G Cite
cited 21× by 10 distinct cases, 1922–2021 · 9 courts↓ Fading ·
…property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
at p. 230
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2000 · 2 courts ·
…property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subject to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
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Treatment trajectory · 1922 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1922
1974
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Steven Elmer Hinds v. the State of Texas
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Coleman v. Pearson
property in dogs . . . may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Wilkins v. Daniels
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Fabrikant v. French
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
City of Belfield v. Kilkenny
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
McNeely v. United States
(2×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Altman v. City Of High Point
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Altman v. City of High Point
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Michigan Wolfdog Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Clair County
(3×)
property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subject to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dotson v. Fayette County Sheriff Department
The Supreme Court held that “property in dogs… may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.” Nicchia v. People of State of New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920); see also Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R.Co., 166 U.S. 698, 704 (1897) (“Even it were assumed that dogs are property in the fullest sense of the word, they would still be subject to the police power of the state, and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgement of the legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens.”)…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mitchell v. Nye County, Nevada
Under Penn Central, I consider “the economic impact of the regulation on the 17 3 See, e.g., Nicchia v. N.Y., 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920) (dogs “may be subjected to peculiar and 18 drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right”); Wilkins v. Daniels, 913 F. Supp. 2d 517, 536 (S.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sekulovski v. Commerce Township
(2×)
Therefore, in Michigan, dogs may “‘be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owner of any federal right.’” Bugai, 258 Mich. at 416-17 , 242 N.W. at 775 (quoting Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Darryl Lunon v. Kathy Botsford
And in Nicchia v. People of State of New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920), the Court declared that “property in dogs . . . may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.” These precedents, not since questioned, required the district court to take a close look at the Arkansas law relating to stray animals. 2 Other animal seizure cases cited by Lunon are distinguishable for the same reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
JUST PUPS, LLC VS. TOWNSHIP OF EAST HANOVER (L-0963-17, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) (noting "[p]roperty in dogs is of an imperfect A-2135-17T3 17 or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any Federal right").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nikita Smith v. City of Detroit, Mich.
Dogs in Michigan may therefore “be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owner of any federal right.’” Bugai, 242 N.W. at 775 (quoting Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rolón López v. Departamento de Agricultura
Véase, además, Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 (1920).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Olguin
(2×)
(See American Dog Owners Ass'n. v. Dade County, Fla. (S.D.Fla. 1989) 728 F.Supp. 1533, 1541 [ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs did not implicate any fundamental rights], relying in part on Nicchia v. New York (1920) 254 U.S. 228, 230 [ 65 L.Ed. 235 , 41 S.Ct. 103 ] ["Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subject to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right."].) We find nothing to the contrary in the federal authority cited by defendant, which simply recognizes that a peace officer…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Bogart v. County of York
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 8 (citing Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Center for Animal Care & Control, Inc.
“Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right.” (Nicchia v People of State of N.Y., 254 US 228, 230 [1920].) Dogs hold their lives at the will of the Legislature, are subject to the police power of the state, and “might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens.” (Sentell v New Orleans & C.R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lamare v. North Country Animal League
In Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920), the United States Supreme Court observed that “[property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right.” This Court has similarly noted that dogs “belong to that class of property the keeping of which may be stringently regulated by the Legislature in the exercise of its police power — even to the extent of providing for their destruction, in given circumstances, without judicial proceedings and in a mos…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews
(Longyear v. Buck, 83 Mich. 236 ; Nicchia v. People, 254 U. S. 228, 230, 231 .) The case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens (12 How. [U. S.] 299) was decided upon the principle that the purpose of the statute was the regulation of navigation in the interest of public safety.
cited
Cited "see"
Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs
See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 (1920); Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2019).
discussed
Cited "see"
Weigel v. Maryland
(2×)
See Nicchia, 254 U.S. at 230 , 41 S.Ct. 103 ; Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1080. 69 Accepting the Plaintiffs’ well-pled allegations as true, Brockington, 637 F.3d at 505, there has been no actual, government interference with the Plaintiffs’ property.
examined
Cited "see"
Dias v. City and County of Denver
(3×)
See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R.
examined
Cited "see"
Bogart v. Chapell
(3×)
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920).
examined
Cited "see"
State v. DeFrancesco
(3×)
See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 , 41 S. Ct. 103 , 65 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
Johnston v. Atlanta Humane Society
(2×)
See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U. S. 228, 230 (41 SC 103, 65 LE 235).
examined
Cited "see"
State v. Anderson
(4×)
See Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 , 13 A.L.R. 826 .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Just Puppies, Inc. v. Anthony Brown
Co., 166 U.S. 698 , 702 (1897); see also Nicchia v. State of New York, 254 U.S. 228 , 230–231 (1920); Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2019); N.Y.
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Zimmerman v. Wolff
(3×)
See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920).
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Bess v. Bracken County Fiscal Court
(3×)
See, e.g., Nicchia v. People of State of New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230 , 41 S.Ct. 103, 104 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920) (dogs “may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right”); Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R.
