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5 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Feltch v. General Rental Co.green2 sentences2023See Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614 , quoting Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 186 (1980). 2000As to the standard for “good cause,” this court remarked in Bernard v. United Brands Co., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 415 , 418 n.8 (1989), that “we would not expect 14(b) to depart substantially from the rather exacting standard of [Mass.R.A.P.] 4(c).” We described the rule 4(c) standard, which is “excusable neglect,” as “look[ing] to ‘circumstances that are unique or extraordinary’; it is not meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy . . . ; [it] is meant to take care of emergency situations only.” Bernard, supra at 418 , quoting from Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 614 | 2 | 2 |
Bernard v. United Brands Co.green2 sentences2023Therefore, "we would not expect [rule 14 (b)] to depart substantially from the rather exacting standard of [rule 4 (c)]" because "the time to apply under [rule 14 (b)] can run for as much as a year." Bernard, supra. A lower threshold for good cause "would have the anomalous effect of making it more difficult to obtain an extension of thirty days than it would be to obtain an extension from thirty-one to 365 days." Trussell, supra at 455 . 18 "[G]arden-variety oversight" does not constitute excusable neglect and, therefore, does not establish good cause. 2010See Bernard v. United Brands Co., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 415 , 418 n.8 (1989) (“[W]e would not expect [rule] 14[b] to depart substantially from the rather exacting standard of [rule] 4[c]”). | 1 | 3 |
Lawrence Savings Bank v. Garabediangreen2 sentences2007Bank v. Garabedian, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 161 . 2007As to standards, we would not expect [rule] 14[b] to depart substantially from the rather exacting standard of [rule] 4[c]”); Lawrence Savings Bank v. Garabedian, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 161 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
Goldstein v. Barrongreen1 sentence2023See Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614 , quoting Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 186 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Trussell
green
1 sentence2023Therefore, "we would not expect [rule 14 (b)] to depart substantially from the rather exacting standard of [rule 4 (c)]" because "the time to apply under [rule 14 (b)] can run for as much as a year." Bernard, supra. A lower threshold for good cause "would have the anomalous effect of making it more difficult to obtain an extension of thirty days than it would be to obtain an extension from thirty-one to 365 days." Trussell, supra at 455 . 18 "[G]arden-variety oversight" does not constitute excusable neglect and, therefore, does not establish good cause. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.