recreational immunity in Wisconsin

2021We explained that Hall’s “ordinary, necessary, and momentary diversion while still on the fair grounds certainly does not remove the landowner from the protection of the statute.” Id. ¶17 Contrary to Baumel’s assertion, Hall does not stand for the proposition that a walk which is a momentary diversion from a nonimmune activity cannot be inextricably connected to a recreational activity for purposes of the recreational immunity statute.

2016The majority's analogy fails because in Hall, 146 Wis. 2d at 487 , the Turtle Lake Lions Club was immunized from liability for an injury occurring on the grounds of a public park and in Lee, 164 Wis. 2d at 107 , the Elk Rod & Gun Club was considered a "landowner" under the recreational immunity statute as an occupant of a city park.

2001Accordingly, we will liberally construe the recreational immunity statute in favor of property owners when the activity in question is not specifically listed but "is substantially similar to the activities listed in the statute or whe[n] [the] activity is undertaken in circumstances substantially similar to the circumstances of a recreational activity." Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 631 . ¶ 21.

2001Accordingly, we will liberally construe the recreational immunity statute in favor of property owners when the activity in question is not specifically listed but "is substantially similar to the activities listed in the statute or whe[n] [the] activity is undertaken in circumstances substantially similar to the circumstances of a recreational activity." Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 631 . [5] ¶ 21.

1993In Bystery , we noted a municipality is not immune from liability under the recreational immunity statute when the injury occurs on a highway or sidewalk that, under sec. 81.15, Stats., it is bound to keep in repair. 4 Bystery, 146 Wis. 2d at 251 , 430 N.W.2d at 613 .

1993In Bystery , we noted a municipality is not immune from liability under the recreational immunity statute when the injury occurs on a highway or sidewalk that, under sec. 81.15, Stats., it is bound to keep in repair. 4 Bystery, 146 Wis. 2d at 251 , 430 N.W.2d at 613 .

2018Id. ¶ 7 The recreational immunity statute was enacted "to encourage property owners to open their lands for recreational activities by removing a property user's potential cause of action against a property owner's alleged negligence." Linville v. City of Janesville , 184 Wis. 2d 705 , 715, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).

2017"Recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 is a defense that may entitle a moving party to summary judgment." Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶ 7 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 .

2016Of Stanley-Boyd, 2001 WI 125, ¶ 11 , 248 Wis. 2d 548 , 635 N.W.2d 762 ("This court has wrestled with applying the recreational immunity statute . . . since its enactment. . . .

2016Of Stanley-Boyd, 2001 WI 125, ¶ 11 , 248 Wis. 2d 548 , 635 N.W.2d 762 ("This court has wrestled with applying the recreational immunity statute . . . since its enactment. . . .

2005STAT. § 29.68. [4] Smith, 823 F.2d at 1194 .

2005Leu argues that Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1987), is not controlling and, as a matter of public policy, should not be applied because the federal court's definition of "occupancy" runs counter to the purposes of Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute.

1995For a summary of the dissent's rationale, see Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 642-43 , 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). 17 Three justices dissented in Olsen, 90 Wis. 2d at 494 , including the author of this opinion. 18 The concurrence limited the cause of action to a social host who negligently provides alcohol beverages to underage persons. 19 See, e.g., Szarzynski v. YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875 , 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994) (holding the recreational immunity statute, sec. 895.92, constitutional even though persons injured on property owned by individuals or for-profit entities have a cause of action against

1995For a summary of the dissent's rationale, see Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 642-43 , 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984). 17 Three justices dissented in Olsen, 90 Wis. 2d at 494 , including the author of this opinion. 18 The concurrence limited the cause of action to a social host who negligently provides alcohol beverages to underage persons. 19 See, e.g., Szarzynski v. YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875 , 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994) (holding the recreational immunity statute, sec. 895.92, constitutional even though persons injured on property owned by individuals or for-profit entities have a cause of action against

2022CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2018 WI 24, ¶19 , 380 Wis. 2d 399 , 909 N.W.2d 136 . ¶20 “Recreational immunity under WIS.

2022CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2018 WI 24, ¶19 , 380 Wis. 2d 399 , 909 N.W.2d 136 . ¶20 “Recreational immunity under WIS.

2022In reviewing the recreational immunity statute, we concluded that “‘malicious’ does not include mere willful behavior.” Wilson v. Waukesha Cnty., 157 Wis. 2d 790, 796 , 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990).

2022In reviewing the recreational immunity statute, we concluded that “‘malicious’ does not include mere willful behavior.” Wilson v. Waukesha Cnty., 157 Wis. 2d 790, 796 , 460 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1990).

2021Kautz, 276 Wis. 2d 833, ¶8 .

