res judicata not only prevents doctrine (Kansas) · Go Syfert
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res judicata not only prevents doctrine in Kansas

5 Kansas opinions name it 1 courts 1940–1969 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

CaseCitedYears
Stimec v. Verderber neutral
kan · 1940
2 sentences

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

31947–1969
Wharton v. Zenger neutral
kan · 1947
2 sentences

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

21954–1969
Kearny County Bank v. Nunn green
kan · 1943
2 sentences

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

21947–1954
Adamson v. Hill green
kan · 1969
2 sentences

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

1969(Boyles v. Emery, supra; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 .) In Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745 , 186 P. 2d 287 , the rule was stated in this manner: “. . . [T]he doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (citing cases).” (p. 750) In Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482 , 449 P. 2d 536 , it was said: “The rule that a plea of res judicata may be asserted only by a person who was a party or in privity

11969–1969
Kenoyer v. Board of Barber Examiners green
kan · 1954
2 sentences

1955(Kenoyer v. Board of Barber Examiners, 176 Kan. 424 , 271 P. 2d 267 , and cases therein cited.) We have held that all matters which properly may be presented and considered in a divorce action must be presented, and if not presented the judgment is as full and complete a bar as if the matter had been fully tried and determined.

1955(Kenoyer v. Board of Barber Examiners, 176 Kan. 424 , 271 P. 2d 267 , and cases therein cited.) We have held that all matters which properly may be presented and considered in a divorce action must be presented, and if not presented the judgment is as full and complete a bar as if the matter had been fully tried and determined.

11955–1955
Levi v. Levi neutral
kan · 1939
2 sentences

1954(Levi v. Levi, 149 Kan. 234 , 86 P. 2d 473 ; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 565 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745, 750 , 186 P. 2d 287 ; Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 704 , 204 P. 2d 742 .) Whether the Harvey county district court was correct in entering judgment against the plaintiff, is immaterial at this stage of the proceeding.

1954(Levi v. Levi, 149 Kan. 234 , 86 P. 2d 473 ; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 565 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745, 750 , 186 P. 2d 287 ; Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 704 , 204 P. 2d 742 .) Whether the Harvey county district court was correct in entering judgment against the plaintiff, is immaterial at this stage of the proceeding.

11954–1954
Feldman v. Feldman green
kan · 1949
2 sentences

1954(Levi v. Levi, 149 Kan. 234 , 86 P. 2d 473 ; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 565 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745, 750 , 186 P. 2d 287 ; Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 704 , 204 P. 2d 742 .) Whether the Harvey county district court was correct in entering judgment against the plaintiff, is immaterial at this stage of the proceeding.

1954(Levi v. Levi, 149 Kan. 234 , 86 P. 2d 473 ; Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 565 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Wharton v. Zenger, 163 Kan. 745, 750 , 186 P. 2d 287 ; Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 704 , 204 P. 2d 742 .) Whether the Harvey county district court was correct in entering judgment against the plaintiff, is immaterial at this stage of the proceeding.

11954–1954
Boyles v. Emery neutral
kan · 1944
2 sentences

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

11947–1947
Bourke v. Bourke green
kan · 1945
2 sentences

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

1947Likewise in its elaboration of the same principle it has repeatedly held that with all' parties in a court having jurisdiction of the issues involved in an action the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of identical facts and questions a second time but bars the litigation of all matters in a subsequent action which might and should have been determined in the first one (Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582 , 106 P. 2d 708 ; Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563 , 134 P. 2d 635 ; Boyles v. Emery 159 Kan. 300 , 153 P. 2d 936 ; In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 559 ,

11947–1947
Farrar v. Perkins neutral
kan · 1928
2 sentences

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

11940–1940
McMichael v. Burnett neutral
kan · 1933
2 sentences

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

11940–1940
Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson yellow
kan · 1934
2 sentences

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

11940–1940
Clark v. Layman green
kan · 1936
2 sentences

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

11940–1940
Lins v. Eads neutral
kan · 1937
2 sentences

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

1940(Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 74 , 266 Pac. 751 ; McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654 , 17 P. 2d 932 ; Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711 , 62 P. 2d 897 ; Lins v. Eads, 145 Kan. 493 , 66 P. 2d 390 ; Kaw Valley State Bank v. Thompson, 140 Kan. 726 , 37 P. 2d 985 .) Certainly, the plaintiffs could have included anything in the petition in case No. 54,133A in reference to the equitable mortgage that they have set out in the petition in this case.

11940–1940
Shelley v. Sentinel Life Insurance neutral
kan · 1937
2 sentences

1940Co., 146 Kan. 227 , 69 P. 2d 737 .) Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of the same matters a second time but equally applies to bar the litigation of all matters in a second suit which could have been litigated under the facts constituting the cause of action in the first suit.

1940Co., 146 Kan. 227 , 69 P. 2d 737 .) Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata not only prevents the relitigation of the same matters a second time but equally applies to bar the litigation of all matters in a second suit which could have been litigated under the facts constituting the cause of action in the first suit.

11940–1940

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