balance claim in Kentucky

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2015McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 , 14 S.Ct. 913 , 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894) (explaining that while “in most1 of the states of the Union a defendant convicted of a criminal charge other than murder has the right ... to give bail pending ... appeal,” that fact does not make that right “a necessary element of due process of law.”); Medina v. California, supra; Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (observing that “ ‘the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — [does not] mean that

2009Unless the balance of these factors strongly favors the alternative forum, “the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Id. 330 U.S. at 508 , 67 S.Ct. at 843 .

2009Unless the balance of these factors strongly favors the alternative forum, “the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Id. 330 U.S. at 508 , 67 S.Ct. at 843 .

1935In Wells v. Thomas, 210 Ky. 785 , 276 S. W. 840 , it is said: “When there is a controversy and a settlement is made by which the debtor pays something he does not admit he owes, the agreement to accept the sum paid in full of the whole account is based upon a valid consideration. > But where the debtor only pays what it is admitted he owes, there is no consideration for the agreement to release the balance of the claim.” *446 In the recent case of People’s State Bank v. McDermott, 251 Ky. 140 , 64 S. W. (2d) 484, 485 , it appears that a compromise settlement was asserted as a defense in an act

1935In Wells v. Thomas, 210 Ky. 785 , 276 S. W. 840 , it is said: “When there is a controversy and a settlement is made by which the debtor pays something he does not admit he owes, the agreement to accept the sum paid in full of the whole account is based upon a valid consideration. > But where the debtor only pays what it is admitted he owes, there is no consideration for the agreement to release the balance of the claim.” *446 In the recent case of People’s State Bank v. McDermott, 251 Ky. 140 , 64 S. W. (2d) 484, 485 , it appears that a compromise settlement was asserted as a defense in an act

1935That rule is also bottomed upon the principle that there is no consideration for such an agreement.” See, also, Fenwick v. Phillips, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 87, 88; Cox v. Adelsdorf, 51 S. W. 616 , 21 Ky. Law Rep. 421 ; and for an extensive citation and discussion of cases-bearing on the different phases of the law of compromise and settlement, see Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173 , 27 S. W. (2d) 695 .

1935That rule is also bottomed upon the principle that there is no consideration for such an agreement.” See, also, Fenwick v. Phillips, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 87, 88; Cox v. Adelsdorf, 51 S. W. 616 , 21 Ky. Law Rep. 421 ; and for an extensive citation and discussion of cases-bearing on the different phases of the law of compromise and settlement, see Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173 , 27 S. W. (2d) 695 .

1935In Wells v. Thomas, 210 Ky. 785 , 276 S. W. 840 , it is said: “When there is a controversy and a settlement is made by which the debtor pays something he does not admit he owes, the agreement to accept the sum paid in full of the whole account is based upon a valid consideration. > But where the debtor only pays what it is admitted he owes, there is no consideration for the agreement to release the balance of the claim.” *446 In the recent case of People’s State Bank v. McDermott, 251 Ky. 140 , 64 S. W. (2d) 484, 485 , it appears that a compromise settlement was asserted as a defense in an act

1935In Wells v. Thomas, 210 Ky. 785 , 276 S. W. 840 , it is said: “When there is a controversy and a settlement is made by which the debtor pays something he does not admit he owes, the agreement to accept the sum paid in full of the whole account is based upon a valid consideration. > But where the debtor only pays what it is admitted he owes, there is no consideration for the agreement to release the balance of the claim.” *446 In the recent case of People’s State Bank v. McDermott, 251 Ky. 140 , 64 S. W. (2d) 484, 485 , it appears that a compromise settlement was asserted as a defense in an act

1900The contention of the appellee is based on the principles announced in Graves v. Bank, 10 Bush, 23 .