scope of employment rule in Indiana

2019Stropes [ ex rel.Taylor v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc. , 547 N.E.2d 244 , 252 (Ind. 1989), reh'g denied ]; see Dickson v. Waldron , 135 Ind. 507 , 516-20, 34 N.E. 506 , 509-10 (1893) [, reh'g denied ].

2019Stropes [ ex rel.Taylor v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc. , 547 N.E.2d 244 , 252 (Ind. 1989), reh'g denied ]; see Dickson v. Waldron , 135 Ind. 507 , 516-20, 34 N.E. 506 , 509-10 (1893) [, reh'g denied ].

2020“Whether an act falls within the scope of employment is generally a question of fact.” Cox v. Evansville Police Dep’t, 107 N.E.3d 453, 460 (Ind. 2018). [13] SoderVick argues that Christian’s conduct falls under the first prong of the scope of employment analysis—whether the misconduct was “incidental to” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2671 | May 15, 2020 Page 8 of 23 authorized conduct—because the acts of accessing and texting SoderVick’s personal health information was incidental to conduct Parkview had authorized Christian to do as part of her employment.

2019Sometime in February 2013 while Johnson was performing his duties at the Prosecutor's Office, Johnson spoke to Tammi Phillips, the Chief Deputy Prosecutor, and told her about [Kailee] striking and killing [the dog]. ( Id. at 23.) [29] In Cox v. Evansville Police Department , 107 N.E.3d 453 (Ind. 2018), our Indiana Supreme Court outlined the framework of the scope-of-employment rule: The scope-of-employment rule emanates from the concept of control.

2020Id. at 701- 02 (internal quotations omitted). [22] We do not disagree that subjective intent and a focus on the specific act of misconduct, rather than the whole employment context, are relevant considerations in the second prong of the scope of employment framework, which considers whether the injurious act “further[ed] the employer’s business.” Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d at 283 ; see also, e.g., Doe, 846 N.E.2d at 702 (finding that teacher who engaged in a romantic relationship with a student, including sending sexually charged emails from a school computer to Court of Appeals of Indiana |

2018But as an exception to the scope-of-employment rule-which is the "general rule" of vicarious liability, Barnett , 889 N.E.2d at 283 -the common-carrier theory is narrower.

2019Stropes [ ex rel.Taylor v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc. , 547 N.E.2d 244 , 252 (Ind. 1989), reh'g denied ]; see Dickson v. Waldron , 135 Ind. 507 , 516-20, 34 N.E. 506 , 509-10 (1893) [, reh'g denied ].

2018Stropes , 547 N.E.2d at 252 ; see Dickson v. Waldron , 135 Ind. 507 , 516-20, 34 N.E. 506 , 509-10 (1893).

2020Id. at 701- 02 (internal quotations omitted). [22] We do not disagree that subjective intent and a focus on the specific act of misconduct, rather than the whole employment context, are relevant considerations in the second prong of the scope of employment framework, which considers whether the injurious act “further[ed] the employer’s business.” Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d at 283 ; see also, e.g., Doe, 846 N.E.2d at 702 (finding that teacher who engaged in a romantic relationship with a student, including sending sexually charged emails from a school computer to Court of Appeals of Indiana |

2020Id. at 701- 02 (internal quotations omitted). [22] We do not disagree that subjective intent and a focus on the specific act of misconduct, rather than the whole employment context, are relevant considerations in the second prong of the scope of employment framework, which considers whether the injurious act “further[ed] the employer’s business.” Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d at 283 ; see also, e.g., Doe, 846 N.E.2d at 702 (finding that teacher who engaged in a romantic relationship with a student, including sending sexually charged emails from a school computer to Court of Appeals of Indiana |

2020SoderVick frames the relevant analysis as one in which “the focus must be on context—not on the specific act of texting,” whereas the analysis provided by Parkview disregards the larger employment context and focuses only on “the specific act of sending a text message to [Christian’s] husband.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8. [14] In Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, the following jury instruction was held to be a correct statement of law as to what factors may be considered in determining whether a wrongful act was “incidental to” the employee’s job duties: 1. whether the wrongful act was of the same gener

1999I would therefore hold that the trial court was correct in denying the City's motion for judgment on the evidence and allowing the case to proceed to the jury for the determination of whether Stanford's misconduct arose within the scope of his employment. [4] NOTES [1] We recently re-affirmed the recognition of a cause of action for negligent hiring and retention in Grzan v. Charter Hosp., 702 N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). [2] In light of our disposition of the issues set forth above, we need not address the Moores' claim on cross-appeal with respect to the damage award. [3] Although not