criminal case reveals error in Texas

1992Harm Analysis We must determine if the prosecutor's indirect comment was harmful to appellant under the federal constitutional standard of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 (1967), or the Texas harmless error rule as propounded by Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides, "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or the punishment." The harm an

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1990I Unlike the rule governing reversal of judgment in a civil cause, Rule 81(b)(2) provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court SHALL reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. " [1] To the fullest extent of legislatively granted authority, this Court created the rule in interest of consistency and our formulation of the "unless" clause is taken practically verbatim from language in Fahy v. Connect

1988The majority opinion correctly points out that the test that is to be used for the kind of charge error that occurred in this cause is not the “egregious harmless error” test set out in Almanza, supra, but, instead, is the test set out in Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, namely: “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment." (My emphasis.) Given t

1988The majority opinion correctly points out that the test that is to be used for the kind of error that occurred in this cause is not the “egregious harmless error” test set out in Almanza, supra, but, instead, is the test that is set out in Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, namely: “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” (My emphasis.) And th

2015Rule 81(b) stated, ―If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.‖ Id. at 740 .

2011Rule 81(b)(2) stated, “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” Id. at 740 .

2010The appeals court then applied former rule of appellate procedure 81(b)(2), which provided: “If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” Id.

2010The appeals court concluded that the error was harmful “because we cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the punishment.” Id.

1997Matchett, supra. Rule 81(b)(2) provides that “if the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” [emphasis added] In the instant case, the record reveals that the trial court committed error by failing to admonish appellant regarding deportation of a non-citizen.

1996Because prosecutors have a duty to reveal the perjured testimony of members of the "prosecution team," whether or not the prosecutor has knowledge of such perjury, this claim effectively merges into the perjured testimony claim and is properly analyzed under the standards pertaining to the latter. [4] Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) states: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or pu

1996Because prosecutors have a duty to reveal the perjured testimony of members of the "prosecution team," whether or not the prosecutor has knowledge of such perjury, this claim effectively merges into the perjured testimony claim and is properly analyzed under the standards pertaining to the latter. [4] Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) states: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or pu

1995Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. [13] Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2) provides: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. [14] Rule 801(e)(2)(B) provides: A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth. [15] Rule 702

1995Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. [13] Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2) provides: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. [14] Rule 801(e)(2)(B) provides: A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth. [15] Rule 702

1995Payne , however, did not hold or suggest that the Eighth Amendment grants a defendant the right to present evidence of the victim's bad character. [1] Although appellant's discussion on the admissibility of victim impact evidence and "reciprocal victim impact evidence" is based upon Payne, supra, appellant does not cite that case. [2] The majority holds only that "a reasonable juror could not conclude that the victim's prior bad act ... tended to lessen the defendant's moral blameworthiness for the murder of that victim when the defendant was unaware of the victim's bad act," ante, 912 S.W.2d

1994We note that we resolved this exact issue in our opinion on appellant's first petition to this Court, Young v. State, 830 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), and that the appropriate time to take exception to our ruling has passed.

1993Ex Parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Cr.App.1987); Ex Parte Twyman, 716 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). [2] The statement of facts from appellant's trial was not, however, made a part of the appellate record. [3] Of course, because we lack the statement of facts from appellant's trial, see n. 2, ante, we cannot tell even from his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law precisely what the habeas court thus finds constituted perjury. [4] In his second ground for review appellant argued that a violation of due process does not depend upon a finding that the prosecutor knowingly used perju

1993Ex Parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Cr.App.1987); Ex Parte Twyman, 716 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). [2] The statement of facts from appellant's trial was not, however, made a part of the appellate record. [3] Of course, because we lack the statement of facts from appellant's trial, see n. 2, ante, we cannot tell even from his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law precisely what the habeas court thus finds constituted perjury. [4] In his second ground for review appellant argued that a violation of due process does not depend upon a finding that the prosecutor knowingly used perju

1993As previously noted, "[i]t does not matter whether the prosecutor actually knows that the evidence is false; it is enough that he or she should have recognized the misleading nature of the evidence." Duggan, 778 S.W.2d 465, 468 . [11] Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) states: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. [1] Because applicant was granted probation, his co

1990Id.

1990Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2), which sets out the harmless error rule applicable to the instant case, states: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgement under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. [emphasis added] This standard for review is remarkably similar to standard, established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1974), applied t

1990Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2), which sets out the harmless error rule applicable to the instant case, states: If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgement under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. [emphasis added] This standard for review is remarkably similar to standard, established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1974), applied t

1990We are aware of the analysis of Rule 81(b)(2) in Belyeu v. State, No. 69-654, Tex.Cr.App., September 27, 1989 791 S.W.2d 66 and Harris v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1989, 790 S.W.2d 568 and have kept those guidelines in mind in consideration of the question presented.

1989The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals approved a procedure similar to the one employed by this Court in abating to permit the trial court to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating: Whether the trial court files findings insufficient in detail to allow an appellate court to resolve the dispute upon which an appealing party predicates his appeal, as in Hester v. State, supra [ 535 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)], and Quinn v. State, 558 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), or no findings are made to support the ruling of the trial court on the voluntariness issue, as in Figueroa v.