v.
Wesco Distribution, Inc.
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
vs.
WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC., AND;
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND INVESTMENT COMMITTEE FOR WESCO DISTRIBUTION, INC.
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN, JOHN
AND JANE DOES 1-30, Defendants, OPINION
Plaintiffs, Robert Mator, and Nancy Mator, Individually and as Representatives of a Class of Participants and Beneficiaries in and on behalf of the Wesco Distribution, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan (Plan), bring claims for Breach of Duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461) (ERISA) (Count I). In addition, at Count II, Plaintiffs set forth a claim for Failure to Adequately Monitor Other Fiduciaries Under ERISA (Count II). Both Counts are asserted against Defendants, Wesco Distribution, Inc., The Administrative and Investment Committee for Wesco Distribution, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan, and John and Jane Does 1-30. (ECF No. 63). Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 66). The matter is now ripe for consideration.
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 63), Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 66), the respective briefs of the parties (ECF Nos. 67, 70, 71), and for the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) will be granted. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiffs and their putative class bring claims against the Defendants, as ERISA fiduciaries, for not protecting participants and their retirement funds by failing to evaluate fees and monitor costs assessed to the Plan. (ECF No. 63 at ¶¶ 5-6, 8). Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts two claims under ERISA: 1) Breach of Duty of Prudence by selecting a Retirement Plan Service (RPS) provider that charged imprudent and unreasonable fees and offering share class funds with excessive expenses; and 2) Failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries who were tasked with monitoring and evaluating RPS providers. Id. at ¶¶ 154-174.
Plaintiffs’ Breach of ERISA duty Count I concerns breaches of Duties of Prudence. The Duty of Prudence claim avers two components, excessive RPS fees and excessive share class expenses. Plaintiffs aver that these fees and expenses can reduce of the value of defined contribution plan accounts and that the Plan’s fiduciaries have control over these expenses. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43.
Defined contribution plans have two primary methods for payment of recordkeeping and administrative services: “direct” payments from plan assets, and “indirect” revenue sharing payments from plan investments, such as mutual funds. Id. at ¶ 71. In a direct payment arrangement, the fiduciary contracts with the recordkeeper to obtain services in exchange for a flat annual fee based upon the number of participants for which the recordkeeper will be providing services. Id. at ¶ 72. In an indirect revenue sharing payment arrangement, the mutual fund pays the plan’s recordkeeper for providing recordkeeping and administrative services for the fund. Id. at ¶ 74. However, because revenue sharing payments are asset-based, the fees can allegedly grow to unreasonable levels if plan assets grow while the number of participants, and thus the services provided, has not increased at a similar rate. Id. Further, Plaintiffs aver that if plan assets decline, participants in revenue-sharing arrangements will not receive a sustained benefit of paying lower fees, because the recordkeeper will demand that the plan make up the shortfall through additional direct payments. Id.
