safe rule in Michigan

2023This is because violation of the restriction affects no interest but his own.” Sloman v Cutler, 258 Mich 372, 374 ; 242 NW 735 (1932).

2023This is because violation of the restriction affects no interest but his own.” Sloman v Cutler, 258 Mich 372, 374 ; 242 NW 735 (1932).

1955The principle was also asserted in Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich 373 ( 42 ALR 1267 ), and Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich 372 , although in the latter case it was held that *352 a vendor conld protect Ms remaining interest in the property by reasonable restraint while the contract was executory.

1955The principle was also asserted in Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich 373 ( 42 ALR 1267 ), and Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich 372 , although in the latter case it was held that *352 a vendor conld protect Ms remaining interest in the property by reasonable restraint while the contract was executory.

1940In Patterson v. Kasper, supra, we said : “In a case like the present one (recovery being sought for an infant’s alleged tort) it is said a safe test to apply is: ‘Can the infant be held liable without directly or indirectly enforcing’ his promise 1’ Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472 ( 9 N. E. 420 , 58 Am.

1940In Patterson v. Kasper, supra, we said : “In a case like the present one (recovery being sought for an infant’s alleged tort) it is said a safe test to apply is: ‘Can the infant be held liable without directly or indirectly enforcing’ his promise 1’ Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472 ( 9 N. E. 420 , 58 Am.

1999Each case must be determined on its own facts, and it cannot be said that the maintenance and breeding of a flock of racing pigeons is the usual, ordinary or incidental use of one’s property for “residential purposes only.” [Id. at 288-289.] *344 With regard to whether a restriction has been waived, we likewise have said that “[w]hether or not there has been a waiver of a restrictive covenant or whether those seeking to enforce the same are guilty of laches are questions to be determined on the facts of each case as presented.” Grandmont Improvement Ass’n v Liquor Control Comm, 294 Mich 541, 5

1999Each case must be determined on its own facts, and it cannot be said that the maintenance and breeding of a flock of racing pigeons is the usual, ordinary or incidental use of one’s property for “residential purposes only.” [Id. at 288-289.] *344 With regard to whether a restriction has been waived, we likewise have said that “[w]hether or not there has been a waiver of a restrictive covenant or whether those seeking to enforce the same are guilty of laches are questions to be determined on the facts of each case as presented.” Grandmont Improvement Ass’n v Liquor Control Comm, 294 Mich 541, 5

1982It is a safe rule that the usual, ordinary and incidental use of property as a place of abode does not violate a covenant restricting such use to 'residence purposes only’, but that an unusual and extraordinary use may constitute a violation.” Wood, supra, 288-289 .

1969The right to a strictly preserved protection against undue influence cannot be made to depend on discretion.” In In re Ascher (1902), 130 Mich 540, 551 (57 LEA 806), this Court said: “It is a right of which the accused cannot be deprived to have his case tried by an impartial jury.” In Cooper v. Carr (1910), 161 Mich 405 , this Court concluded that defendant did not have the benefit of such a jury trial as she was entitled to have under the law, that defendant was entitled — as a matter of right — to have the same set aside, and that the trial judge, on the facts found by him upon the motion f

1969The right to a strictly preserved protection against undue influence cannot be made to depend on discretion." In In re Ascher (1902), 130 Mich 540, 551 (57 LRA 806), this Court said: "It is a right of which the accused cannot be deprived to have his case tried by an impartial jury." *483 In Cooper v. Carr (1910), 161 Mich 405 , this Court concluded that defendant did not have the benefit of such a jury trial as she was entitled to have under the law, that defendant was entitled — as a matter of right — to have the same set aside, and that the trial judge, on the facts found by him upon the mot

1962The right to a strictly preserved protection against undue influence cannot he made to depend on discretion.” *208 As late as 1937 Justice Potter, writing for this Court in People v. Chambers, 279 Mich 73 , in reversing the lower court and granting a new trial, said (p 80): “It may he the acts or conduct of the officer had nothing to do with the deliberations of the jury or the conclusions which they arrived at.

1962The presence of a single other person in the room is an intrusion upon this privacy and confidence, and tends to defeat the purpose for which they are sent out.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Churchill v. Alpena Circuit Judge, 56 Mich 536 , Justice Campbell said (p 540): “The only safe rule must be to treat the jury as disqualified to settle the rights of litigants as soon as they cease to be guarded against unlawful contact with the outside world.

1958Cited by plaintiff, but not in point, is Albrecht v. Pritchard, 347 Mich 166 , in which we said (p 171): “Indeed, and in the present case, the trier of facts would have been justified in finding that located presence of such debris is just as consistent with plaintiff’s theory as with that of defendant.” Heré the location of the skid marks, debris and the 2 vehicles immediately following the accident is absolutely inconsistent with plaintiff’s theory that the accident happened in the west half of the highway and establishes, instead, defendants’ claim in that regard.

