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40 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Spencer Gifts, LLCgreen2 sentences2024The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by parties.'" State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 304 Kan. 755, 761 , 374 P.3d 680 (2016); see also Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) ("We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used."). 2024The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by parties.'" State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 304 Kan. 755, 761 , 374 P.3d 680 (2016); see also Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) ("We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used."). | 5 | 16 |
Wright v. Noellgreen2 sentences2018Indeed, "statutory language is an appellate court's paramount consideration because the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used." In re Estate of Strader , 301 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 769 (2014) ; Wright v. Noell , 16 Kan. 601 , 607 (1876). 2018Indeed, "statutory language is an appellate court's paramount consideration because the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used." In re Estate of Strader, 301 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 769 (2014); Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607 (1876). | 4 | 9 |
Gannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2016A statute’s language is our paramount consideration because “ ‘ “the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.” ’ ” State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014) (quoting Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d 1196 [2014] [quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607 , 1876 WL 1081 (1876)]). 2016A statute’s language is our paramount consideration because “ ‘ “the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.” ’ ” State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014) (quoting Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d 1196 [2014] [quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607 , 1876 WL 1081 (1876)]). | 4 | 6 |
Taylor v. Kobachgreen2 sentences2024The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by parties.'" State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 304 Kan. 755, 761 , 374 P.3d 680 (2016); see also Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) ("We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used."). 2024The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by parties.'" State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 304 Kan. 755, 761 , 374 P.3d 680 (2016); see also Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) ("We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Genslergreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Gensler, 308 Kan. 674 , 677, 423 P.3d 488 (2018) (legislative intent governs statutory interpretation; reliance on plain, unambiguous language "the best and only safe rule" for determining intent; only if language ambiguous does court move to statutory construction). 2020See, e.g., State v. Gensler, 308 Kan. 674 , 677, 423 P.3d 488 (2018) (legislative intent governs statutory interpretation; reliance on plain, unambiguous language "the best and only safe rule" for determining intent; only if language ambiguous does court move to statutory construction). | 2 | 2 |
Merryfield v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2022"Reliance on the plain and unambiguous language of a statute is 'the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of the creators of a written law.'" 304 Kan. at 761 (quoting Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399 , 343 P.3d 515 [2015]). 2022"Reliance on the plain and unambiguous language of a statute is 'the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of the creators of a written law.'" 304 Kan. at 761 (quoting Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399 , 343 P.3d 515 [2015]). | 1 | 12 |
State v. Looneygreen2 sentences2016A statute’s language is our paramount consideration because “ ‘ “the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.” ’ ” State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014) (quoting Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d 1196 [2014] [quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607 , 1876 WL 1081 (1876)]). 2016A statute’s language is our paramount consideration because “ ‘ “the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.” ’ ” State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906 , 327 P.3d 425 (2014) (quoting Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d 1196 [2014] [quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607 , 1876 WL 1081 (1876)]). | 1 | 5 |
In Re the Estate of Stradergreen2 sentences2018Indeed, "statutory language is an appellate court's paramount consideration because the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used." In re Estate of Strader , 301 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 769 (2014) ; Wright v. Noell , 16 Kan. 601 , 607 (1876). 2018Indeed, "statutory language is an appellate court's paramount consideration because the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used." In re Estate of Strader , 301 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 769 (2014) ; Wright v. Noell , 16 Kan. 601 , 607 (1876). | 1 | 4 |
Vontress v. Statered2 sentences2016The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by par ties.” (Emphasis added.) Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399 , 343 P.3d 515 (2015); see Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) (“We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.”); Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 611 , 325 P.3d 1114 (2014); Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d 2016The plain language selected by the legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates, trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by par ties.” (Emphasis added.) Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399 , 343 P.3d 515 (2015); see Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735 , 334 P.3d 306 (2014) (“We have often expressed that the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used.”); Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 611 , 325 P.3d 1114 (2014); Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143 , 319 P.3d | 1 | 2 |
