intoxication defense in California

2018Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , 117-118, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 .) At the same time, defense counsel's closing argument made only one reference to the evidence of Bedolla's intoxication (which was notably contradicted by the police officer's testimony) and made no reference to the intoxication instructions. 7 The fact that Bedolla's defense at trial did not actually rely on the intoxication defense reduced the likelihood that any purported conflict between the intoxication instructions "posed a substantial risk of actually misleading the jury ...." ( Hughes , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 3

2018Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93 , 117-118, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 .) At the same time, defense counsel's closing argument made only one reference to the evidence of Bedolla's intoxication (which was notably contradicted by the police officer's testimony) and made no reference to the intoxication instructions. 7 The fact that Bedolla's defense at trial did not actually rely on the intoxication defense reduced the likelihood that any purported conflict between the intoxication instructions "posed a substantial risk of actually misleading the jury ...." ( Hughes , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 3

2013Further, even if appellant was intoxicated at the time, there was no evidence at all of the effect of his intoxication on his ability to formulate intent the morning of the incident. ( Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 677-678; Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 848 ; Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 415 .) Thus, substantial evidence did not support giving an intoxication instruction and appellant’s attorney was not deficient in failing to request one.

2013Further, even if appellant was intoxicated at the time, there was no evidence at all of the effect of his intoxication on his ability to formulate intent the morning of the incident. ( Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 677-678; Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 848 ; Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 415 .) Thus, substantial evidence did not support giving an intoxication instruction and appellant’s attorney was not deficient in failing to request one.

2025“The effect of such a rule would be to criminalize mere association with gang members, which the law forbids.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 168 .) In an alternative argument, the prosecution contends Orozco “should not be permitted to use the exclusion of [Martinez] Garibo’s statement at the preliminary hearing to try to benefit him by preventing a conspiracy charge, yet thereafter, acquiesce in the admission of the statement at trial to try to benefit him by introducing an intoxication defense.” The prosecution forfeits this one-sentence comment by failing to offer legal logic or au

2025“The effect of such a rule would be to criminalize mere association with gang members, which the law forbids.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 168 .) In an alternative argument, the prosecution contends Orozco “should not be permitted to use the exclusion of [Martinez] Garibo’s statement at the preliminary hearing to try to benefit him by preventing a conspiracy charge, yet thereafter, acquiesce in the admission of the statement at trial to try to benefit him by introducing an intoxication defense.” The prosecution forfeits this one-sentence comment by failing to offer legal logic or au

2021Voluntary Intoxication Evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to whether a defendant actually formed a required specific intent. (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) Voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to a crime, but “rather is proffered in an attempt to raise a doubt on an element of a crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 .) Thus, “a jury need not accept an intoxication defense.” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 .) Rather, the jury may give evidence of intoxication “ ‘whatever weight it deems appr

2013(See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342 ; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119-1120 .) To warrant the instruction, there must be substantial evidence of the defendant‘s voluntary intoxication and that ―‗the intoxication affected the defendant‘s ―actual formation of specific intent.‖‘‖ (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715 , quoting People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 , disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) In other words, even if requested, ―an intoxication instruction is not required when the evidence shows a d

2018He says we must reverse “[u]nless the People can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror would have credited the intoxication defense absent the [trial court’s] error [in refusing to bifurcate].” This assumes prejudice; it does not establish it. “[D]efendant must show joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness,’ amounting to a denial of due process. [Citation.]” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 836 , italics added.) “One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591

2018He says we must reverse “[u]nless the People can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror would have credited the intoxication defense absent the [trial court’s] error [in refusing to bifurcate].” This assumes prejudice; it does not establish it. “[D]efendant must show joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness,’ amounting to a denial of due process. [Citation.]” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 836 , italics added.) “One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591

2018He says we must reverse “[u]nless the People can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror would have credited the intoxication defense absent the [trial court’s] error [in refusing to bifurcate].” This assumes prejudice; it does not establish it. “[D]efendant must show joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness,’ amounting to a denial of due process. [Citation.]” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 836 , italics added.) “One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591

