intoxication defense in Illinois

1986(People v. Schuberth (1983), 115 Ill.

1985(People v. Schuberth (1983), 115 Ill.

2008Mapp, 283 Ill.

2008Mapp, 283 Ill.

2005The court noted that the legislature "has no duty to amend its compilation of statutes when it decides to strike language in one statute simply because the same language is contained in another enactment," and the defendants asserting the insanity defense are not similarly situated to those asserting the intoxication defense. (footnote: 11) Teran , 353 Ill.

2005The court noted that the legislature “has no duty to amend its compilation of statutes when it decides to strike language in one statute simply because the same language is contained in another enactment,” and the defendants asserting the insanity defense are not similarly situated to those asserting the intoxication defense. 11 Teran, 353 Ill.

2005Defendant did present the testimony of Dr. Mitrione, who opined defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his behavior to appreciate the criminality of his acts as a result of the involuntary Zoloft intoxication and his drug condition. “ ‘A jury is not required to accept the conclusions of a psychiatrist with respect to this issue [of an intoxication defense]. [Citation.] Rather, the weight to be given any testimony relating to the mental state of the defendant is peculiarly within the province of the jury [citation], and where the evidence admits of two inferences, a reviewing court wi

2005Defendant did present the testimony of Dr. Mitrione, who opined defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his behavior to appreciate the criminality of his acts as a result of the involuntary Zoloft intoxication and his drug condition. “ ‘A jury is not required to accept the conclusions of a psychiatrist with respect to this issue [of an intoxication defense]. [Citation.] Rather, the weight to be given any testimony relating to the mental state of the defendant is peculiarly within the province of the jury [citation], and where the evidence admits of two inferences, a reviewing court wi

2000Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 86 .

2000Jackson, 145 Ill.2d at 86 , 163 Ill.Dec. 859 , 582 N.E.2d 125 .

1999Ed. 2d 674, 695 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984); Burns, 304 Ill.

1999Ed. 2d 674, 695 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984); Burns , 304 Ill.

1993To reverse the trial court’s ruling would eviscerate the purposes and meaning of the implied-consent statute — to assist in the determination of whether motor vehicle drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol and to make the streets and highways of the State safer for its citizens by making prosecution of intoxicated drivers easier and by suspending drivers’ licenses upon refusal to submit to an intoxication test (People v. Carlyle (1985), 130 Ill.

1993App. 3d 205, 210 , 474 N.E.2d 9, 12 ) — and section 11 — 501.1 is instead to be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of protecting the citizens of Illinois upon its highways (People v. Ellerbusch (1983), 118 Ill.

1992App. 3d 815 , 333 N.E.2d 534 .) Accordingly, we find that any failure by his counsel to investigate an intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance.

1977App. 3d 815 , 333 N.E.2d 534 , the court ruled that failure of the trial court to inform defendant of an intoxication defense had not rendered his guilty plea involuntary or unintelligent.

2013Id.

1993People v. Treadway (1985), 138 Ill.

1993(People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248, 270 .) We are aware of one Illinois case that has found an attorney ineffective for failing to support an intoxication defense.

1993App. 3d 205, 210 , 474 N.E.2d 9, 12 ) — and section 11 — 501.1 is instead to be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of protecting the citizens of Illinois upon its highways (People v. Ellerbusch (1983), 118 Ill.

1993(See also People v. Kyse (1991), 220 Ill.

1992App. 3d 442 , 459 N.E.2d 1137 (self-defense).) However, the fourth district recently reversed and remanded a case for the circuit court’s failure to ask the following propounded question on the intoxication defense: “[D]o any of you have any feelings concerning the use of alcohol or drugs which could affect your ability to be a juror in this case ***.” People v. Lanter (1992), 230 Ill.

1992App. 3d 72, 73 , 595 N.E.2d 210 .

1992App. 3d 193, 197 , stated regarding an intoxication defense: “A jury is not required to accept the conclusions of a psychiatrist with respect to this issue. [Citation.] Rather, the weight to be given any testimony relating to the mental state of the defendant is peculiarly within the province of the jury [citation], and where the evidence admits of two inferences, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment unless the jury’s decision is inherently impossible or unreasonable.” See also Bradney, 170 Ill.

1992The appellate court, in People v. Olson (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 193, 197 , 51 Ill.Dec. 603 , 420 N.E.2d 1161 , stated regarding an intoxication defense: "A jury is not required to accept the conclusions of a psychiatrist with respect to this issue. [Citation.] Rather, the weight to be given any testimony relating to the mental state of the defendant is peculiarly within the province of the jury [citation], and where the evidence admits of two inferences, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment unless the jury's decision is inherently impossible or unreasonable." See also Bradney, 170

1992(People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 61 , 571 N.E.2d 736 .) Moreover, in order to assert an intoxication defense, a defendant must show that his drunkenness was so extreme that it suspended his power of reason and rendered him incapable of forming a specific intent to commit the offense.

1992(People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 61 , 571 N.E.2d 736 .) Moreover, in order to assert an intoxication defense, a defendant must show that his drunkenness was so extreme that it suspended his power of reason and rendered him incapable of forming a specific intent to commit the offense.

1992App. 3d 442 , 459 N.E.2d 1137 (self-defense).) However, the fourth district recently reversed and remanded a case for the circuit court’s failure to ask the following propounded question on the intoxication defense: “[D]o any of you have any feelings concerning the use of alcohol or drugs which could affect your ability to be a juror in this case ***.” People v. Lanter (1992), 230 Ill.

1992Wright, 111 Ill. 2d at 25-31 ; People v. Feagans (1983), 118 Ill.

1990Only if the Defendant’s intoxication is so extreme as to suspend entirely his power of reason, rendering him incapable of any mental action, is that intoxication a defense to the offense of Murder.” ( 82 Ill. 2d at 544 .) The problem in Haywood centered on the ambiguous attempt by the second instruction to redefine the clear statement of the intoxication defense presented in the first instruction.

1990The supreme court was particularly concerned with' the possibility that the second instruction could be construed as requiring a state of unconsciousness for an intoxication defense. ( 82 Ill. 2d at 545-46 .) No such problem exists in the instant case.

1990In closing argument, the prosecutor said that, out of the “molehill” of drugs found on defendant when he was arrested, “the Defense has created a mountain.” He continued by stating that one of the witnesses who testified to defendant’s intoxication was a relative of defendant’s and that the relative, after being summoned to testify in support of an intoxication defense that would require a showing of extreme intoxication if it were to succeed, “had the idea.” The prosecutor also argued that the defense’s expert witness was “hand-picked.” No objection to any of these comments was made at trial