State v. Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Great Plains of Kiowa County, Inc., 308 Kan. at 957 ("Relying on the plain language selected by the legislature is the best and only safe rule for determining legislative intent, and such plain language takes priority over both judicial decisions and policies advocated by the parties.") (citing State v. Spencer Gifts, 304 Kan. 755, 761 , 374 P.3d 680 [2016]). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2018When, as here, "a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it." Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738-39, 317 P.3d 90 (2014) ; see State v. Gray , 306 Kan. 1287 , 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) ("we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words"). 2018When, as here, "a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it." Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738-39, 317 P.3d 90 (2014) ; see State v. Gray , 306 Kan. 1287 , 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) ("we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ambrosier v. Brownback
green
2 sentences2018Therefore, we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words, and only '[i]f the language is less than clear or is ambiguous, [do] we move to statutory construction.' Ambrosier v. Brownback , 304 Kan. 907 , 911, 375 P.3d 1007 (2016). 2018Therefore, we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words, and only '[i]f the language is less than clear or is ambiguous, [do] we move to statutory construction.' Ambrosier v. Brownback , 304 Kan. 907 , 911, 375 P.3d 1007 (2016). | 6 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Nguyen
green
2 sentences2017The statutory language itself is our paramount consideration because "the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Nguyen, 304 Kan. 420, 422 , 372 P.3d 1142 (2016). 2017The statutory language itself is our paramount consideration because "the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the language they have used. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Nguyen, 304 Kan. 420, 422 , 372 P.3d 1142 (2016). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Stanley v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2015Generally, the statutory language is "the primary consideration in ascertaining the intent of the legislature because the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of the creators of a written law is to abide by the language that they have chosen to use." Stanley v. Sullivan, 300 Kan. 1015, 1017 , 336 P.3d 870 (2014). 2015Generally, the statutory language is “tire primary consideration in ascertaining the intent of the legislature because the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of the creators of a written law is to abide by the language that they have chosen to use.” Stanley v. Sullivan, 300 Kan. 1015, 1017 , 336 P.3d 870 (2014). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Cady v. Schroll
green
2 sentences2018When, as here, "a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it." Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738-39, 317 P.3d 90 (2014) ; see State v. Gray , 306 Kan. 1287 , 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) ("we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words"). 2018When, as here, "a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it." Cady v. Schroll , 298 Kan. 731 , 738-39, 317 P.3d 90 (2014) ; see State v. Gray , 306 Kan. 1287 , 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) ("we read the statutory language as it appears, without adding or deleting words"). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Rather, we can look to the plain language of K.S.A. 60-518 itself, which states unequivocally that it applies to " any action" that is commenced within "due time" and that fails "otherwise than upon the merits" when "the time limit for the same shall have expired." (Emphasis added.) This broad language encompasses a suit such as Harsay's, and this straightforward reading of it is " 'the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of lawmakers.' " Neighbor , 301 Kan. at 919 , 349 P.3d 469 . 2018Rather, we can look to the plain language of K.S.A. 60-518 itself, which states unequivocally that it applies to " any action" that is commenced within "due time" and that fails "otherwise than upon the merits" when "the time limit for the same shall have expired." (Emphasis added.) This broad language encompasses a suit such as Harsay's, and this straightforward reading of it is " 'the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the intention of lawmakers.' " Neighbor , 301 Kan. at 919 , 349 P.3d 469 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Skov v. Wicker
green
2 sentences2015Furthermore, third-party visitation statutes must be strictly construed. 6 See Skov v. Wicker, 272 Kan. 240, 249 , 32 P.3d 1122 (2001); State ex rel. 2015Furthermore, third-party visitation statutes must be strictly construed. 6 See Skov v. Wicker, 272 Kan. 240, 249 , 32 P.3d 1122 (2001); State ex rel. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Towner
neutral
1 sentence1990We hold as to the offense charged in count two that the evidence, although sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of petty larceny, was insufficient to support a conviction of grand larceny.” 202 Kan. at 29-30 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
De Jarnett v. Harper
green
1 sentence1903This is the only safe rule, and the only one that will prevent confusion and conflict in the administration of the estates of minors.” In DeJarnett v. Harper, 45 Mo. App. 415 , the syllabus reads as follows : “The jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor rests alone with the probate court at the county where ■the minor has his domicile ; and primarily the domicile of the parents, or the survivor of them, is the domicile of the minor child. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.