6 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.green1 sentence2003RESPA (and TILA) require an ‘up front’ disclosure, at the application stage — not the closing stage — of the loan process.” (Anderson v Wells Fargo Home Mtge., 259 F Supp 2d 1143, 1147 [WD Wash].) This language suggests that the three-day requirement was intended to be consistent with the preconsummation standard in TILA. | 1 | 1 |
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Austingreen1 sentence1982As Professor Siegel points out, however, in his commentary to section 411 of the CCA, even a total failure to file will not constitute a jurisdictional defect, since the statute provides for nunc pro tune relief (cf. Sears Roebuck & Co. u Austin, 60 Misc 2d 908, 910 [Younger, J.] — “If the Marshal had accomplished all that was required except for the filing of proof of service, I would simply authorize filing nunc pro tune”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People ex rel. McLean v. Brunelle
neutral
2 sentences2001Williams v Walsh, 241 AD2d 979 , lv denied 90 NY2d 809 ). 1998Williams v Walsh ( 241 AD2d 979 [4th Dept 1997]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, excused a one-day delay in notice and held that the purpose of the three-day rule is to provide adequate notice of the preliminary hearing and that failure to comply with the rule does not directly affect the right to be restored to parole. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
People ex rel. Gonzales v. Dalsheim
green
2 sentences2001Gonzales v Dalsheim, 52 NY2d 9), concerning the time within which a parole revocation hearing must actually be held, failure to comply with the three-day rule of notice as to one’s rights with regard to an alleged parole violator’s hearing does not directly affect the right to be restored to parole, especially in the absence of a showing of prejudice (People ex rel. 1997Gonzalez v Dalsheim, 52 NY2d 9; People ex rel. | 2 | 1997–2001 |
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner
green
1 sentence2006He relied in part on a Texas case, Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v Havner ( 953 SW 2d 706 [Tex 1997]) which established the requirements of proof of general and specific causation and that epidemiological evidence demonstrating twice the likelihood of contracting the disease was essential to establish general causation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
White v. New York State Division of Parole
green
2 sentences1997Failure to comply with the three-day rule, however, does not directly affect the right to be restored to parole, unlike the failure to comply with Executive Law § 259-i (3) (c) (i) and (f) (i) (see, Matter of White v New York State Div. of Parole, 60 NY2d 920, 922 ; People ex rel. 1997Failure to comply with the three-day rule, however, does not directly affect the right to be restored to parole, unlike the failure to comply with Executive Law § 259-i (3) (c) (i) and (f) (i) (see, Matter of White v New York State Div. of Parole, 60 NY2d 920, 922 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.