evidence meets test in Georgia

2013Thus, if “the evidence meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979)] the case may be retried.” Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 512 (3) ( 421 SE2d 528 ) (1992).

2013Thus, if “the evidence meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979)] the case may be retried.” Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 512 (3) ( 421 SE2d 528 ) (1992).

2008When the evidence meets this test, however, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, Christmas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 4, 7 ( 318 SE2d 682 ) (1984), and “[wjhether this burden has been met is a question for the [factfinder].” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 793, 795 ( 377 SE2d 546 ) (1989).

2008When the evidence meets this test, however, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, Christmas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 4, 7 ( 318 SE2d 682 ) (1984), and “[wjhether this burden has been met is a question for the [factfinder].” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 793, 795 ( 377 SE2d 546 ) (1989).

2008When the evidence meets this test, however, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, Christmas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 4, 7 ( 318 SE2d 682 ) (1984), and “[wjhether this burden has been met is a question for the [factfinder].” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 793, 795 ( 377 SE2d 546 ) (1989).

2008When the evidence meets this test, however, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, Christmas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 4, 7 ( 318 SE2d 682 ) (1984), and “[wjhether this burden has been met is a question for the [factfinder].” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 793, 795 ( 377 SE2d 546 ) (1989).

2025And when the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, and whether this burden has been met is a question for the jury.” (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Elkins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 816, 819 (1) ( 830 SE2d 345 ) (2019). 6 (a) Henry contends that the evidence was insufficient because it showed only mere presence.

2025And when the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, and whether this burden has been met is a question for the jury.” (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Elkins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 816, 819 (1) ( 830 SE2d 345 ) (2019). 6 (a) Henry contends that the evidence was insufficient because it showed only mere presence.

2021But a criminal conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence if “the proved facts are not only consistent with the 8 hypothesis of guilt, but exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the guilt of the accused.”5 Indeed, when the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is “as probative as direct evidence, and whether this burden has been met is a question for the jury.”6 And importantly, when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, excluded every reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt, “the verdict will not be disturbed unless th

2021But a criminal conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence if “the proved facts are not only consistent with the 8 hypothesis of guilt, but exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the guilt of the accused.”5 Indeed, when the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is “as probative as direct evidence, and whether this burden has been met is a question for the jury.”6 And importantly, when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, excluded every reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt, “the verdict will not be disturbed unless th

2017Moore, supra, 290 Ga. at 809-810 (2); see also Sheppard, supra, 294 Ga. App. at 273-274 (3).

2017Moore, supra, 290 Ga. at 809-810 (2); see also Sheppard, supra, 294 Ga. App. at 273-274 (3).

2017Moore, supra, 290 Ga. at 809-810 (2); see also Sheppard, supra, 294 Ga. App. at 273-274 (3).

2017Moore, supra, 290 Ga. at 809-810 (2); see also Sheppard, supra, 294 Ga. App. at 273-274 (3).

2013Thus, [e]ven though there was no direct evidence that defendant committed the crime, we conclude that the evidence meets the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U. S. 307 ], in that a rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.

2013Thus, if “the evidence meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979)] the case may be retried.” Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 512 (3) ( 421 SE2d 528 ) (1992).

2013Thus, “[e]ven though there was no direct evidence that defendant committed the crime, we conclude that the evidence meets the standard set forth in Jackson v. 12 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560), in that a rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.” (Citation omitted.) Giles v. State, 211 Ga. App. at 595 - 596 (1). 2.

2013(Citation omitted.) Giles v. State, 211 Ga. App. at 595-596 (1). 2.

2019And while Elkins summarily concludes that “[o]ne reasonable hypothesis is that the pond gun was a 11 Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 142, 149 (2) ( 796 SE2d 765 ) (2017) (punctuation omitted); accord Johnson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 253, 254 ( 661 SE2d 642 ) (2008); see also OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 Jones, 340 Ga. App. at 149 (2); accord Johnson, 291 Ga. App. at 254 . 13 Jones, 340 Ga.

2019And while Elkins summarily concludes that “[o]ne reasonable hypothesis is that the pond gun was a 11 Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 142, 149 (2) ( 796 SE2d 765 ) (2017) (punctuation omitted); accord Johnson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 253, 254 ( 661 SE2d 642 ) (2008); see also OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 Jones, 340 Ga. App. at 149 (2); accord Johnson, 291 Ga. App. at 254 . 13 Jones, 340 Ga.

2016See Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673, 674 ( 755 SE2d 695 ) (2014).

2016See Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673, 674 ( 755 SE2d 695 ) (2014).

1997(Cit.)’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Harris v. State, 223 Ga. App. 661, 663 ( 478 SE2d 458 ) (1996). “ ‘[I]f the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence.

1997(Cit.)’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Harris v. State, 223 Ga. App. 661, 663 ( 478 SE2d 458 ) (1996). “ ‘[I]f the evidence meets this test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence.

1993See also White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 95 (1), 97 ( 428 SE2d 789 ). 2.

1993See also White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 95 (1), 97 ( 428 SE2d 789 ). 2.

1991If the evidence meets this test, it is then for the jury to say, either that the plaintiff has not carried his burden of proof because the evidence equally supports his hypothesis and some other reasonable hypothesis, or that the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof in that the evidence preponderates to his hypothesis as against all other reasonable but less probable hypotheses.’ ” Henry Grady Hotel Corp. v. Watts, 119 Ga. App. 251, 253 (1) ( 167 SE2d 205 ) (1969).

1991If the evidence meets this test, it is then for the jury to say, either that the plaintiff has not carried his burden of proof because the evidence equally supports his hypothesis and some other reasonable hypothesis, or that the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof in that the evidence preponderates to his hypothesis as against all other reasonable but less probable hypotheses.’ ” Henry Grady Hotel Corp. v. Watts, 119 Ga. App. 251, 253 (1) ( 167 SE2d 205 ) (1969).

1990“We find that the evidence meets the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), enabling a rational trier of fact to convict [defendant of armed robbery, burglary, and kidnapping].” Middlebrooks v. State, 191 Ga. App. 542, 543 (1) ( 382 SE2d 385 ) (1989).

1990“We find that the evidence meets the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), enabling a rational trier of fact to convict [defendant of armed robbery, burglary, and kidnapping].” Middlebrooks v. State, 191 Ga. App. 542, 543 (1) ( 382 SE2d 385 ) (1989).

1980See Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ).

1980See Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ).

1980See Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ).

1980See Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ).

1980See Payne v. State, 151 Ga. App. 165, 166 ( 259 SE2d 168 ); Whatley v. State, 151 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 259 SE2d 175 ); Driggers v. State, 244 Ga. 160, 161 (1) ( 259 SE2d 133 ).