arguments made defense in Maryland

2011See Degren, 352 Md. at 431-32 , 722 A.2d 887 (finding comments by the prosecution during closing argument, though “unprofessional and injudi *288 cious,” to be nonetheless acceptable when “made in response to the defense counsel’s comments during closing argument that the jury should not believe the State’s witnesses because they had various motives to he”); see also Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 394 , 663 A.2d 583 (1995) (stating that a State’s rebuttal closing argument is proper if it is “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel”).

2011See Degren, 352 Md. at 431-32 , 722 A.2d 887 (finding comments by the prosecution during closing argument, though “unprofessional and injudi *288 cious,” to be nonetheless acceptable when “made in response to the defense counsel’s comments during closing argument that the jury should not believe the State’s witnesses because they had various motives to he”); see also Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 394 , 663 A.2d 583 (1995) (stating that a State’s rebuttal closing argument is proper if it is “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel”).

2011See Degren, 352 Md. at 431-32 , 722 A.2d 887 (finding comments by the prosecution during closing argument, though “unprofessional and injudi *288 cious,” to be nonetheless acceptable when “made in response to the defense counsel’s comments during closing argument that the jury should not believe the State’s witnesses because they had various motives to he”); see also Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 394 , 663 A.2d 583 (1995) (stating that a State’s rebuttal closing argument is proper if it is “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel”).

2011See Degren, 352 Md. at 431-32 , 722 A.2d 887 (finding comments by the prosecution during closing argument, though “unprofessional and injudi *288 cious,” to be nonetheless acceptable when “made in response to the defense counsel’s comments during closing argument that the jury should not believe the State’s witnesses because they had various motives to he”); see also Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 394 , 663 A.2d 583 (1995) (stating that a State’s rebuttal closing argument is proper if it is “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel”).

1992The State looks to Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466 , 365 A.2d 545 (1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2183 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) to support its position that the prosecutor’s comments here were “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel.” In Blackwell we determined that the prosecutor, in rebuttal, was merely responding to the argument of defense counsel.

1992The State looks to Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466 , 365 A.2d 545 (1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2183 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) to support its position that the prosecutor’s comments here were “nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel.” In Blackwell we determined that the prosecutor, in rebuttal, was merely responding to the argument of defense counsel.

2008Although the prosecutor was entitled to respond to the argument posed by the defense, see Degren, 352 Md. at 432 n. 14, 433, 722 A.2d at 902 n. 14, 903 (concluding that comments by prosecutor during rebuttal, although "unprofessional and injudicious," *138 but not improper, were made in response to defense counsel's closing argument); Henry, 324 Md. at 232 , 596 A.2d at 1038 (determining that rebuttal argument was not improper, and that, when viewed in context, was merely a direct response to the argument of defense counsel); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 481 , 365 A.2d 545, 553-54 (1976),

2008Although the prosecutor was entitled to respond to the argument posed by the defense, see Degren, 352 Md. at 432 n. 14, 433, 722 A.2d at 902 n. 14, 903 (concluding that comments by prosecutor during rebuttal, although "unprofessional and injudicious," *138 but not improper, were made in response to defense counsel's closing argument); Henry, 324 Md. at 232 , 596 A.2d at 1038 (determining that rebuttal argument was not improper, and that, when viewed in context, was merely a direct response to the argument of defense counsel); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 481 , 365 A.2d 545, 553-54 (1976),

2008See Spain, 386 Md. at 157 n. 7, 872 A.2d at 32 n. 7 (stating that the "invited response doctrine" is only applicable when the response is made after an improper, direct and specific attack is made on a witness's veracity); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 519 , 601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1992) (determining that improper prosecutorial remarks, on rebuttal, were not justified as "nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel" because they were improper, while the defense counsel's argument was not).

2008See Spain, 386 Md. at 157 n. 7, 872 A.2d at 32 n. 7 (stating that the "invited response doctrine" is only applicable when the response is made after an improper, direct and specific attack is made on a witness's veracity); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 519 , 601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1992) (determining that improper prosecutorial remarks, on rebuttal, were not justified as "nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel" because they were improper, while the defense counsel's argument was not).

2008See Spain, 386 Md. at 157 n. 7, 872 A.2d at 32 n. 7 (stating that the "invited response doctrine" is only applicable when the response is made after an improper, direct and specific attack is made on a witness's veracity); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 519 , 601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1992) (determining that improper prosecutorial remarks, on rebuttal, were not justified as "nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel" because they were improper, while the defense counsel's argument was not).

2008See Spain, 386 Md. at 157 n. 7, 872 A.2d at 32 n. 7 (stating that the "invited response doctrine" is only applicable when the response is made after an improper, direct and specific attack is made on a witness's veracity); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 519 , 601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1992) (determining that improper prosecutorial remarks, on rebuttal, were not justified as "nothing more than a reasonable reply to the arguments made by defense counsel" because they were improper, while the defense counsel's argument was not).