Carlos error in California

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1985However, even if it was apparent to defendant that the wound might be fatal unless he helped Wanner obtain treatment, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's behavior suggests only the "implied malice" arising from "an abandoned and malignant heart." (§ 188.) (40) We have made clear that this form of "implied malice" — a base, antisocial indifference to the probability that one is causing death — does not satisfy the Carlos standard of intent to kill, which means the specific intent to take another's life. ( People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 148 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 43

1985However, even if it was apparent to defendant that the wound might be fatal unless he helped Wanner obtain treatment, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant's behavior suggests only the "implied malice" arising from "an abandoned and malignant heart." (§ 188.) (40) We have made clear that this form of "implied malice" — a base, antisocial indifference to the probability that one is causing death — does not satisfy the Carlos standard of intent to kill, which means the specific intent to take another's life. ( People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 148 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 43

1986See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 US 73, 95 , and n. 3 (1983) . . . .” (Cabana v. Bullock, supra, 474 U.S. at p. — [ 88 L.Ed.2d at p. 715 ].) Whether or not Cabana effectively repudiates the Cantrell-Thornton exception as applied to Carlos error is a question that is not properly before us.

1985The last two questions concerned the prospective jurors' understanding that this instruction would have to be followed. [5] Williams left "intact the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits. [Citations.] Under this standard, trial courts need not and should not permit the inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning that prompted the adoption of the Edwards [ People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752 ( 127 P. 58 )] rule.... [¶] ... [T]he court need allow only reasonable questions — although it cannot exclude questions proper in scope, it is free

2013“The determination of whether Carlos error is harmless ‘depends on application of the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [].’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘error in failing to instruct that a special circumstance contains a requirement of the intent to kill is harmless when “the evidence of defendant’s intent to kill . . . was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no reasonable doubt on that matter.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 310 (Haley).) The evidence of intent to kill in this case is overwhelming.

2004The determination of whether Carlos error is harmless "depends on application of the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ]." ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 681 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 ( Osband ).) In other words, "error in failing to instruct that a special circumstance contains a requirement of the intent to kill is harmless when `the evidence of defendant's intent to kill . . . was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no reasonable doubt on that matter.'" ( Ibid. ) Certainly, if

1985The last two questions concerned the prospective jurors' understanding that this instruction would have to be followed. [5] Williams left "intact the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits. [Citations.] Under this standard, trial courts need not and should not permit the inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning that prompted the adoption of the Edwards [ People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752 ( 127 P. 58 )] rule.... [¶] ... [T]he court need allow only reasonable questions — although it cannot exclude questions proper in scope, it is free

1985The last two questions concerned the prospective jurors' understanding that this instruction would have to be followed. [5] Williams left "intact the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits. [Citations.] Under this standard, trial courts need not and should not permit the inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning that prompted the adoption of the Edwards [ People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752 ( 127 P. 58 )] rule.... [¶] ... [T]he court need allow only reasonable questions — although it cannot exclude questions proper in scope, it is free

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1985This omission was error under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 , whose holding governs this case. ( People v. Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 547-549.) (6) Carlos error requires reversal of the special circumstance finding unless one of four narrow exceptions is present. ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 549-556.) Of these four, only the Cantrell-Thornton exception need be considered as the others are clearly inapplicable. [6] That exception calls *640 for affirmance in "cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command o

1985This omission was error under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 , whose holding governs this case. ( People v. Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 547-549.) (6) Carlos error requires reversal of the special circumstance finding unless one of four narrow exceptions is present. ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 549-556.) Of these four, only the Cantrell-Thornton exception need be considered as the others are clearly inapplicable. [6] That exception calls *640 for affirmance in "cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command o

1985This omission was error under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 , whose holding governs this case. ( People v. Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 547-549.) (6) Carlos error requires reversal of the special circumstance finding unless one of four narrow exceptions is present. ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 549-556.) Of these four, only the Cantrell-Thornton exception need be considered as the others are clearly inapplicable. [6] That exception calls *640 for affirmance in "cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command o

1985This omission was error under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 , whose holding governs this case. ( People v. Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 547-549.) (6) Carlos error requires reversal of the special circumstance finding unless one of four narrow exceptions is present. ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 549-556.) Of these four, only the Cantrell-Thornton exception need be considered as the others are clearly inapplicable. [6] That exception calls *640 for affirmance in "cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command o

1990(See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 779 [admission of nonstatutory aggravating evidence concerning nonviolent escape attempt, threats of violence, violation of parole, failure to cooperate with rehabilitation programs, and reputation for violence, discussed solely for guidance on retrial; reversal of special circumstances and penalty verdict predicated on Carlos error (Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 )]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 82-83 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ] [1977 death penalty law—erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s murderous plots

1990(See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 779 [admission of nonstatutory aggravating evidence concerning nonviolent escape attempt, threats of violence, violation of parole, failure to cooperate with rehabilitation programs, and reputation for violence, discussed solely for guidance on retrial; reversal of special circumstances and penalty verdict predicated on Carlos error (Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 )]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 82-83 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ] [1977 death penalty law—erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s murderous plots

2021(See Whitt, at pp. 636-639 [holding that People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , which overruled Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 , was “an intervening, controlling change in the law” and that the defendant could not rely on the overruled Carlos rule in his retrial].) Thus, even if the law of the case doctrine applied, so would the exception for an intervening, controlling change in the law.

