eight factors in Michigan

2021In People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 95 ; 252 NW2d 807 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court listed the following eight factors that a court should consider when determining whether an independent basis exists: (1) the witness’s prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant, (2) the witness’s opportunity to observe the offense, (3) the length of time between the offense and the disputed identification, (4) the accuracy of the witness’s description of the defendant before the showup identification, (5) any proper or erroneous prior identifications of the defendant, (6) any prior identification

2021In People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 95 ; 252 NW2d 807 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court listed the following eight factors that a court should consider when determining whether an independent basis exists: (1) the witness’s prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant, (2) the witness’s opportunity to observe the offense, (3) the length of time between the offense and the disputed identification, (4) the accuracy of the witness’s description of the defendant before the showup identification, (5) any proper or erroneous prior identifications of the defendant, (6) any prior identification

2020In making that determination, “the trial court should consider the eight factors listed in MRPC 1.5(a).” Id. at 766 .

2008Wood listed the following six factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee: (1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. [Wood, 413 Mich at 588 (citation omitted)].[ 14 ] The trial courts have also relied on the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., Dep’t of Transportation

2008Wood listed the following six factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee: (1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. [Wood, 413 Mich at 588 (citation omitted)].[ 14 ] The trial courts have also relied on the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., Dep’t of Transportation

2008Wood listed the following six factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee: (1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. [Wood, 413 Mich at 588 (citation omitted)].[ 14 ] The trial courts have also relied on the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., Dep’t of Transportation

2017Smith, 481 Mich at 530-31 . 2 In re Ujlaky, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2014 (Docket Nos. 316494, 316809); unpub op at 7, rev’d in part In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich 890 (2015). -2- First, the trial court must determine the “reasonable hourly rate” for the attorney’s services.

2017Smith, 481 Mich at 530-31 . 2 In re Ujlaky, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2014 (Docket Nos. 316494, 316809); unpub op at 7, rev’d in part In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich 890 (2015). -2- First, the trial court must determine the “reasonable hourly rate” for the attorney’s services.

2026In Duckworth, this Court determined that the eight factors used in McKissic also applied to an employee determination under MCL 500.3114(3): This Court has recognized the varying formulations of the economic-reality test and concluded that “[t]he tests are basically the same and each provides a rational framework.” Williams v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 190 Mich App 624, 627 , 476 NW2d 414 (1991).

2026In Duckworth, this Court determined that the eight factors used in McKissic also applied to an employee determination under MCL 500.3114(3): This Court has recognized the varying formulations of the economic-reality test and concluded that “[t]he tests are basically the same and each provides a rational framework.” Williams v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 190 Mich App 624, 627 , 476 NW2d 414 (1991).

2026GEICO and State Farm opposed Auto Owners’ motion, arguing that the eight factors from McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208-209 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), as applied to the economic-reality test in Duckworth v Cherokee Ins Co, 333 Mich App 202 ; 963 NW2d 610 (2020), indicated that Knight was an employee, and not an independent contractor.

2026GEICO and State Farm opposed Auto Owners’ motion, arguing that the eight factors from McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208-209 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), as applied to the economic-reality test in Duckworth v Cherokee Ins Co, 333 Mich App 202 ; 963 NW2d 610 (2020), indicated that Knight was an employee, and not an independent contractor.

2020The Supreme Court has cited McKissic with approval, see Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212 , 217 n 8; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), and most recently applied the eight factors, rather than merely four, in Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 578-580 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006), to determine whether the defendant city’s attorney was an employee or independent contract for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.

2020The Supreme Court has cited McKissic with approval, see Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212 , 217 n 8; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), and most recently applied the eight factors, rather than merely four, in Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 578-580 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006), to determine whether the defendant city’s attorney was an employee or independent contract for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.

2020The Supreme Court has cited McKissic with approval, see Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212 , 217 n 8; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), and most recently applied the eight factors, rather than merely four, in Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 578-580 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006), to determine whether the defendant city’s attorney was an employee or independent contract for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.

