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9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Young v. Taylor-White, LLCgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Young v. Taylor-White, LLC, 181 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tenn. 2005) (declining to use the Larson test, instead holding that the question should turn on whether participation in a recreational event was voluntary or was impliedly required as part of one’s employment). 2008See, e.g., Young v. Taylor-White, LLC, 181 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tenn. 2005) (declining to use the Larson test, instead holding that the question should turn on whether participation in a recreational event was voluntary or was impliedly required as part of one’s employment). | 2 | 2 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences2004See id. at 325-26 . 2004See id. at 325-26 . | 2 | 2 |
Shelton v. Azar, Inc.green2 sentences2008While Larson's thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will only approve a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶ 66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are "`"required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest."'" 90 Wash.App. at 933-34 , 954 P.2d 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 278 , 928 P.2d 1138 (quoting 2008While Larson’s thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will approve only a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are “ ‘ “required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer’s interest.” ’ ” 90 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
Moreman v. Butchergreen1 sentence2025We may overturn the trial court’s decision only if the decision “‘rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard’” or even when using the correct legal standard, the trial court “‘adopt[ed] a view that no reasonable person would take’” or “‘arrive[d] at a decision ‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’” Id. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654 , 71 P.3d 638 (2003)). 6 The judge recused himself after Larson, unbeknownst to his attorney, was waiting on benches outside the judge’s courtroom around | 1 | 1 |
State v. Slonegreen1 sentence2013State v. Bourgeois. 133 Wn.2d 389, 406 , 945 P.2d 1120 (1997); State v. Slone. 133 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larsongreen2 sentences2004See id. at 325-26 , 783 P.2d 1093 . 2004See id. at 325-26 , 783 P.2d 1093 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lynch
green
2 sentences2002When police initiate such encounters for "noncriminal noninvestigatory purposes," we determine the admissibility of evidence gained therefrom by balancing "`the individual's interest in freedom from police interference against the public's interest in having the police perform a `community caretaking function.'" State v. Lynch, 84 Wash.App. 467, 477 , 929 P.2d 460 (1996) (quoting State v. Mennegar, 114 Wash.2d 304, 313 , 787 P.2d 1347 (1990)). 2002When police initiate such encounters for “noncriminal noninvestigatory purposes,” we determine the admissibility of evidence gained therefrom by balancing “ ‘the individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the public’s interest in having the police perform a “community caretaking function.” ’ ” State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Rohrich
green
1 sentence2025We may overturn the trial court’s decision only if the decision “‘rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard’” or even when using the correct legal standard, the trial court “‘adopt[ed] a view that no reasonable person would take’” or “‘arrive[d] at a decision ‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’” Id. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654 , 71 P.3d 638 (2003)). 6 The judge recused himself after Larson, unbeknownst to his attorney, was waiting on benches outside the judge’s courtroom around | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bly v. Henry
neutral
1 sentence2025App. 469, 471 , 624 P.2d 717 (1980). 11 We need not consider Larson’s claim that the court erred in awarding Bohn attorney fees because that claim rests entirely on his argument that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Rohrich
green
1 sentence2025We may overturn the trial court’s decision only if the decision “‘rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard’” or even when using the correct legal standard, the trial court “‘adopt[ed] a view that no reasonable person would take’” or “‘arrive[d] at a decision ‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’” Id. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654 , 71 P.3d 638 (2003)). 6 The judge recused himself after Larson, unbeknownst to his attorney, was waiting on benches outside the judge’s courtroom around | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Bourgeois
green
1 sentence2013State v. Bourgeois. 133 Wn.2d 389, 406 , 945 P.2d 1120 (1997); State v. Slone. 133 Wn. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Bourgeois
green
1 sentence2013State v. Bourgeois. 133 Wn.2d 389, 406 , 945 P.2d 1120 (1997); State v. Slone. 133 Wn. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Department of Labor & Industries v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2008While Larson's thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will only approve a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶ 66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are "`"required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest."'" 90 Wash.App. at 933-34 , 954 P.2d 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 278 , 928 P.2d 1138 (quoting 2008While Larson's thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will only approve a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶ 66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are "`"required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest."'" 90 Wash.App. at 933-34 , 954 P.2d 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 278 , 928 P.2d 1138 (quoting | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lunz v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
1 sentence2008While Larson's thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will only approve a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶ 66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are "`"required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest."'" 90 Wash.App. at 933-34 , 954 P.2d 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 278 , 928 P.2d 1138 (quoting | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Mennegar
green
2 sentences2002When police initiate such encounters for "noncriminal noninvestigatory purposes," we determine the admissibility of evidence gained therefrom by balancing "`the individual's interest in freedom from police interference against the public's interest in having the police perform a `community caretaking function.'" State v. Lynch, 84 Wash.App. 467, 477 , 929 P.2d 460 (1996) (quoting State v. Mennegar, 114 Wash.2d 304, 313 , 787 P.2d 1347 (1990)). 2002When police initiate such encounters for "noncriminal noninvestigatory purposes," we determine the admissibility of evidence gained therefrom by balancing "`the individual's interest in freedom from police interference against the public's interest in having the police perform a `community caretaking function.'" State v. Lynch, 84 Wash.App. 467, 477 , 929 P.2d 460 (1996) (quoting State v. Mennegar, 114 Wash.2d 304, 313 , 787 P.2d 1347 (1990)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Gluck
green
2 sentences1981The Larson stop is factually indistinguishable from the circumstances in State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the police had a "well-founded" suspicion justifying a stop for a brief inquiry, arising out of the following facts stated at page 425: Between 4 and 5 a.m. on July 24, 1971, two city policemen were patrolling an industrial area of Seattle, Washington, in which there had been an increasing number of burglaries. 1981The Larson stop is factually indistinguishable from the circumstances in State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the police had a "well-founded" suspicion justifying a stop for a brief inquiry, arising out of the following facts stated at page 425: Between 4 and 5 a.m. on July 24, 1971, two city policemen were patrolling an industrial area of Seattle, Washington, in which there had been an increasing number of burglaries. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Hobart
green
2 sentences1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co 1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Larson
neutral
2 sentences1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co 1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Sieler
green
2 sentences1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co 1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Brown v. Texas
green
2 sentences1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co 1981App. 506 , 587 P.2d 171 (1978)), the majority opinion did not refer to State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424 , 518 P.2d 703 (1974) and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have approvingly cited the case, see State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 46 , 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 443 , 617 P.2d 429 (1980), the continued validity of Gluck is dubious in view of the Larson analysis, which we consider to be controlling. [5] There, the United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the question at bench, reaffirming the principle set forth in Brown, 443 U.S. at 48 , as follows: "Co | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.