state procedural rule in Texas

2013Gallegos v. State, 340 S.W.3d 797 , 801 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Honeycutt v. State, 82 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d); see also DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.”).

2009“In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Honeycutt v. State, 82 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted). “[W]here a defendant is charged in the same indictment with two counts, and assuming one count is a lesser-included offense of the other, the error is apparent on the face of the record.” Id.

2015"In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial." Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n.l (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. refd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex. Crim.

2014“In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (collecting cases dating back t

2015See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 , 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111-12 , 39 L.

2015See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 , 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111-12 , 39 L.

2017See DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.”).

2015"In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial." Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n.l (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. refd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex. Crim.

2015See also, lbarra v. Scephens 723 F3d 599 (5th cir.2013). n l III.’ SUBSTANTIAL CLAIM OF lNEFFECTIVE-AS$ISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL EXTANT IN THIS CASE A substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel exists in this casey due to the facts that trial counsel did not adequately investigate this case, giving erroneous advice refusing to use the defendant's only viable defense and neglecting to object to inadmissible hearsay statements that were placed in front of the jury for the improper use of Substantive evidence to ob- ' tain a conviction. lf the defendant's trial attorney/counsel w

2015See also Ibarra, 723 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2013).

2014Expressing no opinion on these issues, we hold only that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize that Griffith v. Kentucky calls for retroactive application of McLaughlin’s 48-hour rule.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) (addressing whether state-law procedural bar was an adequate and independent ground to bar review of a Batson claim that was retroactive under Griffith and holding that the state procedural rule was not adequate because it had not been firmly established and regularly followed at the time of

2014Expressing no opinion on these issues, we hold only that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize that Griffith v. Kentucky calls for retroactive application of McLaughlin’s 48-hour rule.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) (addressing whether state-law procedural bar was an adequate and independent ground to bar review of a Batson claim that was retroactive under Griffith and holding that the state procedural rule was not adequate because it had not been firmly established and regularly followed at the time of

2014“In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (collecting cases dating back t

1999Id. at 876 ; see also State v. Torres , 805 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim.

2012See post, at 845 n. 9 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (holding that a state procedural rule excluding evidence regarding a confession’s voluntariness violated the defendant’s meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (holding that this principle was not violated when breath-test evidence was not preserved by the Slate)). .

2012See post, at 845 n. 9 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (holding that a state procedural rule excluding evidence regarding a confession’s voluntariness violated the defendant’s meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (holding that this principle was not violated when breath-test evidence was not preserved by the Slate)). .

2012See post, at 845 n. 9 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (holding that a state procedural rule excluding evidence regarding a confession’s voluntariness violated the defendant’s meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (holding that this principle was not violated when breath-test evidence was not preserved by the Slate)). .

2012See post, at 845 n. 9 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (holding that a state procedural rule excluding evidence regarding a confession’s voluntariness violated the defendant’s meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (holding that this principle was not violated when breath-test evidence was not preserved by the Slate)). .

2015"In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial." Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n.l (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. refd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex. Crim.

2014“In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (collecting cases dating back t

2014Expressing no opinion on these issues, we hold only that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize that Griffith v. Kentucky calls for retroactive application of [County of Riverside, Byrd v.] McLaughlin’s [500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661 , 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991)] 48-hour rule.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (addressing whether state-law procedural bar was an adequate and independent ground to bar review of a Batson claim that was retroactive under Griffith and holding that the s

2014Expressing no opinion on these issues, we hold only that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize that Griffith v. Kentucky calls for retroactive application of [County of Riverside, Byrd v.] McLaughlin’s [500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661 , 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991)] 48-hour rule.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (addressing whether state-law procedural bar was an adequate and independent ground to bar review of a Batson claim that was retroactive under Griffith and holding that the s

2015See id., at 478-479 (enforcing a choice-of-law provision that incorporated a state procedural rule concerning arbitration proceedings); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 67 , 131 L.

2015See id., at 478-479 (enforcing a choice-of-law provision that incorporated a state procedural rule concerning arbitration proceedings); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 67 , 131 L.

2018See Brown, 338 U.S. at 298–99; Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 281 (Tex. 1978) (op. on reh’g); Oney, 380 S.W.3d at 800 .

2018See Brown, 338 U.S. at 298–99; Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 281 (Tex. 1978) (op. on reh’g); Oney, 380 S.W.3d at 800 .

2014“In cases where the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served in enforcing the state procedural rule [regarding waiver of double jeopardy claims not raised at trial,] and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd)); see State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Shaffer v. State, 477 S.W.2d 873, 875-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (collecting cases dating back t

2014See [5] Dean Witter argues that, in any event, i.e., even id., at 478-479 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 (enforcing a choice-of-law without an antiarbitration presumption, we should interpret provision that incorporated a state procedural rule concerning the contracts between the parties here as calling for judicial arbitration proceedings); see also **594 Mastrobuono v. determination of the time limit matter.

2014See [5] Dean Witter argues that, in any event, i.e., even id., at 478-479 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 (enforcing a choice-of-law without an antiarbitration presumption, we should interpret provision that incorporated a state procedural rule concerning the contracts between the parties here as calling for judicial arbitration proceedings); see also **594 Mastrobuono v. determination of the time limit matter.

2013Under AEDPA, a state prisoner's habeas claims could not be entertained by a federal court when (1) "a state court [has] declined to address [those] claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement," and (2) "the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Walker v. Martin , 562 U.S. ___ , ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011).

2013See id. at 1316 (citing Coleman v. Thompson; 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). .

2013See id. at 1316 (citing Coleman v. Thompson; 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). .

2013See id. at 1316 (citing Coleman v. Thompson; 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). .

2013See id. at 1316 (citing Coleman v. Thompson; 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). .

2013See id. at 1316 (citing Coleman v. Thompson; 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). .

2011See Blockburger v. United States, 284 2 “In cases in which the trial court either knew or should have known of the jeopardy problem, no purpose is served by enforcing the state procedural rule and the defendant may assert this interest after trial.” Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532 , 533 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (quoting DeMoss v. State, 12 S.W.3d 553 , 559 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d)). -5- 04-09-00677-CR U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Watson v. State, 900 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex. Crim.