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8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hampton v. State
green
1 sentence2015Lewis now appeals, making a number of challenges to the trial proceedings, which we re-order and consolidate as follows: (1) Was the evidence sufficient to prove Lewis engaged in criminal deviate conduct? (2) Was it fundamental error for the trial court to omit a “reasonable theory of innocence” jury instruction under Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480 (Ind.2012)? (3)Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting evidence of Lewis’s prior conduct after drinking alcohol as “habit” evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 406? (4) Was the trial court’s sentencing order adequate and correct a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1997We affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing in accordance with Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693 (Ind.1996). 1997We affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing, in accordance with Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693 (Ind.1996). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Pigg v. State
green
1 sentence1993In accordance with our supreme court's recent decision in Pigg v. State (1992), Ind. 603 N.E.2d 154 , we hold that it did, reverse Morrison's dealing and possession convictions, and remand for a new trial. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Fointno v. State
green
1 sentence1987(Emphasis supplied.) Fointno v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 140, 144 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hutchinson v. Trauerman
green
2 sentences1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . 1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Balz v. Benninghof
green
2 sentences1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . 1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell
green
2 sentences1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . 1987Hutchinson v. Trauerman (1887), 112 Ind. 21 , 13 N.E. 412 ; Beckman Supply Co. v. Newell (1918), 68 Ind.App. 679 , 118 N.E. 962 ; Balz v. Benninghof (1892), 5 Ind.App. 522 , 32 N.E. 595 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Robinson v. State
green
2 sentences1980Robinson v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 604 , 365 N.E.2d 1218 . 1980Robinson v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 604 , 365 N.E.2d 1218 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall
green
2 sentences1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . 1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis
green
2 sentences1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . 1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield
green
2 sentences1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . 1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Wolf v. Forcum
green
2 sentences1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . 1970We start with the proposition that a demurrer admits as true the allegations of the pleading to which it is addressed: Hancock County REMC v. City of Greenfield (1970), 253 Ind. 402 , 254 N. E. 2d 865 ; McCray Memorial Hospital v. Hall (1967), 141 Ind. App. 203 , 226 N. E. 2d 915 ; Wolf v. Forcum (1959), 130 Ind. App. 10 , 161 N. E. 2d 175 ; Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551 , 114 N. E. 2d 873 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Irvin v. Dowd
green
2 sentences1964It is appellant's contention that although the statute [1] [§ 9-1305, Burns' 1956 Repl.] merely grants *132 a right to a change of venue, subject to the discretion of the court, that the denial of such change of venue under the circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and was in violation of Art. 1, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution, [2] and the 6th Amend. to the Constitution of the United States. [3] In support of his contention, appellant cites and relies upon the case of Irvin v. Dowd (1960), 366 U.S. 717 , 6 L.Ed. (2d) 751, 81 Sup. Ct. 1639. 1964It is appellant’s contention that although the statute 1 [§9-1305, Burns’ 1956 Repl.] merely grants a right to a change of venue, subject to the discretion of the court, that the denial of such change of venue under the circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and was in violation of Art. 1, §13 of the Indiana Constitution, 2 and the 6th Amend, to the Constitution of the United States. 3 In support of his contention, appellant cites and relies upon the case of Irvin v. Dowd (1960), 366 U. S. 717 , 6 L. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.