Flint v. Phipps (1888)

A deed may be delivered by doing something and saying nothing, or by saying something and doing nothing, or it may be by both. ’ ’ In Flint v. Phipps, 16 Or. 437, 447 ( 19 Pac. 543, 549 ), the court says: “Before proceeding further with an examination of the evidence on the question of delivery, it may be proper to advert to the legal presumption which arises in all cases where a deed properly executed and acknowledged is found in the possession of the grantee.

In this connection it is pertinent to direct attention to Flint v. Phipps, 16 Or. 437, 449 ( 19 Pac. 543, 550 ), where prior to the adoption of the negotiable instruments law this court said: “His [Owens] debt would be a sufficient consideration to sustain the note, so that if Phipps either executed the note to secure the debt of Owens, or the liability of himself and Owens on the bond, the note would have a sufficient consideration to support it.” It is true that most of th…

In Flint v. Phipps, 16 Or. 437, 439 ( 19 Pac. 543 ), Mr. Justice Stbahan in speak ing of a deed remarks: ‘ ‘ The question of delivery is purely a question of fact.” In State v. Leonard, 73 Or. 451, 483 ( 144 Pac. 113, 681 ), Mr. Justice Ramsey in referring to this subject observes: “The question of delivery is always a question of fact for the jury where there is any conflict in the evidence in relation thereto.” A text-writer, discussing this matter, says: “Some courts have…