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5 Kansas opinions name it 1 courts 1915–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moodygreen2 sentences1994See State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699 , 576 P.2d 637 , cert. denied 439 U.S. 894 (1978). 1994See State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699 , 576 P.2d 637 , cert. denied 439 U.S. 894 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Moody v. Kansasgreen2 sentences1994See State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699 , 576 P.2d 637 , cert. denied 439 U.S. 894 (1978). 1981See State v. Moody, 223 Kan. 699 , 576 P.2d 637 , cert. denied 439 U.S. 894 (1978). (2) In Kansas, as noted above, we have traditionally excluded hearsay statements of coparticipants in a crime as a violation of an accused’s right of confrontation; (3) The factual circumstances presented in this case do not furnish the necessary trustworthiness or indicia of reliability; (a) The declarant, Lorin Axvig, was admittedly a coparticipant in the crime. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Myers
green
1 sentence1994In fact, the testimony of an accomplice against an accused is considered so unreliable as to require a precautionary instruction where there is a lack of evidence which corroborates the testimony of the accomplice. 229 Kan. at 174-75 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Olmstead v. United States
red
2 sentences1983In his famous dissent to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 , 72 L.Ed. 944 , 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), Justice Brandéis explained the reasons for such precautions: “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. 1983In his famous dissent to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 , 72 L.Ed. 944 , 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), Justice Brandéis explained the reasons for such precautions: “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Peasley
neutral
2 sentences1971The law of this state with respect to the testimony of accomplices and the treatment thereof on appellate review was fully set out by Justice Parker speaking for the court in State v. Peasley, 179 Kan. 314 , 295 P. 2d 627 : “. . . 1971The law of this state with respect to the testimony of accomplices and the treatment thereof on appellate review was fully set out by Justice Parker speaking for the court in State v. Peasley, 179 Kan. 314 , 295 P. 2d 627 : “. . . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Martin v. Shumway
neutral
2 sentences1915“He (the father) told •me . . . that he never had a deed to it; in other words, that he had had it deeded to the boy from the owner in order to make him even with the others, so he would be even with the balance on account of that crippled hand.” Some of this testimony related to conversations with the father after the transaction, but even so it was clearly admissible under Martin v. Shumway, supra. ' Keeping in mind that we have no statutory presumption of advancements in this state, and that at most it is only a precautionary presumption imposed by the wisdom of the courts, and merely a reb 1915“He (the father) told •me . . . that he never had a deed to it; in other words, that he had had it deeded to the boy from the owner in order to make him even with the others, so he would be even with the balance on account of that crippled hand.” Some of this testimony related to conversations with the father after the transaction, but even so it was clearly admissible under Martin v. Shumway, supra. ' Keeping in mind that we have no statutory presumption of advancements in this state, and that at most it is only a precautionary presumption imposed by the wisdom of the courts, and merely a reb | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.