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13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Broadrick v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2013The only component of standing the overbreadth doctrine relieves a plaintiff of showing is that his own conduct — the conduct that is limited by the statute or regulation — is protected under the First Amendment: “Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Padou I, 998 A.2d at 293 n. 6 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 2013The only component of standing the overbreadth doctrine relieves a plaintiff of showing is that his own conduct — the conduct that is limited by the statute or regulation — is protected under the First Amendment: “Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Padou I, 998 A.2d at 293 n. 6 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, | 2 | 5 |
Gamble v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016As Mr. Givens’s challenge is directed only to the portion of the statute under which he was convicted, we do not address its other provisions. 29 .The District argues that Mr. Givens lacks standing to raise an overbreadth challenge because the statute does not implicate the First Amendment and our exception to prudential third-party standing rules only applies "in limited circumstances.” Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 166 (D.C. 2011). 2013Id. at 609-10 , 124 S.Ct. 1941 (citing free speech, right to travel, abortion, and legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as rare exceptions); see also Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 167 (D.C.2011); Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323, 338 (D.C.2009). . | 2 | 2 |
Plummer v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013Id. at 609-10 , 124 S.Ct. 1941 (citing free speech, right to travel, abortion, and legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as rare exceptions); see also Gamble v. United States, 30 A.3d 161, 167 (D.C.2011); Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323, 338 (D.C.2009). . 2013The overbreadth doctrine, an exception to this requirement, may be applicable with respect to appellant’s First Amendment and right to travel arguments, see Plummer, 983 A.2d at 338-39 , but we find it unnecessary to reach those arguments in this appeal. . | 1 | 2 |
McNeely v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Although "the absence of First Amendment concerns renders an overbreadth claim non-justiciable under notions of prudential third party standing,” McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 381 (D.C. 2005), the indecent exposure statute facially prohibits some expressive conduct, thereby implicating the First Amendment and affording Mr. Givens standing to raise this challenge. 2016Although "the absence of First Amendment concerns renders an overbreadth claim non-justiciable under notions of prudential third party standing,” McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 381 (D.C. 2005), the indecent exposure statute facially prohibits some expressive conduct, thereby implicating the First Amendment and affording Mr. Givens standing to raise this challenge. | 1 | 1 |
CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2013Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir.2006) (“The overbreadth doctrine does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden to prove constitutional standing”). 2013Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir.2006) (“The overbreadth doctrine does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden to prove constitutional standing”). | 1 | 1 |
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Partygreen2 sentences2013See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449-50 , 128 S.Ct. 1184 . 2013See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449-50 , 128 S.Ct. 1184 . | 1 | 1 |
Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwoodgreen1 sentence2013Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (acknowledging that, in determining standing under the overbreadth doctrine, a “crucial issue[ ]” is whether a plaintiff “satisfies the requirement of ‘injury-in-fact,’ ”); Prime Media, Inc., 485 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he injury in fact requirement still applies to over-breadth claims under the First Amendment.”); CAMP Legal Def. | 1 | 1 |
Gorgone v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen2 sentences2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant “ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation”) (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not “rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him”); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. 2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant "ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation") (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not "rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him"); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Coloradogreen2 sentences2010However, the Court has declared that “an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.’ ” Board of Airport Comm’rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 2568 , 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731-32 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 2010However, the Court has declared that “an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.’ ” Board of Airport Comm’rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 2568 , 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731-32 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 1 |
Leiss v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant “ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation”) (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not “rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him”); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. 2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant "ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation") (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not "rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him"); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Everton v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant “ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation”) (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not “rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him”); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. 2010See Everton v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C.2010) (appellant "ha[d] no standing to challenge [a] statute based on a hypothetical application to a different situation") (citing Leiss v. United States, 364 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1976)); Gorgone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 973 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.2009) (petitioner could not "rely on the rights of others to avoid a result that [was] just as to him"); see also Ball v. Arthur Winn Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Nicchia v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2005Because dog ownership is a form of property interest not protected by the First Amendment, see Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 280 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 285 (1920) (“Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right.”); cf. State v. Peters, 534 So.2d 760, 763-64 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (“Where there is no fundamental right or suspect class at issue — as here, where the classification concerns animals — courts will usually úphold the constitutionality 2005Because dog ownership is a form of property interest not protected by the First Amendment, see Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 280 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 285 (1920) (“Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right.”); cf. State v. Peters, 534 So.2d 760, 763-64 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (“Where there is no fundamental right or suspect class at issue — as here, where the classification concerns animals — courts will usually úphold the constitutionality | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). 