As regards share class expenses, Plaintiffs allege that mutual funds offer their investors different share classes: retail and institutional. Id. at ¶ 64. Plaintiffs aver that retail share classes are marketed to individuals with small amounts to invest, while institutional share classes are offered to investors with large amounts to invest, as with large retirement plans. Id. Plaintiffs maintain that retail share classes incur higher fees, such that retail class investors receive lower returns. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo, N.A., the Plan’s recordkeeper from 2009 to 2020, was responsible for holding the Plan’s assets in trust, tracking participants’ contributions, earnings and investment accounts and executing trades as requested by Plan participants. Id. at ¶ 93. As recordkeeper, Wells Fargo allegedly offered the following services: Internet access to accounts, transaction processing, quarterly participant statements, participant communications-including Plan investments disclosures and periodic participant newsletters, retirement education services- including various tools, such as Plan website retirement income calculators, telephone support to answer questions or give assistance to Plan participants, and a brokerage window to enable Plan participants to invest in securities outside the Plan. Id. at ¶ 94. Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo charged the Plan direct and indirect fees for the recordkeeping and administrative services and that said fees were excessive compared to other similar-sized plans for similar services. Jd. at □ 96. During the Class Period, Plaintiffs aver they paid between $82 and $50 per year for direct recordkeeping and administrative fees. Jd. at {98. Those fees are summarized as follows:
Direct Recordkeeping and Administrative Services Compensation
Per-Participant Cost (source: Forms 5500) Planer
CdL:S2015 2016 2017 2018 | 2019 [2020 | Average _ Participants | 8,486 8,179 8,232 8,870 8,284 8,516 $614,032 | $651,150 | $671,304 | $539,003 | $443,714 | $247,300 | $564,975 Direct Per- | $72 $72 $82 $78 $50 $60 $66 Participant Fee
Id. at § 97. Plaintiffs aver that mutual fund companies paid indirect fees to Wells Fargo as follows during the Class Period:
Indirect Direct Recordkeeping and Administrative Services Compensation
Per-Participant Cost (source: Forms 5500) Planer | 20S | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average | 8,486 8,179 8,232 8,870 8,284 8,516 Indirect $752,446 | $773,658 | $840,637 | $731,513 | $917,662 | $661,665 | $779,597 Fees Indirect $89 $85 $103 $89 $103 $80 $91 Per-Participant
Fee
Id. at § 98. During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and Plan participants each paid between $153 and $185 per year in total retirement plan services expenses as follows:
Direct and Indirect Recordkeeping and Administrative Services
Compensation Per-Participant Cost (source: Forms 5500 Paneer || 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average Per- $157 $185 $154 $153 $110 Participant Fee
Id. at § 99.
Plaintiffs allege that other similarly sized plans maintained an average per-participant fee of $42 and provided the same services as Wells Fargo. Jd. at 7101. Wells Fargo allegedly received both indirect and direct fees for recordkeeping and administrative fees, for substantially the same services as the Plan, as follows:
Plan Participants Assets RPS Total RPS Recordkeeper
Cost Price /pp Rackspace US, Inc.
401(K) Plan 6,556 $289,943,564 $339,238 Wells Fargo Kemper Corporation 401(K) Retirement Plan 6,669 $554,047,025 $343,400 Wells Fargo Wesco Distribution, Inc. Retirement $670,742,749 | $1,270156 Wells Fargo Savings Plan (2018) Red Lobster 401(K) 10,982 $218,558,000 $421,521 $38 Wells Fargo Plan Jeld-Wen 401(K) Retirement Savings 12.668 $280,294.753 $477,797 $37 Wells Fargo Plan Parsons Corporation Retirement Savings 12,134 $1.088,067,182 | $526,392 $43 Wells Fargo Plan
Id. at ¶ 102. On July 1, 2020, the Plan allegedly switched from Wells Fargo to Fidelity Investments, which charges a per participant fee of $53. Id. at ¶ 114.
As regards excess share class expense claims, Plaintiffs aver that the Defendants consistently chose mutual fund share classes with higher operating expenses (retail shares) when identical lower-cost shares (institutional shares) of the same funds were available. Id. at ¶ 130. Plaintiffs allege that the selection of higher cost, retail share classes to pay for Plan administrative expenses was not justified in this case, because Wells Fargo was charging higher direct recordkeeping service fees. Id. at ¶ 134.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants breached their Duty of Prudence to Plan participants, including Plaintiffs, by failing to employ or follow a prudent process to evaluate the availability of lower RPS fees and to lower costs critically or objectively, by purchasing institutional share classes of certain mutual funds available to the Plan. Id. at ¶¶ 158-159.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a viable claim under ERISA. (ECF No. 66). In particular, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs fail to state claims for breach of ERISA’s Duty of Prudence, and for their derivative Failure-to-Monitor claims. Id. This will be the Court’s third opportunity to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims following its prior dismissals of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Amended Complaint, which granted leave to amend. The parties have cast similar legal arguments and have cited case updates since the Court’s April 7, 2022 Opinion. Accordingly, the focus of this Court’s analysis will be whether Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint has cured the pleading deficiencies identified in this Court’s October 4, 2021 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 43) and its April 7, 2022 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 62).1
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir.