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
City of Cleveland v. Johnson
(3×)
Co. (1897), 166 U.S. 698 , 17 S.Ct. 693 , 41 L.Ed. 1169 ; see, also, Nicchia v. New York (1920), 254 U.S. 228 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 ; Downing v. Cook (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 149 , 23 O.O.3d 186 , 431 N.E.2d 995 ; Akron v. Tipton (1989), 53 Ohio Misc.2d 18, 19 , 559 N.E.2d 1385 .
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Kerr v. Kimmell
(3×)
See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 , 41 S.Ct. 103, 103-04 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920).
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Vanater v. Village of South Point
(3×)
See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , 41 S.Ct. 103, 104 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 449-50 , 312 P.2d 786, 790-91 (1957); Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639, 642 , 59 N.E. 20, 22 (1901).
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Peters
(3×)
See also Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Griswold v. Connecticut
Compare Nicchia v. New York, 254 U. S. 228, 231 , upholding a New York dog-licensing statute on the ground that it did not “deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law.” And as I said concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 175 , “I believe that faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than that which can be afforded by the nebulous standards” urged by my concurring Brethren today.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Nicchia
v.
People of the State of New York
v.
People of the State of New York
74.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 6, 1920.
254 U.S. 228
1920 U.S. LEXIS 1184
Mr. George P. Foulk, with whom Mr-. Joseph Nicchia was on the brief, opened for plaintiff in error. The court declined to hear further argument., Mr. Harry E. Lewis, Mr. Harry G. Anderson, Mr. J. Mayhew Wainwright and Mr. William N. Dykman for defendant in error.
McReynolds.
Cited by 79 opinions | Published
Mr. Justice McReynolds
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff in error owned two dogs which she,harbored within New York City without having obtained the license required by c. 115, Laws of New York 1894, as amended by c. 412, Laws 1895, and c. 495, Laws 1902. She was charged with violating the statute, on October 11, 1916,[*229] found guilty in the City Magistrates’ Court, Brooklyn, and required to pay a fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment without opinion.
Chapter 115 as amended provides:
‘ ‘ Sec. 1. Every person who owns or harbors one or more dogs within the corporate limits of any city having a population of over eight hundred thousand, shall procure a yearly license and pay.-.the.sum of two dollars for each dog. ...”
“Sec. 8. The American Society for the Prevention of. Cruelty to Animals is hereby empowered and authorized to carry out the provisions of this act, and the said society is further authorized to issue the licenses and renewals, and to collect the fees therefor, as herein prescribed; and the fees so collected shall be applied by said society in defraying the cost of carrying out the provisions of this act and maintaining a shelter for lost, strayed or homeless animal^; and any fees so collected and not required in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be retained by the said society ás compensation for enforcing the provisions of title sixteen of the penal code and such other statutes of the state as relate to the humané work in which the said society is engaged.”
“Sec. 9. Any person or persons, who shall hinder or molest or interfere with any officer or agent of said society in the performance of any duty enjoined by this act, or who shall use a license tag on a dog for which it was not issued, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who owns or harbors a dog without complying with the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof before any magistrate shall be fined for such offense any sum not exceeding ten dollars, and in default of payment of such fine may be committed to prison by such magistrate until the same be paid, but such imprisonment shall not exceed ten days.”
[*230] The validity of the act was questioned upon the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, by “depriving a citizen of his liberty without due process of law, to-wit, the liberty of owning and harboring a dog without procuring a license from and paying a fée therefor to the Society, a private corporation.” In Fox v. Mohawk & H. R. Humane Society (1901), 165 N. Y. 517, the Court of Appeals declared a statute essentially the same as c. 115 before the amendment. of 1902 invalid under the state constitution because it appropriated public funds, for the use of a private corporation and also because it conferred an exclusive privilege. But the court repudiated the suggestion that the státute deprived dog owners of property without due process or delegated governmental power to a private corporation. Thereafter (1902) the legislature amended c. 115 with the evident purpose of meeting objections pointed out in the Fox Case. Thus amended, the law has been upheld. Our only concern is with the suggested federal question.
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was incorporated by c. 469, Laws of New York 1866. “The purpose of the corporation was to enforce the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals.” Davis v. American Society, 75 N. Y. 362, 366. It has long been recognized by the legislature as a valuable and efficient aid toward the enforcement of those laws. New York Penal Laws, Article XVI, § 196. The payment of public funds to a similar corporation for assistance in enforcing penal statutes has been declared unobjectionable. People ex rel. State Board of Charities v. The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 161 N. Y. 233, 239, 250.
Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton [*231] R. R. Co., 166 U. S. 698. Fox v. Mohawk & H. R. Humane Society, supra. Its power to require those who wish to keep dogs to secure licenses from and pay fees to a public officer is also clear. And when the State iñ the reasonable conduct of its own affairs chooses to entrust the work incident to such licenses and collection of fees to a corporation created by it for the express purpose of aiding in law enforcement, and in good faith appropriates the funds so collected for payment of expenses fairly incurred and just compensation for the valuable services rendered, there is no infringement of any right guaranteed to the individual by the Federal Constitution. Such action does not amount to the taking of one man’s property and giving it to another, nor does it deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law.
The judgment below must be
Affirmed.