16 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Reiffgreen2 sentences2019The judge explained his reasoning for doing so on the record, as follows: I did decide that I would not permit [the defense and instruction], and it's really based upon the case of Commonwealth v. Reiff , [ 489 Pa. 12 , 413 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1980) ], and in that case, the Supreme Court upheld the trial Court for not permitting the intoxication defense, and I thought there were some very similar facts in that case to this case. 2019The judge explained his reasoning for doing so on the record, as follows: I did decide that I would not permit [the defense and instruction], and it's really based upon the case of Commonwealth v. Reiff , [ 489 Pa. 12 , 413 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1980) ], and in that case, the Supreme Court upheld the trial Court for not permitting the intoxication defense, and I thought there were some very similar facts in that case to this case. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Rosegreen2 sentences2012Thus, in Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d 880 (1974), an intoxication defense case, the Court disapproved the approach to affirmative defenses found in this Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970), a self-defense case. 2012Thus, in Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d 880 (1974), an intoxication defense case, the Court disapproved the approach to affirmative defenses found in this Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970), a self-defense case. | 1 | 3 |
Patterson v. McLean Credit Unionred1 sentence2014Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008). [J-3-2014] - 28 elected to forego an intoxication defense at trial--or enhances his guilt phase intoxication defense appreciably, the jury’s first-degree murder verdict would not logically preclude it | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gibsongreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402 , 951 A.2d 1110, 1131-32 (2008). 2011See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402 , 951 A.2d 1110, 1131-32 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tilleygreen2 sentences1993See Commonwealth v. Tilley, 528 Pa. 125, 595 A.2d 575 (1991) (defendant was not entitled to an intoxication defense even though the evidence indicated that he had consumed alcohol and that one of his friends stated that he appeared drunk, because the evidence was not sufficient to show that he was so “overwhelmed or overpowered” to be incapable of forming the specific intent to murder.) The fourth issue presented is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of one’s hands upon the throat of another, or from the use of deadly force up 1993See Commonwealth v. Tilley, 528 Pa. 125, 595 A.2d 575 (1991) (defendant was not entitled to an intoxication defense even though the evidence indicated that he had consumed alcohol and that one of his friends stated that he appeared drunk, because the evidence was not sufficient to show that he was so “overwhelmed or overpowered” to be incapable of forming the specific intent to murder.) The fourth issue presented is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of one’s hands upon the throat of another, or from the use of deadly force up | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Garciagreen2 sentences1984See 505 Pa. at 311 n. 3, 479 A.2d at 477 n. 3. 8 . 1984See 505 Pa. at 311 n. 3, 479 A.2d at 477 n. 3. 8 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kichlinegreen2 sentences1980It is the responsibility of the trial court to instruct on an intoxication defense raised by defendant if the defense is supported by the evidence: Com. v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 286 , 361 A. 2d 282, 293 (1976); Com. v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 389, 390 , 321 A. 2d 880, 884 (1974). 1980It is the responsibility of the trial court to instruct on an intoxication defense raised by defendant if the defense is supported by the evidence: Com. v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 286 , 361 A. 2d 282, 293 (1976); Com. v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 389, 390 , 321 A. 2d 880, 884 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1970Without doubt, when supported by evidence, the question of whether or not a defendant’s intoxication should relieve him of criminal liability for his acts is one which should be submitted to a jury and cannot be determined as a matter of law by the court: Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Pa. 605, 610 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fisher v. Dye
green
2 sentences2017Following Critzer, this Court further clarified the intoxication standard in Fisher v. Dye, 386 Pa. 141 , 125 A.2d 472 (1956), a wrongful death and survival action arising from an automobile collision. 2017Following Critzer, this Court further clarified the intoxication standard in Fisher v. Dye, 386 Pa. 141 , 125 A.2d 472 (1956), a wrongful death and survival action arising from an automobile collision. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries
green
1 sentence2014Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008). [J-3-2014] - 28 elected to forego an intoxication defense at trial--or enhances his guilt phase intoxication defense appreciably, the jury’s first-degree murder verdict would not logically preclude it | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Baranowski
green
1 sentence2012Thus, in Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d 880 (1974), an intoxication defense case, the Court disapproved the approach to affirmative defenses found in this Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970), a self-defense case. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Winebrenner
green
1 sentence2012Thus, in Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d 880 (1974), an intoxication defense case, the Court disapproved the approach to affirmative defenses found in this Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970), a self-defense case. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mahon v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2010In support of this defense, the employer submitted the deposition testimony of a physician certified in clinical toxicology who testified to the physical impairments caused by this high level of intoxication and who concluded that if the “claimant had not consumed as much alcohol as he did, he would not have fallen.” Id. at 423 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
E.J. Stewart, Inc. v. Aitken Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Stewart, Inc. v. Aitken Products, Inc., 607 F.Supp. 883 (E.D.Pa.1985)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
First v. Zem Zem Temple, A.A.O.N.M.S.
