Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Churgin v. Hobbiegreen2 sentences2001However, similar to Churain , it would be clear error, under these circumstances, to give “weight to the unexpressed intentions of Mitchell in the face of altogether contrary provisions in the written” Agreement Id. at 306 . 1996Because a financing contingency clause is for the buyer’s benefit and may be waived by him, Churgin v. Hobbie, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305 (1995); Bossi v. Whalen, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 967 (1985), a buyer may elect to obtain full financing in an amount and form different from that specified in the clause only if the buyer then in fact proceeds to complete his purchase obligations. | 1 | 2 |
DeFreitas v. Cotegreen1 sentence1996“It would be of no importance” to the seller “if the buyer was still able to tender the full purchase price.” DeFreitas v. Cote, 342 Mass. 474, 477 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
Bossi v. Whalengreen1 sentence1996Because a financing contingency clause is for the buyer’s benefit and may be waived by him, Churgin v. Hobbie, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305 (1995); Bossi v. Whalen, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 967 (1985), a buyer may elect to obtain full financing in an amount and form different from that specified in the clause only if the buyer then in fact proceeds to complete his purchase obligations. | 1 | 1 |
Gamache v. Mayor of North Adamsgreen1 sentence1990The crucial issue in this case is intent, whether viewed with respect to the scope of the extension agreement made by the parties or the question of waiver (an intentional act, see Gamache v. Mayor of North Adams, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 293 [1983]) by Estin of the financing contingency clause and its notice requirement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Andrew
green
1 sentence1991The financing contingency clause at issue in this case is the same as the clause reviewed in Lynch v. Andrew, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 623 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sechrest v. Safiol
green
1 sentence1985The trial court properly found that the defendant was not entitled to a return of the deposit under the financing contingency clause of the parties’ agreement, see Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568 (1981); Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399 (1957), and accordingly ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to retain the deposit in question. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Stabile v. McCarthy
green
1 sentence1985The trial court properly found that the defendant was not entitled to a return of the deposit under the financing contingency clause of the parties’ agreement, see Sechrest v. Safiol, 383 Mass. 568 (1981); Stabile v. McCarthy, 336 Mass. 399 (1957), and accordingly ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to retain the deposit in question. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.