1995We later overruled Carlos by holding that intent to kill must be charged and proved only where the defendant was an aider and abettor to the homicide and not the actual killer. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1147 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ].) We subsequently held, however, that for crimes committed during the period between Carlos and Anderson, the Carlos requirement of an intent to kill would govern. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [ 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) The killing in this case was during that period. 1.

1985(See People v. Anderson (1985) 38 Cal.3d 58, 62 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 694 P.2d 1149 ]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 148 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ].) We conclude that the issue whether defendant entertained a specific intent to kill in this case remains very much a question of fact. (5), (6) (See fn. 5.) It is not the function of this court to resolve such factual disputes; the question is for the jury under proper instructions. [5] Because the felony-murder special circumstance findings must be set aside for violation of the Carlos rule, the multiple-murder special circums

1985(See People v. Anderson (1985) 38 Cal.3d 58, 62 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 777 , 694 P.2d 1149 ]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 148 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ].) We conclude that the issue whether defendant entertained a specific intent to kill in this case remains very much a question of fact. (5), (6) (See fn. 5.) It is not the function of this court to resolve such factual disputes; the question is for the jury under proper instructions. [5] Because the felony-murder special circumstance findings must be set aside for violation of the Carlos rule, the multiple-murder special circums

2004(See, e.g., People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560-561 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 [single five-to-six-inch-deep stab wound to back of apparently sleeping and helpless victim]; Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 681-682, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 [severe beating and deep stab wound in *901 the neck of elderly victim that severed carotid artery]; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 630 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390 , 863 P.2d 635 [multiple blows to back and sides of head on helpless victim, fracturing the skull and lacerating the brain]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 46-47 ,

2004(See, e.g., People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560-561 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 [single five-to-six-inch-deep stab wound to back of apparently sleeping and helpless victim]; Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 681-682, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 [severe beating and deep stab wound in *901 the neck of elderly victim that severed carotid artery]; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 630 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390 , 863 P.2d 635 [multiple blows to back and sides of head on helpless victim, fracturing the skull and lacerating the brain]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 46-47 ,

1996(See, e.g„ People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 697-698 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 715 P.2d 665 ]; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 787-788 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 699 P.2d 1259 ]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 147-148 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ]; People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 735 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 ].) Here, the jury was instructed, in accordance with Carlos , that in order to sustain the robbery-murder special circumstance, it must find that defendant intended to kill.

1996(See, e.g„ People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 697-698 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 715 P.2d 665 ]; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 787-788 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 699 P.2d 1259 ]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 147-148 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ]; People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 735 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 ].) Here, the jury was instructed, in accordance with Carlos , that in order to sustain the robbery-murder special circumstance, it must find that defendant intended to kill.

1993(See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1100 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414-415 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 , 754 P.2d 184 ].) Odle concluded that a harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pages 710-711], is appropriate and constitutionally permissible in cases involving failure to instruct on an element of a special circumstance.

1993(See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1100 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414-415 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 137 , 754 P.2d 184 ].) Odle concluded that a harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pages 710-711], is appropriate and constitutionally permissible in cases involving failure to instruct on an element of a special circumstance.

1990(See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 779 [admission of nonstatutory aggravating evidence concerning nonviolent escape attempt, threats of violence, violation of parole, failure to cooperate with rehabilitation programs, and reputation for violence, discussed solely for guidance on retrial; reversal of special circumstances and penalty verdict predicated on Carlos error (Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131 )]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 82-83 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ] [1977 death penalty law—erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s murderous plots

1985(People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 ]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ]; People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 664 , 693 P.2d 243 ]; People v. Anderson (1985) 38 Cal.3d 58 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 694 P.2d 1149 ]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ]; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 699 P.2d 1259 ], See also Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 136, fn. 4, 150.) In each of these cases, either the defendant did not present a de

1985Because of the manner in which Leach defended the case — denial that he in any way aided in the commission of the murder — there was no way for the jury to find that he "aided" the commission of the murder only "accidentally" or "unintentionally." ( People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) We conclude, therefore, that on the record in this case the Sedeno exception operates to "cure" the Carlos error. [11] 2.

1985Because of the manner in which Leach defended the case — denial that he in any way aided in the commission of the murder — there was no way for the jury to find that he "aided" the commission of the murder only "accidentally" or "unintentionally." ( People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) We conclude, therefore, that on the record in this case the Sedeno exception operates to "cure" the Carlos error. [11] 2.

2013“The determination of whether Carlos error is harmless ‘depends on application of the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [].’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘error in failing to instruct that a special circumstance contains a requirement of the intent to kill is harmless when “the evidence of defendant’s intent to kill . . . was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no reasonable doubt on that matter.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 310 (Haley).) The evidence of intent to kill in this case is overwhelming.

2004In People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 636-637 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ], the Supreme Court held that a defendant who committed his crime pre-Carlos was not entitled to the benefit of Carlos on retrial, even though his initial conviction was vacated for Carlos error.

2004In People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 636-637 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ], the Supreme Court held that a defendant who committed his crime pre-Carlos was not entitled to the benefit of Carlos on retrial, even though his initial conviction was vacated for Carlos error.

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p

1998Under this fourth exception, Carlos error would not require reversal "where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and ... the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of consideration." ( Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 556 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 , fn. omitted.) Finding none of the foregoing exceptions to the reversal-per-se rule to be applicable under the facts of that case, Garcia reversed the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Id. at p