2019STAT. § 895.52, reflects a legislative choice to "expand[ ] liability protection for landowners who open their private property for public recreational use." Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc. , 2018 WI App 69 , ¶15, 384 Wis.2d 520 , 920 N.W.2d 329 (citing Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc. , 2018 WI 12 , ¶21, 379 Wis.2d 471 , 907 N.W.2d 68 ).

2019STAT. § 895.52, reflects a legislative choice to "expand[ ] liability protection for landowners who open their private property for public recreational use." Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc. , 2018 WI App 69 , ¶15, 384 Wis.2d 520 , 920 N.W.2d 329 (citing Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc. , 2018 WI 12 , ¶21, 379 Wis.2d 471 , 907 N.W.2d 68 ).

2019Regardless of the court's statements about other possible scenarios and uses, it was not confronted with a situation in which the area was being used for recreational purposes but was also available for use by the general public. ¶24 The better analogy is to Lasky v. City of Stevens Point , 220 Wis.2d 1 , 582 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1998), in which we applied the recreational immunity *260 statute to bar personal injury claims arising out of a fall on a wooden bridge in a city park.

2019Regardless of the court's statements about other possible scenarios and uses, it was not confronted with a situation in which the area was being used for recreational purposes but was also available for use by the general public. ¶24 The better analogy is to Lasky v. City of Stevens Point , 220 Wis.2d 1 , 582 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1998), in which we applied the recreational immunity *260 statute to bar personal injury claims arising out of a fall on a wooden bridge in a city park.

2018STAT. § 895.52 (2015-16), barred the Langs' negligence claim against that defendant. 1 The issue before us is whether Fryed is also entitled to immunity under the recreational immunity statute either as an "agent" of the Lions Club or as an "occupier." 2 *526 ¶ 3 The trial court concluded that Fryed is entitled to immunity and granted summary judgment in its favor; in its oral ruling, the trial court cited to Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc. , 2015 WI App 61 , 364 Wis.2d 658 , 869 N.W.2d 515 , and Leu v. Price County Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc. , 2005 WI App 81 , 280 Wis.2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 88

2018STAT. § 895.52 (2015-16), barred the Langs' negligence claim against that defendant. 1 The issue before us is whether Fryed is also entitled to immunity under the recreational immunity statute either as an "agent" of the Lions Club or as an "occupier." 2 *526 ¶ 3 The trial court concluded that Fryed is entitled to immunity and granted summary judgment in its favor; in its oral ruling, the trial court cited to Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc. , 2015 WI App 61 , 364 Wis.2d 658 , 869 N.W.2d 515 , and Leu v. Price County Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc. , 2005 WI App 81 , 280 Wis.2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 88

2018In Doane, the court of appeals explained that the term "occupy" as it is used in Wis. Stat. § 895.52 requires "a degree of permanence, as opposed to the mere use of the property in question." Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351 . ¶47 In Roberts, we also noted that the purpose of the recreational immunity statute is to encourage landowners to open land for public use.

2018Ltd., 161 Wis. 2d 887, 900 , 469 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that § 29.68 did not grant immunity to a contractor working to deconstruct an abandoned railroad right-of-way because neither the activity, which was riding an ATV, nor the modified condition of the land, fell within the purview of the statute). 11 No. 20151039 ¶22 The legislative purpose of the statute is stated in 1983 Wis. Act. 418, § 1.

2018Ltd., 161 Wis. 2d 887, 900 , 469 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that § 29.68 did not grant immunity to a contractor working to deconstruct an abandoned railroad right-of-way because neither the activity, which was riding an ATV, nor the modified condition of the land, fell within the purview of the statute). 11 No. 20151039 ¶22 The legislative purpose of the statute is stated in 1983 Wis. Act. 418, § 1.

2018STAT. § 895.52 (2015-16), barred the Langs' negligence claim against that defendant. 1 The issue before us is whether Fryed is also entitled to immunity under the recreational immunity statute either as an "agent" of the Lions Club or as an "occupier." 2 *526 ¶ 3 The trial court concluded that Fryed is entitled to immunity and granted summary judgment in its favor; in its oral ruling, the trial court cited to Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc. , 2015 WI App 61 , 364 Wis.2d 658 , 869 N.W.2d 515 , and Leu v. Price County Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc. , 2005 WI App 81 , 280 Wis.2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 88

2018STAT. § 895.52 (2015-16), barred the Langs' negligence claim against that defendant. 1 The issue before us is whether Fryed is also entitled to immunity under the recreational immunity statute either as an "agent" of the Lions Club or as an "occupier." 2 *526 ¶ 3 The trial court concluded that Fryed is entitled to immunity and granted summary judgment in its favor; in its oral ruling, the trial court cited to Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc. , 2015 WI App 61 , 364 Wis.2d 658 , 869 N.W.2d 515 , and Leu v. Price County Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc. , 2005 WI App 81 , 280 Wis.2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 88