United States v. Robert Jackson, William Scott and Martin Allen (1977)

See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir.1976); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir.1990).

United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 , 102 S.Ct. 94 , 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988-89 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 , 101 S.Ct. 922 , 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 , 102 S.Ct. 94 , 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988-89 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 , 101 S.Ct. 922 , 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

But while it is true that a substantial step towards a completed Hobbs 8 Act robbery need not itself involve the "use . . . of physical force" within the meaning 9 of § 924(c)(3)(A), see, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir.) ("Jackson") 10 ("reconnoiter[ing] the place contemplated for the commission of the crime and 11 possess[ing] the paraphernalia to be employed in the commission of the crime" 12 constituted substantial steps towards a bank robbery i…

The following circuits have not required actual intimidation to prove attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a): United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir.2005) ("Actual intimidation is not required to prove attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)."); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding § 2113(a) “does not require the actual use of force, violence or intimidation”); United States v.…

No. 07-2839 11 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, however, have concluded that an attempt to use force and violence or intimidate is sufficient under the statute, United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying the logic of United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976), which addressed the “substantial step” element of attempt crime, to the first paragraph of § 2113(a)); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th C…

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, however, have concluded that an attempt to use force and violence or intimidate is sufficient under the statute, United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116-17 (2d Cir.1977) (applying the logic of United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir.1976), which addressed the “substantial step” element of attempt crime, to the first paragraph of § 2113(a)); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149,152 (4th Cir.1984) (followin…

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d Cir.) (discussing 18 U.S.C. §§ 32 (a)(1), *250 (2), and (7) (2000) (which prohibited destruction of and attempts to destroy aircraft)) (other internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 , 124 S.Ct. 353 , 157 L.Ed.2d 241 (2003); see, e.g., United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 , 102 S.Ct. 94 , 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988-89 (2d Cir.1…

See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990).

See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990).

See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir.1976); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1984); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir.1990).

Information Provided by Informants Often the information needed to supply probable cause is not gathered independently by police officers but instead is provided by professional criminal informants, Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 163 , witnesses to a particular event, id., or participants in the crime at issue, United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.1977).

In United States v. Jackson, “relying on United States v. Baker, 129 F.Supp. 684 (S.D.Cal.1955), [the defendant-appellant] contended] that since [Section 2113(a) ] only mentions attempted taking and not attempted force, violence, or intimidation, it clearly contemplates that actual use of force, violence, or intimidation must *456 precede an attempted taking in order to make out the offense of attempted bank robbery.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977)…

Cal. 1955), [the defendant-appellant] 8 contend[ed] that since [Section 2113(a)] only mentions attempted taking and not attempted force, violence, or intimidation, it clearly contemplates that actual use of force, violence, or intimidation must precede an attempted taking in order to make out the offense of attempted bank robbery.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977).5 The court rejected this contention based upon an earlier Second Circuit panel opinio…

A defendant may be convicted of attempt even where significant steps necessary to carry out the substantive crime are not completed, so that "dangerous persons [may be apprehended] at an earlier stage ... without immunizing them from attempt liability." United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir.1977). 284 In reviewing whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Yousef's convictions on the attempt crimes charged in Counts Thirteen and Fourteen, we view t…

A defendant may be convicted of attempt even where significant steps necessary to carry out the substantive crime are not completed, so that “dangerous persons [may be apprehended] at an earlier stage ... without immunizing them from attempt liability.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir.1977).

“Most recently revised codes and proposals adopt a renunciation defense substantially similar to the Model Code’s.” Id. cmt. 8, at 360 & n. 279 (collecting statutes). 3 This Court has never directly addressed whether such a defense is included within the concept of .“attempt” incorporated by Congress without definition into many criminal statutes, though it has frequently cited the Model Penal Code’s analysis as persuasive in other respects, including in adopting the substan…

This is substantially the approach undertaken in the Model Penal Code, and represents a standard “more inclusive than *116 one requiring the last proximate act before attempt liability would attach, but less inclusive than one which would make every act done with the intent to commit a crime criminal.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir.1977).

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

See also: United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 , 95 S.Ct. 792 , 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir.1967); United States v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 257, n. 9 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1037 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom.

The government relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116-17 (2d Cir.1977).

