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5 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.green2 sentences2026See Piercefield, 133 N.W.2d at 133 ; id. at 130 (O’Hara, J., dissenting). - 18 - and proved both “the defect of manufacture upon which he relie[d]” and “injury or damage caused by or resulting from such defect.” The Court explained that proof of negligence is not required for breach of an implied warranty claim. 2026See Piercefield, 133 N.W.2d at 133 ; id. at 130 (O’Hara, J., dissenting). - 18 - and proved both “the defect of manufacture upon which he relie[d]” and “injury or damage caused by or resulting from such defect.” The Court explained that proof of negligence is not required for breach of an implied warranty claim. | 1 | 1 |
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.green2 sentences2001The Court of Special Appeals improperly shifted the plaintiffs burden of proof onto the manufacturer to demonstrate that the event causing injury or property damage was not caused by any defect that originated with the manufacturer. *334 We consistently have held that a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on an implied warranty claim, as well as with regard to strict liability and negligence claims. 13 For instance, in Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 273 Md. 592, 608-09 , 332 A.2d 1, 10 (1975), w 2001The Court of Special Appeals improperly shifted the plaintiffs burden of proof onto the manufacturer to demonstrate that the event causing injury or property damage was not caused by any defect that originated with the manufacturer. *334 We consistently have held that a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on an implied warranty claim, as well as with regard to strict liability and negligence claims. 13 For instance, in Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 273 Md. 592, 608-09 , 332 A.2d 1, 10 (1975), w | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp.green2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac of Marlow Heights, Inc.green2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 1 |
Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.green2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 1 |
International Motors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2001The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the trial court reached the improper conclusion that General Accident did not prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it was either a defect or negligence by the ... defendant” as, according to the Court of Special Appeals, General Accident did not have to prove a specific manufacturing or design defect “to prevail on an implied warranty claim.” International Motors, 133 Md.App. at 276 , 754 A.2d at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2001The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the trial court reached the improper conclusion that General Accident did not prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it was either a defect or negligence by the ... defendant” as, according to the Court of Special Appeals, General Accident did not have to prove a specific manufacturing or design defect “to prevail on an implied warranty claim.” International Motors, 133 Md.App. at 276 , 754 A.2d at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving
green
2 sentences2007Regarding those latter claims, the intermediate appellate court held that the risk of serious injury or death, as alleged by the appellants, amounted to “[m]ere possibilities ... [that did not] meet the threshold of establishing a clear danger of death or personal injury.” Id. 340 Md. at 531 , 667 A.2d at 630 . 2007Regarding those latter claims, the intermediate appellate court held that the risk of serious injury or death, as alleged by the appellants, amounted to “[m]ere possibilities ... [that did not] meet the threshold of establishing a clear danger of death or personal injury.” Id. 340 Md. at 531 , 667 A.2d at 630 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ford Motor Co. v. General Accident Insurance
green
2 sentences2007That is, “a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on an implied warranty claim, as well as with regard to strict liability and negligence claims.” Id. at 334 , 779 A.2d 362 . 2007That is, “a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on an implied warranty claim, as well as with regard to strict liability and negligence claims.” Id. at 334 , 779 A.2d 362 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Virgil v. \ KASH N'KARRY\" SERVICE CORP."
green
2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Eaton Corp. v. Wright
green
2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Jensen v. American Motors Corp., Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti 2001Id., see, e.g., Giant Food, Inc., 273 Md. at 608 , 332 A.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (stating that “irrespective of the theory of recovery — negligence or implied warranty — a prerequisite to recover against a manufacturer for a defective product is that the plaintiff must show the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123 , 499 P.2d 539, 542 (1972))); Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80 , 92 n. 3, 375 A.2d 1122 , 1128 n. 3 (1977) (explaining that, in a strict liability acti | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bowman v. Woodway Stores, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1938To the same effect is the case of Bowman v. Woodway Stores, Inc., 258 Ill. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.