commit reversible error in Maryland

2026Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the jury to hear Jefferson’s statements made to interrogators even though Jefferson’s waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary? 3.

2026Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the jury to hear Jefferson’s statements made to interrogators even though Jefferson’s waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary? 3.

2014Under this Court’s holding in Johnson v. State, 423 Md. 137 (2011), which presumes prejudice from juror misconduct and in such cases imposes on the trial judge a duty to sua sponte voir dire the jurors to ensure that they can still render a fair and impartial verdict, is juror misconduct limited to “improper communications with the parties, other jurors, or witnesses” and “conduct[ing] independent research (continued…) -9- Did the trial court commit reversible error when, after receiving a jury note stating that one juror indicated a willingness to change her vote from not guilty to guilty “be

2009We granted certiorari on our own initiative, In re Faith H., 408 Md. 148 , 968 A.2d 1064 (2009), prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, to review the following question: Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing the Department to present its case-in-chief through written reports without any in person testimony where the natural parent objected? *629 We conclude that the Department was not required to present its case-in-chief through “in person” testimony, and that the trial court did not err by allowing the Department to present its case-in-chief through writt

2009We granted certiorari on our own initiative, In re Faith H., 408 Md. 148 , 968 A.2d 1064 (2009), prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, to review the following question: Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing the Department to present its case-in-chief through written reports without any in person testimony where the natural parent objected? *629 We conclude that the Department was not required to present its case-in-chief through “in person” testimony, and that the trial court did not err by allowing the Department to present its case-in-chief through writt

1982Kirtz.” In this appeal the mother phrases the single issue: "Did the lower court commit reversible error in granting the demurrer because, under the particular facts and circumstances of this motor-tort case, the appellant-mother should be allowed to maintain a cause of action against her subsequently emancipated appellee-daughter?” It is conceded on behalf of the mother that in Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18 (1930), the Court of Appeals denied the right of a mother to sue her minor son for injuries arising out of an automobile accident, stressing "the importance of maintaining the family