2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa.
1 To the extent the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 63) and Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 66) overlap the prior pleadings and motions to dismiss, the Court incorporates in this Opinion its analysis and reasoning from its prior Opinions and Orders (ECF Nos. 43 and 62). June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016) (“Although a reviewing court now affirmatively disregards a pleading’s legal conclusions, it must still . . . assume all remaining factual allegations to be true, construe those truths in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable inferences from them.”) (citing Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n. 1 (3d Cir.2014)).
Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline [ ] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–327, (1989).
When a court grants a motion to dismiss, the court “must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Further, amendment is inequitable where there is “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] unfair prejudice.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Amendment is futile “where an amended complaint ‘would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.’” M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 175).
III. Discussion
A. Duty of Prudence
Such disparities raise serious doubt as to plausibility of how the purported comparator plans are indeed comparable. Even if these comparators had similar assets or participants, an examination of the 2018 Form 5500 for at least one comparator, Centerpoint/Voya, did not have the same list codes relative to services as Wells Fargo did for the Plan.
As regards Plaintiffs’ procedures in their calculations for the comparators, an examination of Plaintiffs’ methods reveals several flaws that cast doubt on the premise that the Second Amended Complaints alleged “apples to apples” comparison. In calculating the WESCO plan fees, Plaintiffs derived the purported amount of direct fees by multiplying total assets (less loans) indicated in Form 5500s by “Additional Asset Based Fee” as reflected in the Wells Fargo Agreement, and then dividing by number of year-end plan participants. (ECF No. 63 at ¶ 97 at n. 16). Whereas, for other plans, Plaintiffs only allege the direct fee amount listed in the Form 5500. Id. at ¶ 103. For example, the amount for the Edward-Elmhurst plan is only the “direct compensation” paid to the recordkeeper as set forth on the plan’s Form 5500, even though the same Form 5500 shows the recordkeeper also received indirect compensation. Cf.
ECF No. 63 at ¶ 106 with ECF No. 67-25. Moreover, Red Lobster, which also utilized Wells Fargo, specifically states in its 2018 Form 5500 the Financial Statement that although Wells Fargo remits excess revenue sharing amounts “[d]uring 2018, there were no excess amounts.” (ECF No. 67-26 at p. 35). Therefore, under this premise, it is clear that Plaintiffs have inconsistently included indirect compensation when calculating fees for the WESCO Plan, while excluding it for the Red Lobster plan in 2018, a year when Red Lobster specifically stated that no revenue sharing amounts were rebated. While Plaintiffs have argued that Defendants are asking this Court to improperly parse their Second Amended Complaint, such arguments have been consistently rejected. See, e.g. Smith v. CommonSpirit Health, 37 F.4th 1160 (6th Cir. 2022); Riley v. Olin Corp., No. 21-1328, 2022 WL 2208953, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2022) (dismissing excessive RPS fee claims); Morales v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 21-1454, Dkt. 42 (Order) (E.D. Va. May 27, 2022) (dismissing excessive RPS fee claims); Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., Inc., No. 20- 275, 2022 WL 1186532, at *7,[*12] (D. Utah Apr. 21, 2022), appeal filed, No. 22-4045 (10th Cir. May 20, 2022) (dismissing excessive RPS fee and share-class claims); Perkins v. United Surgical Partners Int’l Inc., No. 21-973, 2022 WL 824839, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2022) (dismissing claims for excessive RPS fees). Therefore, without pleading additional details as to fee structures and services provided, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint only infers a possibility but not a plausibility that Defendants acted imprudently.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, as regards Count I’s excessive RPS fee claim, will be granted.