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5 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafoodgreen2 sentences1994Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Okla.1964); In re Stovall, 306 Or. 25, 38 , 757 P.2d 410, 417 (1988). 1994Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Okla.1964); In re Stovall, 306 Or. 25, 38 , 757 P.2d 410, 417 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
H. J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grishamgreen2 sentences1994Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Okla.1964); In re Stovall, 306 Or. 25, 38 , 757 P.2d 410, 417 (1988). 1994Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Okla.1964); In re Stovall, 306 Or. 25, 38 , 757 P.2d 410, 417 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Still v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.green2 sentences1994Co., 368 U.S. 35, 44 , 82 S.Ct. 148, 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 103, 109 (1961), limited Rock “to its precise facts.” Under Still , a railroad cannot defend a-Federal Employers’ Liability Act claim by proving that the employee made false representations as to his physical condition upon which the railroad relied in hiring him, even if the misrepresentation contributed to the injury or accident. 368 U.S. at 35-36, 44-45 , 82 S.Ct. at 149, 153-154 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 104-105, 109-110 . 3 After reviewing these authorities, we determine that the better-reasoned approach, considering the New Jersey statutory schem 1994Co., 368 U.S. 35, 44 , 82 S.Ct. 148, 153 , 7 L.Ed.2d 103, 109 (1961), limited Rock “to its precise facts.” Under Still , a railroad cannot defend a-Federal Employers’ Liability Act claim by proving that the employee made false representations as to his physical condition upon which the railroad relied in hiring him, even if the misrepresentation contributed to the injury or accident. 368 U.S. at 35-36, 44-45 , 82 S.Ct. at 149, 153-154 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 104-105, 109-110 . 3 After reviewing these authorities, we determine that the better-reasoned approach, considering the New Jersey statutory schem | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Port Authority
green
1 sentence2020Applying the six "Larson factors," as relied upon by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82 , 87–88 (2003) (establishing the proper jurisdictional analysis for an employee's occupational disease claim and discussing the common factors used to confer jurisdiction) (citing 9 Lex K. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kelly v. Geriatric and Med. Serv.
green
2 sentences2014In Kelly v. Geriatric and Medical Services, Inc., 287 N.J. 2014In Kelly v. Geriatric and Medical Services, Inc., 287 N.J. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Volb v. G.E. Capital Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Capital Corp., 139 N.J. 110 (1995), the Court expressed its approval of our adoption of the Larson test, as well as two additional factors, particularly noting that "the most important factor in determining a special employee's status is whether the borrowing employer had the right to control the special employee's work[.]" Id. at 116 . 2014Capital Corp., 139 N.J. 110 (1995), the Court expressed its approval of our adoption of the Larson test, as well as two additional factors, particularly noting that "the most important factor in determining a special employee's status is whether the borrowing employer had the right to control the special employee's work[.]" Id. at 116 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Connolly v. Port Authority
green
2 sentences2009In Connolly , the plaintiff was an employee of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority), a bi-state agency. 317 N.J.Super. at 318 , 722 A. 2d 110 . 2009In Connolly , the plaintiff was an employee of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority), a bi-state agency. 317 N.J.Super. at 318 , 722 A. 2d 110 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Air Mod Corporation v. Newton
green
2 sentences1994Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo.1985) (reversing only because line on job application left blank, not filled in with dishonest answer) [note the similarity to the facts in our case]; Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del. 148 , 215 A.2d 434 (1965); Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Georgia Elec. 1994Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo.1985) (reversing only because line on job application left blank, not filled in with dishonest answer) [note the similarity to the facts in our case]; Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del. 148 , 215 A.2d 434 (1965); Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Georgia Elec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994Carr and Pitts cite the following cases: Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 603 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992); Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365 , 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); Artcraft Sign Co. v. McGrath, 679 P.2d 1103 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) (court adopts Larson test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Artcraft Sign Co. v. McGrath
neutral
1 sentence1994Carr and Pitts cite the following cases: Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 603 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992); Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365 , 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); Artcraft Sign Co. v. McGrath, 679 P.2d 1103 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) (court adopts Larson test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Shippers Transport of Georgia v. Stepp
green
2 sentences1994Carr and Pitts cite the following cases: Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 603 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992); Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365 , 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); Artcraft Sign Co. v. McGrath, 679 P.2d 1103 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) (court adopts Larson test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 1994Carr and Pitts cite the following cases: Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 603 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992); Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365 , 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); Artcraft Sign Co. v. McGrath, 679 P.2d 1103 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) (court adopts Larson test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Martin Company v. Carpenter
green
1 sentence1994Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo.1985) (reversing only because line on job application left blank, not filled in with dishonest answer) [note the similarity to the facts in our case]; Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del. 148 , 215 A.2d 434 (1965); Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Georgia Elec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co.
green
1 sentence1994Kraus v. Artcraft Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480 (Colo.1985) (reversing only because line on job application left blank, not filled in with dishonest answer) [note the similarity to the facts in our case]; Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del. 148 , 215 A.2d 434 (1965); Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 400 (Fla.1961); Georgia Elec. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York
green
2 sentences1992Three elements must be met under Lemon, viz: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [ 403 U.S. at 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 755 (quoting Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 704 ).] Because the kosher regulations provide both substantive standards prescribing religious practices and procedures for their enforcement, the entanglement prong, wh 1992Three elements must be met under Lemon, viz: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [ 403 U.S. at 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 755 (quoting Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 704 ).] Because the kosher regulations provide both substantive standards prescribing religious practices and procedures for their enforcement, the entanglement prong, wh | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences1992Three elements must be met under Lemon, viz: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [ 403 U.S. at 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 755 (quoting Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 704 ).] Because the kosher regulations provide both substantive standards prescribing religious practices and procedures for their enforcement, the entanglement prong, wh 1992Three elements must be met under Lemon, viz: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ... finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” [ 403 U.S. at 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 755 (quoting Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 704 ).] Because the kosher regulations provide both substantive standards prescribing religious practices and procedures for their enforcement, the entanglement prong, wh | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.