Phillips v. Ferguson (1999)

See Phillips, 182 F.3d at 772 (“The federal courts on habeas review cannot strike down as unconstitutional a state postconviction procedural rule.”); see also Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1339 .

This exception is “a markedly narrow one, implicated only ‘in extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

We have further explained that this exception is reserved for cases “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999)).

Although Mr. Antwine argues that the district court imposed a higher standard than necessary upon his claim, the district court did not — its statement that he must affirmatively demonstrate his innocence is consistent with Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999), and is consistent with the demanding nature of an actual innocence claim.

See Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Steele’s claim challenging the Oklahoma post-conviction procedures on their face and as applied to him would fail to state a federal constitutional claim cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.”); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1219 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that a procedural error in carrying out state post-conviction procedures would “not rise to the level of a federal constitutional claim recognizable …

However, none of this evidence “affirmatively demonstrates his innocence,” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion because “the files and records of the case conclusively show” that Kalu is not entitled to relief. § 2255(b); see also United States v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183 , 1187 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) (denial of evidentiary hearing reviewed for abuse of discretion); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1211 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics are insufficient to require a court to grant an evide…

However, “[c]onclusory allegations unsupported by specifics are insufficient to require a court to grant an evidentiary hearing, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1211 (10th Cir.1989) (quotation and ellipses omitted), overruled on other grounds as stated in Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 772-73 (10th Cir.1999).

The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default is “a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’ ” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999)).

Miscarriage of Justice The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default is “a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999)).

In any event, a fundamental miscarriage of justice can be established only “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 775 (10th Cir.1999).

Moreover, a petitioner “asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-537 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (quotations omitted); Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999) (quotations omitted).

Such new evidence must “affirmatively demonstrate[ ] his innocence,” not simply “undermine the finding of guilt against him.” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir.1999) (state law evidentiary errors not reviewable); 3 Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 772-73 (10th Cir.1999) (state post-conviction procedural rules not reviewable); 4 Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir.1990) *22 (state sentencing law not renewable).

This exception, however, is a markedly narrow one, implicated only in “extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

Va. Aug. 28, 2023) (citing Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

Further, this evidence must "affirmatively demonstrate[ the petitioner's] innocence," not just "undermine the finding of guilt against him." Green v. Kansas, 190 F. App'x 682, 685 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation modified)).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

The miscarriage of justice exception that permits review of procedurally defaulted claims “is a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

See Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999) (“To prevail, [the petitioner] must identify evidence that affirmatively demonstrates his innocence.

See Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999) (“To prevail, [the petitioner] must identify evidence that affirmatively demonstrates his innocence.

The miscarriage of justice exception “is a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007 (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

The miscarriage-of-justice exception, “however, is a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is “a markedly narrow one, implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

Defendant’s new evidence does not affirmatively demonstrate his innocence or do “more than simply undermine the finding of guilt.” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

See Klobuchir v. Commonwealth, 639 F.2d 966 , 974 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981) (“To constitute an adequate and independent state ground, the [state court’s] interpretation of the rules of practice . . . had to be constitutionally sound and have a fair and substantial basis in state law.”); Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the state asserts its post- conviction procedural rules as an independent and adequate state procedural bar, the federal courts are r…

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

The new evidence must be evaluated with any other admissible evidence of guilt, Wilson, 155 F.3d at 404-05 , and it must do more than undermine the finding of guilt; it must affirmatively demonstrate innocence, Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 773-74 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

But that exception is “implicated only in ‘extraordinary case[s] where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999)).

An inmate “must identify evidence that affirmatively demonstrates his innocence.” Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999).

Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir.1999).

See Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1999) (“To prevail, [Applicant] must identify evidence that affirmatively demonstrates his innocence.”) (citations omitted).

Id. at 1248-49 (citing Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 415 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that even if a delay in state post-conviction relief constituted a due process violation, a delay in a collateral proceeding could not be the basis of a § 2254 habeas petition); Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Delay in processing [a state] collateral claim does not make the continued imprisonment of the defendant unlawful, and hence, does not warrant federal habeas corp…

But it is also true that “[c]onclusory allegations unsupported by specifics are insufficient to require a court to grant an evidentiary hearing, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible . . . .” Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1211 (10th Cir. 1989) (overruled on other grounds as stated in Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 772-73 (10th Cir. 1999)).

Courts have broad discretion on matters of continuances. 90 An order denying a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.91 A trial judge’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion 90 Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 775 (10th Cir. 1999). 91 Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190 , 1193 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002) (order denying motion to continue trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion). -24- only if the denial was arbitrary or unreasona…

Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103 (d) 1 ; Phillips v. Ferguson, 182 F.3d 769, 771 (10th Cir.1999).