Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (1998)

Pawlosky, 525 A.2d at 1209 , quoting Creighan, 155 A.2d at 847 (further quotations omitted) (emphasis added by Pawlosky) 9 Accord Metropolitan Edison, 718 A.2d at 763 (same).

Where, as here, the evidence demonstrates that the offensive behavior complained of is an isolated incident, we must conclude that an abnormal working condition has not been established. [1] I dissented from Zink because our Supreme Court established in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Werner), 553 Pa. 177, 186 , 718 A.2d 759, 764 (1998) that normal working conditions, such as requiring an employee to work a [rotating] eight-hour shift, [does] …

Appeal Bd. (Werner), 553 Pa. 177, 184-87 , 718 A.2d 759, 763-64 (1998), the Court stated: The claimant's exposure to chemical fumes in the workplace clearly met the approved definition of injury. ....

Edison Co. v. W.C.A.B., 718 A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. 1998) (holding that “shift work maladaptation syndrome” does not constitute an “injury” under the Workers’ Compensation Act). 46 Id.

See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. WCAB (Werner), 553 Pa. 177 , 718 A.2d 759, 764 (1998) (a compensable injury under the Act requires proof of, inter alia, violence to the physical structure of the body or disease or infection, injuries sustained due to exposure to hazardous or toxic conditions of the workplace, or psychic injury); Richards v. Unemp.