The 1951 requirement of an “act or acts done with the specific intent to commit the particular offense which, except for the interference of some cause preventing the carrying out of the intent, apparently would result in the actual commission of the offense” appears to impose a stricter requirement than that stated immediately thereafter — namely, that “there must be a specific intent to commit the particular offense accompanied by an overt act which directly tends to accom…

It is also clear that Appellant only stopped engaging with Anna because he found her “to[o] sketchy,” which we, like the military judge, interpret in context to mean he was guided by a fear of 69 Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F. 2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)). 70 Id. (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)). 71 Id. at 409. 72 Id. at 407. 73 Id. at 407-08 (quoting United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2008)). 74 United …

We know, for instance, that “reconnoiter[ing]” or casing a potential robbery target or possessing robbery paraphernalia qualify.See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977)(reconnoitering and paraphernalia).

He never discussed “where they would meet, how they would find each other, 99 Id. at 407 (quoting United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2011)). 100 Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)). 101 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1231 (9th Cir. 2007)). 102 Id. (citing United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 150 (2d.

The Model Penal Code’s substantial step provision did not require ‘‘a ‘last proximate act’ or one of its various analogues’’ in order to ‘‘permit the apprehension of dangerous per- sons at an earlier stage than . . . other approaches without immunizing them from attempt liability.’’ United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Model Penal Code § 5.01, comment, pp. 47–48 [Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960]), cert. denied sub nom.

IV, para. 4.c.(2), the act must be “strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A 1987) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)).

IV, para. 4.c.(2), the act must be “strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A. 1987) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)).

However, “ ‘[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intqnt.’ ” United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A.1987) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977)).

“There is, in particular, ‘no need to show past reliability when the informant ... is in fact a participant in the very crime at issue.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.1977)) (alteration in Gagnon); see also United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1978) (because “informant [was] an admitted participant in the very crime at issue, the Government was not required to show past reliability[; h]is participation as an accomplice satisfie…

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1977).

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1977).

In determining whether the accused was guilty of an attempt, the Court in Byrd applied the following standard: “ '[A] defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime’ and that ‘[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.’ ” 24 M.J. at 290 (citing United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54…

In determining whether the accused was guilty of an attempt, the Court in Byrd applied the following standard: “’[A] defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a 15 United States v. Joseph P. Redlinski, No. 1116 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2001) substantial step toward commission of the crime’ and that ‘[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.’” 24 M.J. at 290 (citing United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2…

One line of authority suggests that a “ ‘defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime’ and that ‘[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.’ ” United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A.1987) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977)); see also United Stat…

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

An attempt to commit a crime requires conduct on the part of the individual “which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A.1987) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977)).

In United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A.1987), the United States Court of Military Appeals relied upon a test adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: [T]o be guilty of an attempt, a ‘defendant must have engaged in conduct which con: stitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime’ and that ‘[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.’ United States v. Jackso…

By way of clarification, we stated in Byrd : [T]o be guilty of an attempt, a “defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime” and ... “[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal’ intent.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); see also United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 37…

United States v. Byrd, 24 M.J. 286, 290 (C.M.A. 1987), citing United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); see also United States v. Presto, 24 M.J. 350 (C.M.A.1987).

In Byrd , this Court found some help in this regard in the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: [T]o be guilty of an attempt, a “defendant must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime” and that “[a] substantial step must be conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 941 [ 98 S.Ct. 434 , …

United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 .

The crux of his position is that because of the role played by the government agents, Wilson’s conduct neither amounted to a “substantial step” towards the commission of the substantive offense, see United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 , 101 S.Ct. 922 , 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); United States v. Stallworth,…

See United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F.Supp. at 637 ; see also United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d 1147 , 1150-51 n.10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 , 99 S.Ct. 154 , 58 L.Ed.2d 153 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977) (independent corroboration of innocent facts can predicate a finding of probable cause for the warr…

See Fambo v. Smith, 433 F.Supp. 590, 599 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Heng Awkawk Homan, 356 F.Supp. 434, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 , 94 S.Ct. 1565 , 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974); cf. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977). 13 .

The government contends that in the Second Circuit the corroboration necessary to establish the reliability of an informant’s information may relate to only innocent details, citing United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); United States v. Gonzalez, 555 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 , 96 S.Ct. 1122 , 47 L.Ed.2…

See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir.1977).

See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118, 120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977).

See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 , 98 S.Ct. 434 , 54 L.Ed.2d 301 (1977); see also Model Penal Code Commentary at 324-25 (under Model Penal Code approach need not show defendant would probably not have desisted prior to completing crime).