago by the afternoon mails 'to hundreds of country dealers offers to buy, at the prices named, any number of carloads, subject to acceptance before 9.30 A. M. on the next business day.

In 1906 the Board adopted what is known as the “Call” rule. By it members were prohibited from purchasing or offering to purchase, during the period between the close of the Call and the opening of the session on the next business day, any wheat, corn, oats or rye “to arrive” at a price other than the closing bid at the Call. The. Call was over, with rare exceptions, by two o’clock. The change effected was this: Before the adoption of the rule, members fixed their bids throughout the day at such prices as they respectively saw fit; after the adoption of the rule, the bids had to be fixed at the day’s closing bid on the Call until the opening of the next session.

In 1913 the United. States filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois this suit against the Board and its executive officers and directors, to enjoin the enforcement of the Call rule, alleging it to be in violation of the Anti-Trust Law (July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209). The defendants admitted the adoption and enforcement of the Call rule, and averred that its purpose was not-to prevent competition or to control prices, but to promote the convenience of members by restricting their hours of business and to break up a monopoly in that branch of the grain trade acquired by four or five warehousemen in Chicago. On motion of the Government the allegations- concerning the purpose of establishing the regulation were stricken from the record. The case was then heard upon evidence; and a decree was entered which declared that defendants became parties to a combination or conspiracy to restrain interstate and foreign trade and commerce “by adopting, acting upon and enforcing” the “Call” rule; and enjoined them from act[*238] ing upon the same or from adopting or acting upon any similar rule.

No opinion was delivered by the District Judge. The Government proved the existence of the rule and described its application and the change in business practice involved. It made no attempt to show that the rule was designed to or that it had the effect of limiting the amount of grain shipped to Chicago; or of retarding or accelerating shipment; or of raising or depressing prices; or of discriminating against any part of the public; or that it resulted in hardship to anyone. The case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or agreement by which men occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would buy or sell during an important part of the business day, is an illegal restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Law. But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is. whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as nay suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. The District Court erred, therefore, in striking from the answer[*239] allegations concerning the history and purpose of the Call rule and in later excluding evidence on that subject. But the evidence admitted makes it clear that the rule was a reasonáble regulation of business consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Trust Law.

First: The nature of the rule: The restriction was upon the period of price-making. It required members to desist from further price-making after the close of the Call until 9.30 A. M. the next, business day: but there was no restriction upon the sending out of bids after close of the Call. Thus it required members who desired to buy grain “to arrive” to make up their minds before the close of the Call how much they were willing to pay during the interval before the next session of the Board. The rule made it to their interest to attend the Call; and if they did not fill their wants by purchases there, to make ,the final bid high enough to enable them to purchase from country dealers.

Second: The scope of the rule: It is restricted in operation to grain “to arrive.” It applies only to a small part of the grain shipped from day to day to Chicago, and to an even smaller part of the day’s sales: members were left free to purchase grain already in Chicago from anyone at any price throughout the day. It applies only during a small part of the business day; members were left free to purchase during the sessions of the Board grain “to arrive,” at any price, from members anywhere and from non-members anywhere except on the premises of the Board. It applied only to grain shipped to Chicago: members- were left free to purchase at any price throughout the day from either members or non-members, grain “to arrive” at any other market. Country dealers and farmers had available in practically every part of the territory called tributary to Chicago some other market for grain “to arrive.” Thus Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and parts of Illinois are also tributary to St. Louis; Ne[*240] braska and Iowa, to Omaha; Minnesota, Iowa, South and North Dakota, to Minneapolis or Duluth; Wisconsin and parts of Iowa and of Illinois, to Milwaukee; Ohio, Indiana and parts of Illinois, to Cincinnati; Indiana and parts of Illinois) to Louisville.

Third: The effects of the rule: As it applies to only a small part of the grain shipped to Chicago and to that only during a part of the business day and does not apply at all to grain shipped to other markets, the rule had no appreciable effect on .general market prices; nor did it materially affect the total volume of grain coming to Chicago. But within the narrow limits of its operation the rule helped.to improve market conditions thus:

(а) It created a public market for grain “to arrive.” Before its adoption, bids were made privately. Men had to *buy and sell without adequate knowledge of actual market conditions. This was disadvantageous to all concerned, but particularly so to country dealers and farmers.

(б) It brought into the regular market hours of the Board sessions more of the trading in grain “to arrive.”

(c) It brought buyers and sellers into more direct relations; because on the Call they gathered together for a free and open interchange of bids and offers.

(d) It distributed the business in grain “to arrive” among a far larger number of Chicago receivers and commission merchants than had been the case there before.

(e) It increased the number of country dealers engaging in this branch of the business; supplied them more regularly with bids from Chicago; and also increased the number of bids received by them from competing markets.

(/) It eliminated risks necessarily incident to a private - market, and thus enabled country dealers to do business on a smaller margin. In that way the rule made it possible for them to pay more to farmers without raising the price to consumers.

[*241] (g) It enabled country dealers to sell some grain to arrive which they would otherwise have been obliged either. to ship to Chicago commission merchants or to sell for “future delivery.”

Qi) It enabled those grain merchants of Chicago who sell to millers and exporters to trade on a smaller margin and, by paying more for grain or selling it for less, to make the Chicago market more attractive for both shippers and buyers of grain.

(i) Incidentally it facilitated trading “to arrive” by enabling those engaged in these transactions to fulfil their contracts by tendering grain arriving at Chicago on any railroad, whereas formerly shipments had to be made over the particular railroad designated by the buyer.

The restraint imposed by the rule is less severe than that sustained in Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604. Every board of tirade and nearly every trade organization imposes some restraint upon the conduct of business by its members. Those relating to the hours in which • business may be done are common; and they make a special appeal where, as here, they tend to shorten the working day or, at least, limit the period of most exacting activity. The decree of the District Court is reversed with directions to dismiss the bill.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice, McReynolds took no part in the consideration or decision of this case;
1

There is an exception as to future sales not here material.