green
2 sentences2010In Ma-hon, we addressed what was needed to establish the intoxication defense and held that the General Assembly’s use of the term “but for” in the Act meant that an employer asserting an employee’s intoxication as an affirmative defense must establish “that intoxication was the cause in fact of an injury.” In negligence actions, but for causation or the cause in fact standard requires a direct causal connection between the individual’s negligence and the injury sustained, meaning that “the harmful result would not have come about but for the negligent conduct.” First v. Zem Zem Temple, 454 Pa 2010In Ma-hon, we addressed what was needed to establish the intoxication defense and held that the General Assembly’s use of the term “but for” in the Act meant that an employer asserting an employee’s intoxication as an affirmative defense must establish “that intoxication was the cause in fact of an injury.” In negligence actions, but for causation or the cause in fact standard requires a direct causal connection between the individual’s negligence and the injury sustained, meaning that “the harmful result would not have come about but for the negligent conduct.” First v. Zem Zem Temple, 454 Pa | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Payne
neutral
1 sentence1984In particular, he alleged that the plea was deficient in that he was not informed that “a jury ... would have to return a unanimous verdict” and “[a]t no point in the ... colloquy [was] a factual basis established prior to the acceptance of that plea.” (Appellant’s PCHA petition at 3) In addition, the appellant complained that his attorneys “never explored an intoxication defense or requested psychological testing for an intoxication defense.” Ibid. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Commonwealth v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1981In Commonwealth v. Bailey, 480 Pa. 329 , 390 A.2d 166 (1978), for example, defense counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to pursue an intoxication defense. 1981In Commonwealth v. Bailey, 480 Pa. 329 , 390 A.2d 166 (1978), for example, defense counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to pursue an intoxication defense. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Smith v. Clark
green
2 sentences1980If the trial judge fails to clarify issues and the application of law to the facts, a fair trial is not present: Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142 , 190 A. 2d 441 (1963). 1980If the trial judge fails to clarify issues and the application of law to the facts, a fair trial is not present: Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142 , 190 A. 2d 441 (1963). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth v. Barlow
neutral
2 sentences1979Commonwealth v. Barlow, 446 Pa. 263 , 284 A.2d 768 (1971). 1979Commonwealth v. Barlow, 446 Pa. 263 , 284 A.2d 768 (1971). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Commonwealth v. Pickett
green
2 sentences1979In Commonwealth v. Pickett, 244 Pa.Super. 433 , 368 A.2d 799 (1976) [hereinafter: Pickett], cited by Betrand in his brief to this Court, the Superior Court viewed, as we do today, the introduction of intoxication evidence pursuant to Graves as a matter of evidentiary law: “Read together, Rose and Graves hold that, because Pennsylvania law permits the introduction of intoxication on the issue of intent as a matter of evidentiary law, the Commonwealth must bear the burden of proof of sobriety as a matter of constitutional law.” [Emphasis supplied.] In Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d 1979In Commonwealth v. Pickett, 244 Pa.Super. 433 , 368 A.2d 799 (1976) [hereinafter: Pickett], cited by Betrand in his brief to this Court, the Superior Court viewed, as we do today, the introduction of intoxication evidence pursuant to Graves as a matter of evidentiary law: “Read together, Rose and Graves hold that, because Pennsylvania law permits the introduction of intoxication on the issue of intent as a matter of evidentiary law, the Commonwealth must bear the burden of proof of sobriety as a matter of constitutional law.” [Emphasis supplied.] In Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380 , 321 A.2d | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Commonwealth v. Tarver
green
2 sentences1979Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446 Pa. 233 , 284 A.2d 759 (1971), Commonwealth v. Barlow, 446 Pa. 263 , 284 A.2d 768 (1971). 1979Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446 Pa. 233 , 284 A.2d 759 (1971), Commonwealth v. Barlow, 446 Pa. 263 , 284 A.2d 768 (1971). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.