16 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1989–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bonacorsa v. Van Lindtgreen2 sentences2016Nevertheless, when a private employer or public agency relies on the unreasonable risk exception of Correction Law § 752 in determining whether to grant employment or license to an ex-offender, it must also consider and apply the eight factors contained in Correction Law § 753 (1) (see Matter of Bonacorsa v Van Lindt, 71 NY2d 605, 613 [1988]). 1999Nonetheless, the certificate does not establish a prima facie entitlement to the license or employment, but only establishes, if not rebutted, that the applicant has been rehabilitated — just one of the eight factors that the Board must consider in determining whether an exception applies (Matter of Bonacorsa v Van Lindt, supra, 71 NY2d, at 614 ; see, Correction Law § 753 [1] [g]). | 3 | 5 |
Arrocha v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2016It is well established that a “certificate [of relief] does not establish a prima facie entitlement to . . . employment, but only establishes, if not rebutted, that the applicant has been rehabilitated—just one of the eight factors [to be considered under Correction Law § 753]” (Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 93 NY2d 361, 365 [1999]). 2016It is well established that a “certificate [of relief] does not establish a prima facie entitlement to . . . employment, but only establishes, if not rebutted, that the applicant has been rehabilitated—just one of the eight factors [to be considered under Correction Law § 753]” (Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 93 NY2d 361, 365 [1999]). | 3 | 4 |
Acosta v. New York City Department of Educationgreen2 sentences2020The DOE was "not required" to "state with specificity its detailed analysis with respect to each of the eight factors in its denial letter" or to "point to any contemporaneously created record" to show that it considered all eight factors ( Matter of Acosta v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 16 NY3d 309, 318-319 [2011]). 2015Moreover, the DOE is not obliged “to point to any contemporaneously created record that demonstrates that it considered each of the eight factors in reviewing petitioner’s application” (Acosta, 16 NY3d at 319 ). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Luther Dempsey v. New York City Department of Educationgreen1 sentence2020Nor has petitioner adduced evidence showing that the DOE failed to consider the information he provided in support of his application, which were specifically referenced in the letter or already a part of the entire file that was reviewed ( see Matter of Dempsey v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 25 NY3d 291, 300 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
Frank MM. v. Lorain NN.green1 sentence2018"Because Family Court did not articulate its consideration of each of the factors relevant to the . . . petition . . . and we are unable to glean the necessary information from the record, the court's [implicit] finding that New York was an inconvenient forum to resolve the [custody] petition is not supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record" ( Matter of Frank MM. v Lorain NN. , 103 AD3d 951, 954 [3d Dept 2013]). | 1 | 1 |
Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. The Stanley Worksgreen1 sentence1997(See, Estee Lauder, Inc. v The Gap, 108 F3d 1503 [2d Cir 1997].) No one of the Polaroid factors is dispositive, and the list is not exhaustive; “the analysis of the factors is ‘not a mechanical process.’ ” (Arrow Fastener Co. v Stanley Works, 59 F3d 384, 391 [2d Cir 1995]; see, Gruner + Jahr USA Publ. v Meredith Corp., 991 F2d 1072,1077 [2d Cir 1993].) A trial court’s finding as to each factor is one of fact, subject to review for a clearly erroneous standard. 1. | 1 | 1 |
Marra v. City of White Plainsgreen1 sentence1989Thus the licensing agency or employer must consider the eight factors listed in Correction Law § 753 (1) (a)-(h) to determine whether, in fact, the "direct relationship” is sufficiently attenuated to warrant issuance of the license (see, Matter of Marra v City of White Plains, 96 AD2d 17, 23 [2d Dept 1983]; 1985 Opns Atty Gen 14). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morris v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision
neutral
1 sentence2013In Morris, the court held that “the amended statute required that respondent develop written procedures that implement risk and needs principles, determine the likelihood of an inmate’s success upon release, and adopt those procedures as an exercise of its rule-making power.” ( 40 Misc 3d at 230 .) Further, “the amendment requires respondents to ‘establish written procedures,’ i.e., enumerate the materials the Board would use to determine an inmate’s likelihood of success upon release.” (Id.) This court agrees that the Department must develop these procedures, enumerate them, and apply them ac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.
green
1 sentence1997Co. ( 74 NY2d 201 ), and subsequently codified, as relevant to this matter, in various provisions of the rent stabilization regulations, the definition of a “family member” has been expanded beyond its traditional meaning to include “[a]ny other person residing with the tenant in the housing accommodation as a primary residence, who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and interdependence between such person and the tenant.” (9 NYCRR 2500.2 [n] [2]; see also, 9 NYCRR 2520.6 [o] [2].) These regulations provide that evidence of whether such “commitment” and “interdependence” existed may | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Estee Lauder Inc., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee v. The Gap, Inc. D/B/A Old Navy Clothing Company, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant
green
1 sentence1997(See, Estee Lauder, Inc. v The Gap, 108 F3d 1503 [2d Cir 1997].) No one of the Polaroid factors is dispositive, and the list is not exhaustive; “the analysis of the factors is ‘not a mechanical process.’ ” (Arrow Fastener Co. v Stanley Works, 59 F3d 384, 391 [2d Cir 1995]; see, Gruner + Jahr USA Publ. v Meredith Corp., 991 F2d 1072,1077 [2d Cir 1993].) A trial court’s finding as to each factor is one of fact, subject to review for a clearly erroneous standard. 1. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Keltner v. United States
green
1 sentence1997(Coach Leatherware Co. v AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F2d 162, 169 [2d Cir 1991] [reaffirming the rule that a showing of secondary meaning is not necessary to prove unfair competition under New York common law]; Perfect Fit Indus, v Acme Quilting Co., 618 F2d 950, 953-954 [2d Cir 1980], cert denied 459 US 832 [1982].) Polaroid (287 F2d 492, 495, supra) sets forth a still applicable balancing test with respect to “likelihood of confusion” of the following eight factors, including the: (1) strength of the mark; (2) degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) proximity of the products; (4) likelihood | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Magro v. Ambach
green
1 sentence1992Given that petitioner admitted previously purchasing a videotape depicting nudity of persons in their teens and younger and using pornographic material for sexual stimulation, that the materials on which his conviction was based involved children engaged in sexual activity, that petitioner was neither involved in therapy nor planning to recommence therapy at the time of the hearing despite the recommendations of two of the three psychiatrists he saw, that he had apparently not yet explored the conflict underlying his conduct, that just a year had elapsed between his offense and his application | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.