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5 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 1909–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Standifurgreen2 sentences2024As discussed above, we treat “as ‘inevitably suspect’ a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant” because a “defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame.” 16 Standifur, 310 Md. at 13 (citations omitted). 16 To support its position that statements against penal interest should be treated the same as any other type of hearsay evidence, the Dissent relies upon State v. Grant, 776 N.W.2d 2024As discussed above, we treat “as ‘inevitably suspect’ a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant” because a “defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame.”16 Standifur, 310 Md. at 13 (citations omitted). 16 To support its position that statements against penal interest should be treated the same as any other type of hearsay evidence, the Dissent relies upon State v. Grant, 776 N.W.2d 2 | 2 | 2 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphygreen1 sentence2005See Aetna, 538 A.2d at 221 ; Alcazar, 982 S.W.2d at 853 . 10 We agree with the reasoning articulated above by our sister state courts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Grant
green
2 sentences2024As discussed above, we treat “as ‘inevitably suspect’ a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant” because a “defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame.” 16 Standifur, 310 Md. at 13 (citations omitted). 16 To support its position that statements against penal interest should be treated the same as any other type of hearsay evidence, the Dissent relies upon State v. Grant, 776 N.W.2d 2024As discussed above, we treat “as ‘inevitably suspect’ a statement made to persons in authority and implicating a codefendant” because a “defendant implicating his confederate may do so to curry favor with the authorities, to achieve a plea bargain, to shift the blame by showing that another was more culpable, or simply to have another with whom to share the blame.”16 Standifur, 310 Md. at 13 (citations omitted). 16 To support its position that statements against penal interest should be treated the same as any other type of hearsay evidence, the Dissent relies upon State v. Grant, 776 N.W.2d 2 | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Chicago City v. Robbins
green
2 sentences1909Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “The principle announced in Robbins v. Chicago, supra, ‘qualifies and restrains within just limits the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers.’ In the leading case of Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad, 23 Pick. 24 , 32, the doctrine was thus stated: ‘Our law, however, does not in every case disallow an action, by one wrongdoer against another, to recover damages incurred in eonsequennce of their joint offence. 1909JUSTICE WHITE, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "The principle announced in Robbins v. Chicago, supra, `qualifies and restrains within just limits the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers.' In the leading case of Lowell v. Boston and Lowell Railroad, 23 Pick. 24 , 32, the doctrine was thus stated: `Our law, however, does not in every case disallow an action, by one wrongdoer against another, to recover damages incurred in consequennce of their joint offence. | 2 | 1909–1909 |
Alcazar v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2005See Aetna, 538 A.2d at 221 ; Alcazar, 982 S.W.2d at 853 . 10 We agree with the reasoning articulated above by our sister state courts. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.