19 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Michael Alexandergreen2 sentences2015The Phelps court also held that a “change of heart” may warrant the withdrawal of a guilty plea when the balance of the factors weighs in the defendant‟s favor: Significantly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the purpose of the “any fair and just reason” standard “is to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone.” United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 2013The Phelps court also held that a “change of heart” may warrant the withdrawal of a guilty plea when the balance of the factors weigh in the defendant’s favor: Significantly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the purpose of the “any fair and just reason” standard “is to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone.” United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). | 4 | 5 |
Henning v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Thus, where the balance of the factors weighs in the defendant’s favor, the trial court should permit a defendant to withdraw a plea “even if the defendant’s reasons could be characterized as a ‘change of heart.’” Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 448 . “[T]he trial judge should always exercise his discretion with caution in refusing to set aside a plea of guilty, to the end that one accused of crime may have a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 443 (quoting Henning v. State, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1947)). 2024Thus, where the balance of the factors weighs in the defendant’s favor, the trial court should permit a defendant to withdraw a plea “even if the defendant's reasons could be characterized as a ‘change of heart.’” Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 448 . “[T]he trial judge should always exercise his discretion with caution in refusing to set aside a plea of guilty, to the end that one accused of crime may have a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 443 (quoting Henning v. State, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1947)). | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Michael Carrgreen2 sentences2016However, the court cautioned “that a defendant should not be allowed to pervert this process into a tactical tool for purposes of delay or other improper purpose.” Id. (citing United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir.1984))). 2015See Alexander, 948 F.2d at 1004 (quoting United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1984)). | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Bernard H. Ellis, Jr.green2 sentences2015See also Ellis, 470 F.3d at 281 (“Withdrawal of a plea is appropriate where there is a real confusion or misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement.”). 2013See also Ellis, 470 F.3d at 281 (“Withdrawal of a plea is appropriate where there is a real confusion or misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement.”). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Haygoodgreen1 sentence2021Id. (quoting United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). “[W]here a trial court applies the correct nonexclusive multi-factor analysis and determines that the balance of factors weighs in the defendant’s favor, the trial court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea, even if the defendant’s reasons could be characterized as a ‘change of heart.’” Id. at 448. | 1 | 1 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Its Corporate Capacity v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Marylandgreen1 sentence2007FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 978 (5th Cir.1995); Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman’s Fund Am. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Phelps
green
2 sentences2025Thus, where the balance of the factors weighs in the defendant’s favor, the trial court should permit a defendant to withdraw a plea “even if the defendant’s reasons could be characterized as a ‘change of heart.’” Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 448 . “[T]he trial judge should always exercise his discretion with caution in refusing to set aside a plea of guilty, to the end that one accused of crime may have a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 443 (quoting Henning v. State, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1947)). 2025Thus, where the balance of the factors weighs in the defendant’s favor, the trial court should permit a defendant to withdraw a plea “even if the defendant’s reasons could be characterized as a ‘change of heart.’” Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 448 . “[T]he trial judge should always exercise his discretion with caution in refusing to set aside a plea of guilty, to the end that one accused of crime may have a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 443 (quoting Henning v. State, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1947)). | 11 | 2013–2025 |
VanArsdall v. State
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
cluster 424875
green
1 sentence2007The prevailing authority today is that the admissibility of a non-party’s invocation of its Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be analyzed using the balance test in Fed.R.Evid. 403 and its state counterparts, Brink’s, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 , 710 (2d Cir.1983), and that questions regarding admissibility should be decided on a case-by-case basis. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lytle v. Clopton
green
2 sentences1969There was no notation on the checks that they were in full settlement of the balance of the claim. * * * # * # ^ # # “[4] As is pointed out in Lytle v. Clopton, supra [ 149 Tenn. 655 , 261 S.W. [664], 666] an accord is an agreement whereby one of the parties undertakes to give or perform and the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim in dispute, arising either from contract or *411 from tort, something other than or different from what he considers himself entitled to, and a satisfaction is the execution of such agreement. 1969There was no notation on the checks that they were in full settlement of the balance of the claim. * * * # * # ^ # # “[4] As is pointed out in Lytle v. Clopton, supra [ 149 Tenn. 655 , 261 S.W. [664], 666] an accord is an agreement whereby one of the parties undertakes to give or perform and the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim in dispute, arising either from contract or *411 from tort, something other than or different from what he considers himself entitled to, and a satisfaction is the execution of such agreement. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.