three-day hearing in Louisiana

2021App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 102 So.3d 186, 189 , writ denied, 12-2196 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , and writ denied, 12-2210 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , pointed out that, “[w]hile the appeal was pending in this Court, the trial court held a three-day hearing on the issue of reasonable attorneys’ fees due Staf-Rath as per the terms of the purchase agreement” and referenced that “[t]his Court granted a writ application in Staf- Rath’s favor, ruling that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the attorneys’ fees matter during the pendency of the appeal.” Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., No. 10

2021App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 102 So.3d 186, 189 , writ denied, 12-2196 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , and writ denied, 12-2210 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , pointed out that, “[w]hile the appeal was pending in this Court, the trial court held a three-day hearing on the issue of reasonable attorneys’ fees due Staf-Rath as per the terms of the purchase agreement” and referenced that “[t]his Court granted a writ application in Staf- Rath’s favor, ruling that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the attorneys’ fees matter during the pendency of the appeal.” Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., No. 10

2021App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 102 So.3d 186, 189 , writ denied, 12-2196 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , and writ denied, 12-2210 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62 , pointed out that, “[w]hile the appeal was pending in this Court, the trial court held a three-day hearing on the issue of reasonable attorneys’ fees due Staf-Rath as per the terms of the purchase agreement” and referenced that “[t]his Court granted a writ application in Staf- Rath’s favor, ruling that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the attorneys’ fees matter during the pendency of the appeal.” Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., No. 10

2010In Whitnell v. Silverman, 93-2468, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/4/94), 646 So.2d 989, 994 , reversed on other grounds, 95-0112 (La.12/6/95), 686 So.2d 23 , the trial court held a three-day hearing that presented extensive evidence on the issue of whether a medical malpractice insurance crisis existed when La.

2010In Whitnell v. Silverman, 93-2468, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/4/94), 646 So.2d 989, 994 , reversed on other grounds, 95-0112 (La.12/6/95), 686 So.2d 23 , the trial court held a three-day hearing that presented extensive evidence on the issue of whether a medical malpractice insurance crisis existed when La.

2006Thus, the court in Clement v. Graves, 04-1831, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/05), 924 So.2d 196 , in dismissing the suspensive appeal while maintaining the appeal as devolutive, offered the following reasoning: Additionally, the jurisprudence holds that an appellant's tardiness in furnishing security merely constitutes an irregularity or defect which, if imputable to the appellant, may form the basis for the appellee to move for the dismissal of the suspensive appeal under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2161.

1963In Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowman, 238 La. 399 , 115 So.2d 797 , the Court was influenced by the fact that the Federal Power Commission, after a three day hearing, had ordered a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the plaintiff in connection with the proposed pipe line.

1963In Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowman, 238 La. 399 , 115 So.2d 797 , the Court was influenced by the fact that the Federal Power Commission, after a three day hearing, had ordered a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the plaintiff in connection with the proposed pipe line.

1958While the three day rule here stated has been qualified (see State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552 , 76 So.2d 727 and State v. Butler, 227 La. 937 , 81 So.2d 1 ), the requirement that any such attack must be urged and disposed of before trial remains in full force.

1958While the three day rule here stated has been qualified (see State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552 , 76 So.2d 727 and State v. Butler, 227 La. 937 , 81 So.2d 1 ), the requirement that any such attack must be urged and disposed of before trial remains in full force.

1958While the three day rule here stated has been qualified (see State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552 , 76 So.2d 727 and State v. Butler, 227 La. 937 , 81 So.2d 1 ), the requirement that any such attack must be urged and disposed of before trial remains in full force.

1958While the three day rule here stated has been qualified (see State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552 , 76 So.2d 727 and State v. Butler, 227 La. 937 , 81 So.2d 1 ), the requirement that any such attack must be urged and disposed of before trial remains in full force.