rule of reason analysis in California

2020(Ibid.) 33 the significance of a distributor’s refusal to do business with an independent shifts dramatically.’ ” (Id. at p. 698, quoting Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co. (5th Cir. 1982) 672 F.2d 485, 498 .) In light of these changed market conditions, the modern antitrust approach to vertical restraints, and the need to understand Paramount Pictures “in light of its peculiar facts and context” ( Redwood, supra, at p. 697 ), the Redwood court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff ’s non-monopoly circuit- dealing claim was subject to the rule of reason analysis under the Cartwri

1994Redwood Theatres characterizes the refusal of a supplier to deal with a potential customer as a “vertical restraint” and holds, “[u]nder Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. [(1977)] 433 U.S. 36 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 568 , 97 S.Ct. 2549 ], such vertical restraints are subject to a rule-of-reason analysis to determine their impact on competition.” ( Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 , fn. omitted.) “Since the Sylvania decision, several other federal courts applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints have required [a] threshold inquiry int

1994Redwood Theatres characterizes the refusal of a supplier to deal with a potential customer as a “vertical restraint” and holds, “[u]nder Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. [(1977)] 433 U.S. 36 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 568 , 97 S.Ct. 2549 ], such vertical restraints are subject to a rule-of-reason analysis to determine their impact on competition.” ( Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 , fn. omitted.) “Since the Sylvania decision, several other federal courts applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints have required [a] threshold inquiry int

1994Redwood Theatres characterizes the refusal of a supplier to deal with a potential customer as a “vertical restraint” and holds, “[u]nder Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. [(1977)] 433 U.S. 36 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 568 , 97 S.Ct. 2549 ], such vertical restraints are subject to a rule-of-reason analysis to determine their impact on competition.” ( Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 , fn. omitted.) “Since the Sylvania decision, several other federal courts applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints have required [a] threshold inquiry int

2020(Ibid.) 33 the significance of a distributor’s refusal to do business with an independent shifts dramatically.’ ” (Id. at p. 698, quoting Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co. (5th Cir. 1982) 672 F.2d 485, 498 .) In light of these changed market conditions, the modern antitrust approach to vertical restraints, and the need to understand Paramount Pictures “in light of its peculiar facts and context” ( Redwood, supra, at p. 697 ), the Redwood court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff ’s non-monopoly circuit- dealing claim was subject to the rule of reason analysis under the Cartwri

2011(Mateo-Woodburn, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1185 .) “ ‘ “Judges are untrained and courts ill-equipped for hospital administration, and it is neither possible nor desirable for the courts to act as supervening boards of directors for every . . . hospital ... in the state.” [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.) Even vertical restrictions may legitimately be allowed to reduce some forms of competition, if they also promote other forms of competition by allowing service providers “ ‘to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of its products [citation],’ ” under the rule of reason standard.

1999(G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 269 .) 29 The federal denial of access cases have similarly recognized that although denial of access to an MLS bore some resemblance to classic group boycott arrangements, such “ ‘easy labels do not always supply ready answers’ ” {United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., supra, 629 F.2d at p. 1365 ) and have rejected the per se illegality test ordinarily applicable to classic group boycotts in favor of a rule of reason analysis when examining denial of access to MLS’s. {Id. at pp. 1366-1369.) These observations convince us that the denial o

1999(G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 269 .) 29 The federal denial of access cases have similarly recognized that although denial of access to an MLS bore some resemblance to classic group boycott arrangements, such “ ‘easy labels do not always supply ready answers’ ” {United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., supra, 629 F.2d at p. 1365 ) and have rejected the per se illegality test ordinarily applicable to classic group boycotts in favor of a rule of reason analysis when examining denial of access to MLS’s. {Id. at pp. 1366-1369.) These observations convince us that the denial o

1994Redwood Theatres characterizes the refusal of a supplier to deal with a potential customer as a “vertical restraint” and holds, “[u]nder Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. [(1977)] 433 U.S. 36 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 568 , 97 S.Ct. 2549 ], such vertical restraints are subject to a rule-of-reason analysis to determine their impact on competition.” ( Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 , fn. omitted.) “Since the Sylvania decision, several other federal courts applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints have required [a] threshold inquiry int

1985Soc. of Composers (2d Cir. 1980) 620 F.2d 930, 934 .) While it is undisputed that to prevail at trial under a rule of reason, plaintiffs must prove that the alleged anticompetitive effects on intrabrand competition outweigh any pro-competitive effects on interbrand competition of the restraint, the parties dispute the quantity of evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment under a rule of reason analysis.

1985They are, therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason standard.” (Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp. (2d Cir. 1978) 579 F.2d 126, 131 , italics in original.) 8 The parties have also referred to Battle v. Lubrizol Corp. (8th Cir. 1982) 673 F.2d 984, 987 , in discussing whether the per se rule or the rule of reason is appropriate in determining whether a technically vertical restraint of trade which smacks of horizontal price fixing interference unduly restrains trade under the Sherman Act.

1985They are, therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason standard.” (Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp. (2d Cir. 1978) 579 F.2d 126, 131 , italics in original.) 8 The parties have also referred to Battle v. Lubrizol Corp. (8th Cir. 1982) 673 F.2d 984, 987 , in discussing whether the per se rule or the rule of reason is appropriate in determining whether a technically vertical restraint of trade which smacks of horizontal price fixing interference unduly restrains trade under the Sherman Act.

1976In Associated Press v. United States (1945) 326 U.S. 1 [ 89 L.Ed. 2013 , 65 S.Ct. 1416 ], the bylaws of the Associated Press, a cooperative association engaged in gathering and distributing news, prohibited service of AP news to nonmembers, prohibited members from furnishing news to nonmembers, and empowered members to block the membership applications of competitors.

1976In Associated Press v. United States (1945) 326 U.S. 1 [ 89 L.Ed. 2013 , 65 S.Ct. 1416 ], the bylaws of the Associated Press, a cooperative association engaged in gathering and distributing news, prohibited service of AP news to nonmembers, prohibited members from furnishing news to nonmembers, and empowered members to block the membership applications of competitors.

1976In Associated Press v. United States (1945) 326 U.S. 1 [ 89 L.Ed. 2013 , 65 S.Ct. 1416 ], the bylaws of the Associated Press, a cooperative association engaged in gathering and distributing news, prohibited service of AP news to nonmembers, prohibited members from furnishing news to nonmembers, and empowered members to block the membership applications of competitors.