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20 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023The “evidence [must be] reasonably sufficient to prove that the defendant was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010)). 2023The “evidence [must be] reasonably sufficient to prove that the defendant was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010)). | 3 | 3 |
Ratliff v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021The general effect, she alleged, was that she could not recall anything between her visit to Calloway’s trailer at 2:30 AM and approximately the time of her arrest around 5:30 AM, and therefore she could not form the criminal intent most fundamental and serious type of errors—are generally analyzed under a harmless error standard.”). 6 RCr 10.26. 7See Nunn, at 751 (“Palpable error is essentially comprised of two elements: obviousness and seriousness.”). 8 RCr 9.54(2). 9 Breazeale v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 682 , 691 (Ky. 2020) (citing Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006)); 2020The general effect, she alleged, was that she could not recall anything between her visit to Calloway’s trailer at 2:30 AM and approximately the time of her arrest around 5:30 AM, and therefore she could not form the criminal intent most fundamental and serious type of errors—are generally analyzed under a harmless error standard.”). 6 RCr 10.26. 7See Nunn, at 751 (“Palpable error is essentially comprised of two elements: obviousness and seriousness.”). 8 RCr 9.54(2). 9 Breazeale v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 682 , 691 (Ky. 2020) (citing Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006)); | 2 | 2 |
Sargent v. Shaffergreen2 sentences2021The general effect, she alleged, was that she could not recall anything between her visit to Calloway’s trailer at 2:30 AM and approximately the time of her arrest around 5:30 AM, and therefore she could not form the criminal intent most fundamental and serious type of errors—are generally analyzed under a harmless error standard.”). 6 RCr 10.26. 7See Nunn, at 751 (“Palpable error is essentially comprised of two elements: obviousness and seriousness.”). 8 RCr 9.54(2). 9 Breazeale v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 682 , 691 (Ky. 2020) (citing Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006)); 2020The general effect, she alleged, was that she could not recall anything between her visit to Calloway’s trailer at 2:30 AM and approximately the time of her arrest around 5:30 AM, and therefore she could not form the criminal intent most fundamental and serious type of errors—are generally analyzed under a harmless error standard.”). 6 RCr 10.26. 7See Nunn, at 751 (“Palpable error is essentially comprised of two elements: obviousness and seriousness.”). 8 RCr 9.54(2). 9 Breazeale v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 682 , 691 (Ky. 2020) (citing Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006)); | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2008See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ky.1978). 1994In Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 575 S.W.2d 451 (1978), this Court set out the guidelines for a separate intoxication instruction to be given to juries in relevant cases, If it is to be submitted and the mass of evidence on the' subject is to have any comprehensible meaning to the jury it must be accompanied by an instruction in substantially the following form. | 1 | 2 |
McClellan v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2015Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky.2006) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). . | 1 | 1 |
Greene v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2015Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Ky.2006) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). . | 1 | 1 |
Vaughn v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2009“In order to be valid, a guilty plea in a criminal case must represent a meaningful choice between the probable outcome at trial and the more certain outcome offered by the plea agreement.” Vaughn, 258 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Ky.App.2008). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2003See generally Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 362 (1999)(challenge to *653 absence of instruction on intoxication un-preserved where defendant did not request or tender intoxication instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Slaven v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000In Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845 (1997), the Court’s language was less rigid and the holding was that the jury’s belief in the intoxication defense “could reduce the offense from intentional homicide to wanton homicide....” Id. at 857 (emphasis added). 2000In Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845 (1997), the Court’s language was less rigid and the holding was that the jury’s belief in the intoxication defense “could reduce the offense from intentional homicide to wanton homicide....” Id. at 857 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mishler v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2021KRS 513.020 (“with intent to destroy or damage a building, he starts a fire or causes an explosion”) and 513.030 (“when he starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building”). 18 556 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1977). 7 The Mishler Court fully acknowledged the preposterousness of Skaggs’s defense19 but found error in the trial court’s refusal to give the intoxication instruction. 2020KRS 513.020 (“with intent to destroy or damage a building, he starts a fire or causes an explosion”) and 513.030 (“when he starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building”). 18 556 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1977). 7 The Mishler Court fully acknowledged the preposterousness of Skaggs’s defense19 but found error in the trial court’s refusal to give the intoxication instruction. | 3 | 2019–2021 |
