8 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabarigreen1 sentence2012See Interstellar Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 946 (finding no likelihood of confusion where the defendant “could not financially capitalize on [a] misdirected consumer even if it so desired”). 20 Under the circumstances of this case, such potential uncertainty would be a result of “sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.” Toyota Motor Sales, supra. Where the balance of factors otherwise so strongly favors Long Bow, we decline to hold that such uncertainty creates a material factual dispute on the likelihood of actionable initial interest confusion. 21 d. | 1 | 1 |
Interstellar Starship Services, Limited v. Epix, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2012See Interstellar Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 946 (finding no likelihood of confusion where the defendant “could not financially capitalize on [a] misdirected consumer even if it so desired”). 20 Under the circumstances of this case, such potential uncertainty would be a result of “sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.” Toyota Motor Sales, supra. Where the balance of factors otherwise so strongly favors Long Bow, we decline to hold that such uncertainty creates a material factual dispute on the likelihood of actionable initial interest confusion. 21 d. | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. NetCentric Corp.green1 sentence2011“Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and, where viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 468 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Louis Wernergreen1 sentence2001Thus the clause is applied, but with the observation that “we are inclined to think” the joinder could qualify under the “common scheme or plan” of the balance of the rule, see United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926-928 (2d Cir. 1980). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Irwin Halpergreen1 sentence2001For an example of limits, self-imposed by the courts, on the application of the clause, see United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 430-432 (2d Cir. 1978). | 1 | 1 |
Anny Newman v. Diana Burgingreen1 sentence1996(Emphasis supplied.) Not only is the usual rule not inflexible, cf. Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir. 1991) (weighing whether there was an abuse of discretion in dismissal of pendent State claims against a professor even after all Federal claims were dismissed against the university and its officials), it is probably inapplicable here. | 1 | 1 |
Moss v. Goldsteingreen1 sentence1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 1 | 1 |
MacDonald v. Kavanaughgreen1 sentence1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1962Since the condition was one which Glass had no right to impose, and for that reason was void, the defendant was not put to an election to refuse the check or to take it on the condition on which it was offered, but could take it free of the void condition which Glass sought to impose.” Both of the above cited cases are based on the law as set forth in Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 at 208 , a well reasoned case. 1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 3 | 1931–1962 |
Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Ass'n
green
2 sentences1962In the case of Schumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, at 205 , the court says: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” Further, in the case of Russell v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 276 Mass. 458 at 462 , it is said: “As the amount covered by the payment was admittedly due from Glass to the defendant he could not make acceptance of this payment by the defendant conditional upon the defendant’s applying the c 1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 2 | 1938–1962 |
Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Inc.
green
2 sentences1962In the case of Schumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, at 205 , the court says: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” Further, in the case of Russell v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 276 Mass. 458 at 462 , it is said: “As the amount covered by the payment was admittedly due from Glass to the defendant he could not make acceptance of this payment by the defendant conditional upon the defendant’s applying the c 1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 2 | 1938–1962 |
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
red
1 sentence1996The general, but not mandatory, rule is that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 , 350 n.7 (1988). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co.
green
1 sentence1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Commonwealth v. Soaris
green
1 sentence1938Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Commumty Association, 275 Mass. 291 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Dedham Lumber Co. v. Hartung
green
2 sentences1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber 1938The rule was stated in more detail in Dedham Lumber Co. v. Hartung, supra, where the court, said at page 491: “. : . when a check is sent to be accepted on condition, as by the writing here, one who accepts and uses it is bound by the condition ‘where a check is sent in full discharge of a claim no part of which is admitted to be due’; but it is not so ‘where a debtor undertakes to make payment of what he admits to be due conditioned on its being accepted in discharge of what is in dispute.’ Such a condition is void and the creditor ‘can take the payment admittedly due free of the void conditi | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Rosenblatt v. Holstein Rubber Co.
green
1 sentence1938In Shumaker v. Lucerne-in-Maine Community Association, 275 Mass. 201, 250 , the court said: “The acceptance of a check for an undisputed part of a disputed claim does not operate as a release of the balance of the claim, even though the check purports to be in settlement of the whole amount due.” See also Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204 ; Moss v. Goldstein, 254 Mass. 334, 336, 337 ; McDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 444, 445 ; Puritan Wool Co. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 263 Mass. 467, 471 ; Russell v. Bond & Goodwin Co., 276 Mass. 458, 462 ; Dedham Lumber | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.