2018He says we must reverse “[u]nless the People can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror would have credited the intoxication defense absent the [trial court’s] error [in refusing to bifurcate].” This assumes prejudice; it does not establish it. “[D]efendant must show joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness,’ amounting to a denial of due process. [Citation.]” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 836 , italics added.) “One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591

2014(See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694.) As already noted, Salinas's attempt in his opening brief to meet his burden of showing prejudice consists solely of his conclusory statement that "[i]t appears reasonably probable that [he] would have achieved a more favorable result had an intoxication instruction been presented to the jury." Such an argument is patently insufficient, borders on the frivolous, and alone renders meritless his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

1995Such declarations are `subjective, self-serving, and, by [themselves], insufficient to satisfy the Strickland test for prejudice.' ( In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 939 [ 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 713 , 830 P.2d 747 ].)" (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ].) In a footnote, respondent stated: "We also dispute the factual allegations of trial counsel's investigator in this case, Chuck Harrington." Arguing that respondent had not had the "opportunity to test the opinions of any defense expert, or offer its own expert's opinion, on the effect of alcohol

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal. Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ]. [1] "For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino's having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino's intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial `couple of beers.' This we decline to do." ( People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal. App.3

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ], '‘For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino’s having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino’s intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial ‘couple of beers.’ This we decline to do.” (People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 593,

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal. Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ]. [1] "For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino's having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino's intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial `couple of beers.' This we decline to do." ( People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal. App.3

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ], '‘For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino’s having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino’s intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial ‘couple of beers.’ This we decline to do.” (People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 593,

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ], '‘For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino’s having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino’s intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial ‘couple of beers.’ This we decline to do.” (People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 593,

1970The final opinion of that court is reported in 3 Cal.3d 150 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 474 P.2d 673 ], '‘For this court, on the basis of a cold record of Trevino’s having consumed an indeterminate amount of beer, to now second-guess all the attorneys and the trial court, and rule that the evidence of Trevino’s intoxication was such as to require a diminished capacity instruction, sua sponte, will open the floodgates to such demands in all other cases where there is testimony that the defendant had the proverbial ‘couple of beers.’ This we decline to do.” (People v. Gonzales, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 593,

2024Courts retain . . . a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 .) “It follows, for the most part, that the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such ‘normal’ rules does not implicate the federal 10 Constitution.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Smith (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 297, 305, fn. 4 .) Finally, the court instructed the jurors on the impact of intoxication (albeit voluntary) on Ervin’s mental state, and counsel argued the p

2024“Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense” might rise to the level of a constitutional violation, preventing a defendant from presenting “evidence on a . . . subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 .) In sum, the record does not support Ervin’s claim that the court’s ruling excluding Dr. Searles’s testimony violated his federal constitutional right to present a defense.

2023For purposes of an intoxication defense, the jury was instructed that “[a] person is voluntarily intoxicated if he becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink or other substance, knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.” We presume the jurors followed these instructions (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 517 ), and no evidence suggests otherwise.

2023(People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 559 [reviewing court “assume[d] the jury abided by the court’s admonitions and instructions, and thereby avoided any prejudice”].) “When argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and disregarded the former, for ‘[w]e presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.’ ” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 717 .) The prosecutor herself encouraged the jury to

2022All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 .) Even if requested, “an intoxication instruction is not required when the evidence shows that a defendant ingested drugs or was drinking, unless the evidence also shows he became intoxicated to the point he failed to form the requisite intent or attain the requisite mental state.” (Ivans, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1661 .) The record thus suggests defense counsel made the tactical decision not to request the instruction since P.S.’s testimony was insuf

2022(People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 295 .) “A defendant is entitled to such an instruction only when there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant’s ‘actual formation of specific intent.’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 ; People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 295 .) “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was suff

2021(People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) F. Analysis None of the three witnesses in this case testified they smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath or person.