Glover v. Callahan (1937)

Wigmore, supra § 1136, at 307, 307-310 n.l), but in the Commonwealth and a few other jurisdictions the rule is settled that “the whole of the statement ..., including the details, is admissible.” Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937); see Commonwealth v. Hanger, supra; Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra; State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207-208 (1968); State v. Crissman, 60 Ohio Op. 2d 279, 281 (County Ct. App. 1971); Dunn v. State, 45 Ohio St. 249 , 251 (1887) . 4 A fresh co…

Compare, under prior law, e.g., Commonwealth v. Izzo, 359 Mass. 39, 44 (1971) (Commonwealth has "duty" to demonstrate victim made "fresh [i.e., prompt] complaint"); Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57 (1937) (unlike "the ordinary case," "where a female witness testifies as to a rape or similar assault upon her the mere absence of evidence of an earlier complaint discredits her.

L. c. 265, § 23) makes the child “incapable, as matter of law, of giving any effective consent.” Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 583 (1977), quoting from Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937).

However, this treatise cites Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937), in support of this statement, in which the victim’s testimony was corroborated by testimony of the victim’s mother and a police officer.

“When a [victim of a sexual assault] testifies in such a case ‘the mere absence of evidence of an earlier complaint discredits her’ so that earlier statements of the witness may be admitted for the purpose of corroboration.” Commonwealth v. Hanger, 357 Mass. 464, 466 (1970), quoting from Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57 (1937).

Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 56 (1937): two hours.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. LeFave, 407 Mass. 927, 941 (1990); Glover v. Cal lahan, 299 Mass. 55, 56-58 (1937).

The Commonwealth argues, in its brief, that the question was proper because “evidence of the reason for a delayed report of a rape and the circumstances of the report have long been held admissible,” and cites Commonwealth v. Rollo, 203 Mass. 354, 355 (1909); Commonwealth v. Colangelo, 256 Mass. 165, 166 (1926); Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 (1937), as support for its argument.

While there is support for the proposition that once a statement is allowed in evidence as a fresh complaint, “the whole of the statement ... is admissible,” Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937), a better approach in the circumstances might be to excise, on appropriate motion, such portions as go beyond simply corroborating the victim’s testimony.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 942, 943 (1981), where the Appeals Court held that complaints made four to eight months after various assaults were reasonably prompt in the circumstances. 10 As this court stated in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388, 392 (1976): “A fresh complaint doctrine is justified on the ground that a victim’s failure to make prompt complaint might be viewed by the jury as inconsistent with the charge of sexual assault (see Commo…

See Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937) (“Where, as in this Commonwealth, evidence as to such complaints is admitted for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the complainant, the whole of the statement made by her, including the details, is admissible”).

See Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 582-583 (1977); Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58-59 (1937).

“Fresh complaint” testimony has not been confined to cases of forcible rape, where its rationale is most evident, see Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388, 392-394 (1976), but has been received in other cases of sexual assaults, Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 56 (1937), including those where consent is immaterial, as in Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 177 (1898) (statutory rape), and Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 629 (1946) (statutory rape).

Thus, “the ground of admission is held to be the corroboration of the testimony of the complainant as a witness.” Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57 (1937). 6 Counsel for the defendants repeatedly asserted during trial that the proffered evidence did not fall within the rape-shield statute.

In this Commonwealth “the rule is settled that ‘the whole of the statement . . ., including the details, is admissible.’” Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388, 392 (1976), quoting Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58 (1937).

The Legislature as a matter of public policy, for the protection of female children under the age of sixteen, has fixed an age below which a female child is to be held legally incapable of consenting to assaults of this character.” Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58-59 (1937).

The critical question whether she had made any complaint to her “aunt” or her mother (see Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57 [1937]; Commonwealth v. Izzo, 359 Mass. at 44 ) was first broached in the evidence during the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim; on no less than four separate occasions (either in reply to questions by counsel 2 or by means of unresponsive answers not objected to) the victim gave affirmative testimony to the effect that she had complained o…

Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 58, 59 .

In this Commonwealth the ground of admission is held to be the corroboration of the testimony of the complainant as a witness. . . . [[The] whole of the statement made by her, including the details, is admissible.” Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57, 58 .

See Commonwealth v. Izzo , 359 Mass. 39 , 44, 267 N.E.2d 631 (1971), quoting Glover v. Callahan , 299 Mass. 55 , 57, 12 N.E.2d 194 (1937) (Commonwealth has "duty" to demonstrate victim expeditiously reported sexual assault because "where a female witness testifies as to a rape or similar assault upon her the mere absence of evidence of an earlier complaint discredits her.

See generally Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 (1937); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388, 391-397 (1976).

See Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 (1937).

See Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 (1937).