Luna v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2023To merit an intoxication instruction, “[s]imple drunkenness is not sufficient[.]” Luna, 460 S.W.3d at 882 . 2023To merit an intoxication instruction, “[s]imple drunkenness is not sufficient[.]” Luna, 460 S.W.3d at 882 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Campbell v. City of Booneville
green
2 sentences2022The Board also cited to three cases to support its decision: Campbell, supra; Wilson v. Wizor, 544 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1976); and Ford Motor Company v. Smith, 283 Ky. 795 , 143 S.W.2d 507 (1940). -15- We believe the Board erred in its interpretation. 2020One year after the Woosley decision the legislature changed 14 the language of the intoxication defense statute to provide a defense only if an injury was “proximately caused primarily” by an employee’s voluntary intoxication.5 This Court discussed the statutory amendment in Campbell v. City of Booneville, 85 S.W.3d 603 (Ky. 2002), noting that the 1972 amendment addressed the issue of multiple causation — a problem that concerned the Court in Woosley. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Malone v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Malone v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 647 ([Ky.] 1982); Isaacs v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 843 ([Ky.] 1977); Henson [v.] Commonwealth, [No. 2020-SC-0343- MR, 2021 WL 5984690 [Ky. Dec. 16, 2021].[6] It is not ineffective assistance to either fail or refuse to present a futile or unlawful defense. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Isaacs v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Malone v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 647 ([Ky.] 1982); Isaacs v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 843 ([Ky.] 1977); Henson [v.] Commonwealth, [No. 2020-SC-0343- MR, 2021 WL 5984690 [Ky. Dec. 16, 2021].[6] It is not ineffective assistance to either fail or refuse to present a futile or unlawful defense. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Smith
green
2 sentences2022The Board also cited to three cases to support its decision: Campbell, supra; Wilson v. Wizor, 544 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1976); and Ford Motor Company v. Smith, 283 Ky. 795 , 143 S.W.2d 507 (1940). -15- We believe the Board erred in its interpretation. 2022The Board also cited to three cases to support its decision: Campbell, supra; Wilson v. Wizor, 544 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1976); and Ford Motor Company v. Smith, 283 Ky. 795 , 143 S.W.2d 507 (1940). -15- We believe the Board erred in its interpretation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wilson v. Wizor
green
1 sentence2022The Board also cited to three cases to support its decision: Campbell, supra; Wilson v. Wizor, 544 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1976); and Ford Motor Company v. Smith, 283 Ky. 795 , 143 S.W.2d 507 (1940). -15- We believe the Board erred in its interpretation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Weaver v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 857 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mabe v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2008An identical intoxication instruction was approved by this Court in Mabe, 884 S.W.2d at 672 . 2008An identical intoxication instruction was approved by this Court in Mabe, 884 S.W.2d at 672 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2002Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2002Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McGuire v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2000While the Slaven version can be interpreted consistently with McGuire v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 931 (1994), today's majority opinion cannot. 2000While the Slaven version can be interpreted consistently with McGuire v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 931 (1994), today’s majority opinion cannot. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Clemons
green
1 sentence1997If there had been no murder and the only charge in this case had been robbery, the intoxication defense would have required an instruction on first-degree wanton endangerment, KRS 508.060, Commonwealth v. Clemons, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 459 (1987), as a lesser included offense for which voluntary intoxication would be no defense. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wyatt v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1994As stated in 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal), Sec. 11.33, Comment: “This defense [‘temporary mental incapacity’] is not found in the penal code, but was resurrected from the common law in Wyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 832 (1987).... [T]he defense is really a claim of temporary insanity....” In this case the trial court’s instruction on the defense of insanity exculpated the defendant if the jury believed “that at the time he committed the offense or offenses he was temporarily insane.” The jury was instructed to find him insane “if as a result of mental illnes 1994In the present case the defense objected to an intoxication instruction, not as unwarranted by its evidence, but because it preferred in lieu thereof a tendered instruction on “Temporary Mental Incapacity.” The instruction the defense tendered, and the court refused, was as follows: “Even though you believe from the evidence that the Defendant, Phillip Howard McGuire, entered Ely Drugs and took prescription drugs without the permission of Ely Drugs, if you further believe from the evidence that at the time he did so, the Defendant was, as a result of ingested drugs, alcohol, or mental illness, | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Tuggle's Admr.
neutral
2 sentences1969Co. v. Tuggle’s Adm’r, 151 Ky. 409 , 152 S.W. 270 , and Louisville & N. R. 1969Co. v. Tuggle’s Adm’r, 151 Ky. 409 , 152 S.W. 270 , and Louisville & N. R. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.