13 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1887–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Holleygreen1 sentence2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Cee Dee, LLCgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holleygreen2 sentences2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. PRECISION MECHANICAL SERVICES, INC.green1 sentence2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Seekinsgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Carr v. CONNEX CREDIT UNIONgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Seekins, 123 Conn. App. 220, 226 , 1 A.3d 1089 (‘‘[t]his court repeatedly has refused to apply the consciousness of innocence principle to jury instruc- tions regarding a consciousness of guilt’’), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010); see also State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 365 , 877 A.2d 872 (‘‘[e]ven in cases in which a defendant has explained his flight, an instruction that flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt need not be accom- panied by a discussion by the court of the benign explanations for flight offered by the defendant’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 9 | 1 | 1 |
Levine v. Marchgreen1 sentence2008Ultimately, the test is whether any adverse inference sought is reasonable, reliable, relevant to the dispute, and fairly *740 advanced against a party.”); Levine v. March, Court of Appeals, Docket No. M2006-00297-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 728, *39 (November 27, 2007) (“[t]he prevailing authority today is that the admissibility of a non-party’s invocation of the [fjifth [a]mendment privilege against self-incrimination should be analyzed using the balance test in Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Herbert W. Rounseville and Robert Rounseville v. Samuel Zahl, Treva M. Way, and Geoffrey P. Seratagreen1 sentence1997Ed. 2d 721 [1986]). ‘Factors to be considered by the court include (1) the length of time the matter has been pending before the federal court; (2) the proximity of the trial date; and (3) the predominance of issues of federal, as opposed to local concern.’ Drexel Burnham Lambert, supra, [240]. ‘In the usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.’ Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127-128 (2d Cir. 1992).” Reynolds v. Mercy Hospital, 861 F | 1 | 1 |
Linda Morse v. University of Vermontgreen1 sentence1997Ed. 2d 721 [1986]). ‘Factors to be considered by the court include (1) the length of time the matter has been pending before the federal court; (2) the proximity of the trial date; and (3) the predominance of issues of federal, as opposed to local concern.’ Drexel Burnham Lambert, supra, [240]. ‘In the usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.’ Morse v. University of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 127-128 (2d Cir. 1992).” Reynolds v. Mercy Hospital, 861 F | 1 | 1 |
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuitgreen1 sentence1997Co. v. Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1490 (2d Cir. 1993); West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 , 104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ ‘if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well,’ ” quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. 726 ). | 1 | 1 |
Breneman v. Brenemangreen2 sentences1985By the inclusion of the word “may” in that section, the legislature clearly intended that the inconvenient forum issue in UCCJA cases remain discretionary; see Breneman v. Breneman, 92 Mich. App. 336, 342 , 284 N.W.2d 804 (1979); as is the common law forum non conveniens principle. 1985By the inclusion of the word “may” in that section, the legislature clearly intended that the inconvenient forum issue in UCCJA cases remain discretionary; see Breneman v. Breneman, 92 Mich. App. 336, 342 , 284 N.W.2d 804 (1979); as is the common law forum non conveniens principle. | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. County of Cochisegreen2 sentences1980See Riley v. County of Cochise, 10 Ariz. App. 55, 58-59 , 455 P.2d 1005 (1969). 1980See Riley v. County of Cochise, 10 Ariz. App. 55, 58-59 , 455 P.2d 1005 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Brown
green
2 sentences1996Brown v. Brown, Id., 109 . 1992Brown v. Brown, 195 Conn. 98 , 109 . | 2 | 1992–1996 |
Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health
green
1 sentence2019Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla- tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Additionally, in order to overcome the presumption that no private right of action is implied in the statutory enactment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that no factor weighs against affording an implied right of action and [that] the balance of factors weighs in [the plaintiffs’] favor. . . . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rollins v. People's Bank Corp.
green
1 sentence2018Additionally, in order to overcome the presumption that no private right of action is implied in the statutory enactment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that "no factor weighs against affording an implied right of action and [that] the balance of factors weighs in [the plaintiffs'] favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Burns-Toole v. Byrne
green
1 sentence2000There are, however, unusual cases in which the balance of factors to be considered under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine will point to federal decision of the state law claims on the merits, such as when — the statute of limitations has run on the supplemental claim, precluding the filing of the separate suit in the state court. . . ." Pp. 142-143 cf. Burns — Toole v. Byrne , 11 F.3d 1270 , 1276 (CA 5, 1994); CT Page 6739 Wright v. Assoc. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Town Of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue
green
1 sentence1997Co. v. Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1490 (2d Cir. 1993); West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 , 104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ ‘if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well,’ ” quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. 726 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Commission
green
1 sentence1993In fact, this very procedure was approved by our Supreme Court in Bombero v. Planning and Zoning Commission 218 Conn. 737 , 745 (1991) wherein the court stated: "Where, as here, the plaintiffs combined constitutional and unconstitutional attacks on the regulation, it serves judicial economy to require that the non constitutional claims of invalidity be presented to the court in the same action as the constitutional claims. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Arseniadis v. Arseniadis
green
2 sentences1988The balance of the clause shall remain in full force and effect.” At the hearing on the modification, the parties agreed orally and the court ordered that the plaintiff’s obligation to pay tuition, room and board costs “is limited . . . [to] a four year B.A. degree, so he is responsible for four scholastic years.” The plaintiff first argues that the court’s order that the plaintiff be responsible for additional college expenses of his daughter due to her potential late enrollment is invalid because the court “had no authority to order post age eighteen support without the agreement of the part 1988The balance of the clause shall remain in full force and effect.” At the hearing on the modification, the parties agreed orally and the court ordered that the plaintiff’s obligation to pay tuition, room and board costs “is limited . . . [to] a four year B.A. degree, so he is responsible for four scholastic years.” The plaintiff first argues that the court’s order that the plaintiff be responsible for additional college expenses of his daughter due to her potential late enrollment is invalid because the court “had no authority to order post age eighteen support without the agreement of the part | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mayer v. Mayer
green
2 sentences1985In passing, we also note that the “home state factor” relied upon by the plaintiff “was never intended to tip the balance of factors toward a new forum.” Mayer v. Mayer, 91 Wis. 2d 342, 356 , 283 N.W.2d 591 (1979). 18 Declining jurisdiction under § 46b-97 is discretionary with the court. 1985In passing, we also note that the “home state factor” relied upon by the plaintiff “was never intended to tip the balance of factors toward a new forum.” Mayer v. Mayer, 91 Wis. 2d 342, 356 , 283 N.W.2d 591 (1979). 18 Declining jurisdiction under § 46b-97 is discretionary with the court. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Avery v. Brown
green
1 sentence1887In Avery v. Brown, 31 Conn., 398 , the court makes a clear distinction between independent debts and debts growing out of the same transaction. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.