2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petersgreen1 sentence2005Because dog ownership is a form of property interest not protected by the First Amendment, see Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 280 , 41 S.Ct. 103 , 65 L.Ed. 285 (1920) (“Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the State without depriving their owners of any federal right.”); cf. State v. Peters, 534 So.2d 760, 763-64 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (“Where there is no fundamental right or suspect class at issue — as here, where the classification concerns animals — courts will usually úphold the constitutionality | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mazuriegreen2 sentences2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). 2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Powellgreen2 sentences2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). 2005See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (“[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand”) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975))). | 1 | 1 |
Ernest v. Millergreen1 sentence1981See id. at 223-24 . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sabri v. United States
green
2 sentences2009Mr. Plummer correctly notes, however, that the overbreadth doctrine has been applied in other settings, but Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 1941 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004), a case involving a facial challenge to a federal bribery statute, emphasized that the doctrine has *339 been applied “in relatively few settings” which, other than First Amendment cases, include the right to travel, abortion, and legislation enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2009Mr. Plummer correctly notes, however, that the overbreadth doctrine has been applied in other settings, but Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 1941 , 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004), a case involving a facial challenge to a federal bribery statute, emphasized that the doctrine has *339 been applied “in relatively few settings” which, other than First Amendment cases, include the right to travel, abortion, and legislation enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 2 | 2009–2013 |
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 , 108 S.Ct. 636 , 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); see also Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 2013Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 , 108 S.Ct. 636 , 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); see also Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
green
2 sentences2013Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (acknowledging that, in determining standing under the overbreadth doctrine, a “crucial issue[ ]” is whether a plaintiff “satisfies the requirement of ‘injury-in-fact,’ ”); Prime Media, Inc., 485 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he injury in fact requirement still applies to over-breadth claims under the First Amendment.”); CAMP Legal Def. 2013Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (acknowledging that, in determining standing under the overbreadth doctrine, a “crucial issue[ ]” is whether a plaintiff “satisfies the requirement of ‘injury-in-fact,’ ”); Prime Media, Inc., 485 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he injury in fact requirement still applies to over-breadth claims under the First Amendment.”); CAMP Legal Def. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Padou v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2013Finally, we note that the doctrine of overbreadth, an exception to the prudential standing rule referenced in Padou I, 998 A.2d at 293 , does not relieve the Padous of their burden of meeting constitutional standing requirements and thus does not assist the Padous in establishing standing to challenge § 108 more broadly. 2013The only component of standing the overbreadth doctrine relieves a plaintiff of showing is that his own conduct — the conduct that is limited by the statute or regulation — is protected under the First Amendment: “Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Padou I, 998 A.2d at 293 n. 6 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010However, the Court has declared that “an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.’ ” Board of Airport Comm’rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 2568 , 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731-32 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 2010However, the Court has declared that “an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.’ ” Board of Airport Comm’rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 2568 , 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731-32 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Virginia v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2009Even assuming that the overbreadth doctrine were applicable to the challenge to the constitutionality of this jurisdiction’s UF and CPWL statutes, we are confident that Mr. Plummer would not be able to sustain his burden on this record since “the overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, from the text of [the law] and from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (citing N.Y. 2009Even assuming that the overbreadth doctrine were applicable to the challenge to the constitutionality of this jurisdiction’s UF and CPWL statutes, we are confident that Mr. Plummer would not be able to sustain his burden on this record since “the overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, from the text of [the law] and from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 , 123 S.Ct. 2191 , 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (citing N.Y. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2009State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 , 108 S.Ct. 2225 , 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 , 108 S.Ct. 2225 , 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
City of Chicago v. Morales
green
2 sentences2005“First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 2005“First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
green
2 sentences1987Because the trafficking statute does not implicate first amendment concerns, however, see City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), German does not have standing to assert the rights and interests of third parties who might be unconstitutionally affected by the statute. 1987Because the trafficking statute does not implicate first amendment concerns, however, see City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), German does not have standing to assert the rights and interests of third parties who might be unconstitutionally affected by the statute. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (footnote omitted). 1983If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1982Second, just as this court concluded in Edwards, supra at 1342-43 , that there could be no doubt about the meaning of "safety of the community," here we conclude that there can be no doubt about the meaning of the phrase "pose a danger to. . . the community." *1317 We also reject the overbreadth challenge. 1982Second, just as this court concluded in Edwards, supra at 1342-43 , that there could be no doubt about the meaning of “safety of the community,” here we conclude that there can be no doubt about the meaning of the phrase “pose a danger to ... the community.” We also reject the overbreadth challenge. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.