rigor rule in New York

1987Co., 50 Hun 581, 584 ) evolved by the courts to ameliorate in exceptional circumstances 'the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers.’ (Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327 .) It is applied only in situations where the relationship between joint tort-feasors to one another or to the event indicates such a difference in their respective delinquencies that one may be said to be actually or primarily, and the other only legally or secondarily, responsible for the happening of the consequent damages.” Classic common-law indemnification situations

1960Co., 50 Hun 581, 584 ) evolved by the courts to ameliorate in exceptional circumstances ‘ the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers. ’ (Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327 .) It is applied only in situations where the relationship between joint tort-feasors to one another or to the event indicates such a difference in their respective delinquencies that one may be said to be actually or primarily, and the other only legally or secondarily, responsible for the happening of the consequent damages.

1987Co., 50 Hun 581, 584 ) evolved by the courts to ameliorate in exceptional circumstances 'the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers.’ (Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327 .) It is applied only in situations where the relationship between joint tort-feasors to one another or to the event indicates such a difference in their respective delinquencies that one may be said to be actually or primarily, and the other only legally or secondarily, responsible for the happening of the consequent damages.” Classic common-law indemnification situations

1960Co., 50 Hun 581, 584 ) evolved by the courts to ameliorate in exceptional circumstances ‘ the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers. ’ (Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327 .) It is applied only in situations where the relationship between joint tort-feasors to one another or to the event indicates such a difference in their respective delinquencies that one may be said to be actually or primarily, and the other only legally or secondarily, responsible for the happening of the consequent damages.

1919The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Scott, said: “ The rigor of this rule has been modified in later years. ‘ An arrest on a body execution is now generally considered not to operate as a satisfaction of the judgment, but simply as a suspension for the time being of other remedies of the creditor thereon.’ (Flack v. State of New York, 95 N. Y. 461, 471 ; Koenig v. Steckel, 58 id. 475 .) ” The defendant having obtained his release upon a stipulation that he might again be arrested upon the execution herein, I can see no reason why the terms of that stipulation should not be carried out and

1919The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Scott, said: “ The rigor of this rule has been modified in later years. ‘ An arrest on a body execution is now generally considered not to operate as a satisfaction of the judgment, but simply as a suspension for the time being of other remedies of the creditor thereon.’ (Flack v. State of New York, 95 N. Y. 461, 471 ; Koenig v. Steckel, 58 id. 475 .) ” The defendant having obtained his release upon a stipulation that he might again be arrested upon the execution herein, I can see no reason why the terms of that stipulation should not be carried out and

1987Co., 50 Hun 581, 584 ) evolved by the courts to ameliorate in exceptional circumstances 'the rigor of the rule which forbids recourse between wrongdoers.’ (Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 327 .) It is applied only in situations where the relationship between joint tort-feasors to one another or to the event indicates such a difference in their respective delinquencies that one may be said to be actually or primarily, and the other only legally or secondarily, responsible for the happening of the consequent damages.” Classic common-law indemnification situations

1947(Myers v. Albany Savings Bank, 270 App. Div. 466 , affd. 296 N. Y, 562.) Section 44 of the General Business Law contains no such requirement, but specifically provides that the effectiveness of the pawn ticket shall be destroyed by issuance of a stop ticket on the application of a pawnor in the prescribed manner.

1945(Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571 .) It is pointed out in Faucett v. Nichols ( 64 N. Y. 377, 380 ) that “ to mitigate the rigor of the rule declared in Hulett v. Swift ” chapter 658 of the Laws of 1866 was enacted.

1945That statute is now section 202 of the General Business Law and reads as follows: “ No inn keeper shall be liable for the loss or destruction by fire of property received by him from a guest, stored or being with the knowledge of such guest in a barn or other out-building, where it shall appear that such loss or destruction was the work of an incendiary, and occurred without the fault or negligence of such inn keeper.” It was held in Faucett v. Nichols (supra) that the statute creates a defense which the innkeeper has the burden of establishing.

1945(Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571 .) It is pointed out in Faucett v. Nichols ( 64 N. Y. 377, 380 ) that “ to mitigate the rigor of the rule declared in Hulett v. Swift ” chapter 658 of the Laws of 1866 was enacted.

1942(Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623 , revg. 176 Misc. 82 .) Consequently, the examination sought is clearly material and necessary to the defense of the action.

1942(Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623 , revg. 176 Misc. 82 .) Consequently, the examination sought is clearly material and necessary to the defense of the action.

1939Numerous instances are cited in Schonhous v. Weiner ( 138 Misc. 759 ), where the authorities are collated and discussed.

1938(Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520 .) In the Brown case the plaintiff was permitted to describe the actual words, scenes and incidents of the motion picture claimed to be libelous but only out of necessity and in recognition of the difficulty of setting forth the actual dialogue and incidents in the picture.

1932(People v. Weinberger, 239 N. Y. 307 .) Here the witness denied he had any present recollection of the number but no further attempt was made to show whether his recollection could be refreshed by the paper.

1932R., 17 N. Y. 134 ; National Ulster County Bank v. Madden, 114 id. 280 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 id. 365, 392.) The rigor of this rule appears to have been somewhat ameliorated, especially where, as here, specific objection is not made on that ground or the asking of the questions appears useless.

1932R., 17 N. Y. 134 ; National Ulster County Bank v. Madden, 114 id. 280 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 id. 365, 392.) The rigor of this rule appears to have been somewhat ameliorated, especially where, as here, specific objection is not made on that ground or the asking of the questions appears useless.

1929The representative is now excused though the debt was unreal if he has paid it in good faith and on reasonable grounds (Surrogate’s Court Act, § 210; Matter of Taylor, 251 N. Y. 257 ).

1918So in this state also, Wardell v. Eden, 2 Johns.

1915(Lathrop v. Briggs, supra.) The rigor of this rule has been modified in later years.

1910And this does not so much depend upon an implied contract that the services are to be gratuitous as upon the absence of any contract or promise that a reward should be paid.” The rigor of this rule was somewhat modified in Moore v. Moore, 3 Abb.

1905Sedgwick v. Macy, 24 App. Div. 1 , 49 N. Y.

1905Sedgwick v. Macy, 24 App. Div. 1 , 49 N. Y.

1905(Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244 ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519 ; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480 , and Wood v. Whitehead Bros.

1905(Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244 ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519 ; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480 , and Wood v. Whitehead Bros.

1905(Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244 ; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519 ; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480 , and Wood v. Whitehead Bros.

1903(Otto v. Van Riper, 164 N. Y. 536 ; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219 ; Long v. Long, 142 id. 545 .) If the allegations of the complaint in this case are to be taken as admitted upon the motion to dismiss, granted at the commencement of the trial, this exception to the rule is strongly applicable here.

1903(Otto v. Van Riper, 164 N. Y. 536 ; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219 ; Long v. Long, 142 id. 545 .) If the allegations of the complaint in this case are to be taken as admitted upon the motion to dismiss, granted at the commencement of the trial, this exception to the rule is strongly applicable here.

1903(Hood v. Hood,. 85 N. Y. 561 ; Perkins v. Stimmel, 114 id. 359.) It has been held,, however, that there may be proper exceptions to this general rule and that where it appears “ that an accounting is impossible or impracticable ” the courts will suspend the rigor of that rule and allow an action in equity to be maintained to establish the extent of the liability and charge the sureties.

1888Kaveny v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 571 , 15 N. E.