2020The Supreme Court has cited McKissic with approval, see Askew v Macomber, 398 Mich 212 , 217 n 8; 247 NW2d 288 (1976), and most recently applied the eight factors, rather than merely four, in Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 578-580 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006), to determine whether the defendant city’s attorney was an employee or independent contract for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.

2016Defendant bases his argument on Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin, 288 Mich App 143, 162-165 ; 792 NW2d 749 (2010), asserting that the trial court failed to apply the eight factors listed by the Duray Court that a trial court may consider when fashioning a remedy for a discovery violation.

2016Defendant bases his argument on Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin, 288 Mich App 143, 162-165 ; 792 NW2d 749 (2010), asserting that the trial court failed to apply the eight factors listed by the Duray Court that a trial court may consider when fashioning a remedy for a discovery violation.

2014The following eight factors should be considered, where relevant, to determine if an independent basis exists for admission of an in-court identification: (1) prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant; (2) opportunity to observe the offense, including length of time, lighting, and proximity to the criminal act; (3) length of time between the offense and the disputed identification; (4) accuracy of description compared to the defendant’s actual appearance; (5) previous proper identification or failure to identify the defendant; (6) any . . . identification lineup of another person a

2014The following eight factors should be considered, where relevant, to determine if an independent basis exists for admission of an in-court identification: (1) prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant; (2) opportunity to observe the offense, including length of time, lighting, and proximity to the criminal act; (3) length of time between the offense and the disputed identification; (4) accuracy of description compared to the defendant’s actual appearance; (5) previous proper identification or failure to identify the defendant; (6) any . . . identification lineup of another person a

2008See, e.g., Zdrojewski, 254 Mich App at 73 ; Temple v Kelel Distributing Co Inc, 183 Mich App 326, 333 ; 454 NW2d 610 (1990).

2008See, e.g., Zdrojewski, 254 Mich App at 73 ; Temple v Kelel Distributing Co Inc, 183 Mich App 326, 333 ; 454 NW2d 610 (1990).

2000It cited Howard v Canteen Corp, 192 Mich App 427 ; 481 NW2d 718 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265 ; 602 NW2d 367 (1999), and Rode v Dellarciprete, 892 F2d 1177 (CA 3, 1990), as persuasive authority that reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is the preferred method of calculating attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes.

2000It cited Howard v Canteen Corp, 192 Mich App 427 ; 481 NW2d 718 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265 ; 602 NW2d 367 (1999), and Rode v Dellarciprete, 892 F2d 1177 (CA 3, 1990), as persuasive authority that reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is the preferred method of calculating attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes.

2000It cited Howard v Canteen Corp, 192 Mich App 427 ; 481 NW2d 718 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265 ; 602 NW2d 367 (1999), and Rode v Dellarciprete, 892 F2d 1177 (CA 3, 1990), as persuasive authority that reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is the preferred method of calculating attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes.

2000It cited Howard v Canteen Corp, 192 Mich App 427 ; 481 NW2d 718 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265 ; 602 NW2d 367 (1999), and Rode v Dellarciprete, 892 F2d 1177 (CA 3, 1990), as persuasive authority that reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate is the preferred method of calculating attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes.

1998In Sword , Justice Coleman was discussing inability to pay as a defense in a civil contempt proceeding resulting from an "order of the court resulting from a previous trial...." Id. at 382 , 249 N.W.2d 88 .

1998We note that the eight factors have been affirmatively cited in dicta by this Court in People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 598-599 ; 330 NW2d 314 (1982), and also by Justice *117 Boyle’s separate opinion in People v Lee, 434 Mich 59, 110-111, n 4 ; 450 NW2d 883 (1990) (Boyle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 12 Because the independent basis inquiry is a factual one, not all eight factors will always be relevant to every case.

1998We note that the eight factors have been affirmatively cited in dicta by this Court in People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 598-599 ; 330 NW2d 314 (1982), and also by Justice *117 Boyle’s separate opinion in People v Lee, 434 Mich 59, 110-111, n 4 ; 450 NW2d 883 (1990) (Boyle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 12 Because the independent basis inquiry is a factual one, not all eight factors will always be relevant to every case.