1958Cited by plaintiff, but not in point, is Albrecht v. Pritchard, 347 Mich 166 , in which we said (p 171): "Indeed, and in the present case, the trier of facts would have been justified in finding that located presence of such debris is just as consistent with plaintiff's theory as with that of defendant." Here the location of the skid marks, debris and the 2 vehicles immediately following the accident is absolutely inconsistent with plaintiff's theory that the accident happened in the west half of the highway and establishes, instead, defendants' claim in that regard.

1955We there said (p 107) : “The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which would suspend all power of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and void.” We have continued to follow the principle of restraints on alienation as set forth in the above case by holding various types of pre-emption provisions void because they were restraints on alienation, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich 143 ( 124 ALR 215 ), where a deed attempted to prohibit either 1 of 2 joint tenants fro

1955We there said (p 107) : “The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which would suspend all power of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and void.” We have continued to follow the principle of restraints on alienation as set forth in the above case by holding various types of pre-emption provisions void because they were restraints on alienation, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich 143 ( 124 ALR 215 ), where a deed attempted to prohibit either 1 of 2 joint tenants fro

1953We there said: “The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which would suspend all power of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and void.”' *695 See, also, In re Estate of Schilling, 102 Mich 612 ; and Chappell v. Chappell (Ky Ct of App), 119 SW 218 .

1940In Fox v. Peninsular White Lead & Color Works, 92 Mich. 243 ( 16 Am.

1940In Patterson v. Kasper, supra, we said : “In a case like the present one (recovery being sought for an infant’s alleged tort) it is said a safe test to apply is: ‘Can the infant be held liable without directly or indirectly enforcing’ his promise 1’ Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472 ( 9 N. E. 420 , 58 Am.

1929Bement’s Sons, supra, arose.

1925The only safe rule is to hold that a condition that restrains *379 the power of alienation to any extent whatever, either as to- persons or time, is inconsistent with the estate granted, as, indeed, it necessarily must be if the estate be title in fee simple absolute, and if, as all must admit, the power of alienation is an inseparable incident to, and a necessary concommitant of, ownership.” In addition to the cases cited by plaintiffs’ counsel it should be stated that Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 Fed. 899 , also sustains their contention although the bill in that case only asked for the enforcem

1921“Certainty in the law of real estate, as to the incidents and nature of the several species of estates and the effect of the recognized instruments and modes of transfer is of too much importance to be sacrificed to the unskilfulness, the whims or caprices of a few peculiar individuals in isolated cases.” The case was cited with approval in Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526 (7 L.

1917Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95 [6 Sup. Ct. 291]; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 [15 Sup. Ct. 116] ; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 709 [23 Sup. Ct. 456]; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372 [25 Sup. Ct. 282]; Davis’ Case, 122 Mass. 324 ; State v. O’Connor, 38 Minn. 243 [ 36 N. W. 462 ]; State v. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 [ 68 N. W. 1089 ]; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J.

1917Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95 [6 Sup. Ct. 291]; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 [15 Sup. Ct. 116] ; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 709 [23 Sup. Ct. 456]; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372 [25 Sup. Ct. 282]; Davis’ Case, 122 Mass. 324 ; State v. O’Connor, 38 Minn. 243 [ 36 N. W. 462 ]; State v. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 [ 68 N. W. 1089 ]; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J.

1917Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95 [6 Sup. Ct. 291]; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 [15 Sup. Ct. 116] ; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 709 [23 Sup. Ct. 456]; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372 [25 Sup. Ct. 282]; Davis’ Case, 122 Mass. 324 ; State v. O’Connor, 38 Minn. 243 [ 36 N. W. 462 ]; State v. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 [ 68 N. W. 1089 ]; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J.

1917Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95 [6 Sup. Ct. 291]; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 [15 Sup. Ct. 116] ; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 709 [23 Sup. Ct. 456]; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372 [25 Sup. Ct. 282]; Davis’ Case, 122 Mass. 324 ; State v. O’Connor, 38 Minn. 243 [ 36 N. W. 462 ]; State v. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 [ 68 N. W. 1089 ]; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J.

1917Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95 [6 Sup. Ct. 291]; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U. S. 311, 313 [15 Sup. Ct. 116] ; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 709 [23 Sup. Ct. 456]; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372 [25 Sup. Ct. 282]; Davis’ Case, 122 Mass. 324 ; State v. O’Connor, 38 Minn. 243 [ 36 N. W. 462 ]; State v. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 [ 68 N. W. 1089 ]; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J.

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1915There can be no longer any doubt in this State that, ‘where a duty is assumed by the master, or is imposed upon him by contract, or is customarily performed by him, it becomes a nondelegable one’ ” — citing Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 ( 135 N. W. 937 ); Scendar v. Copper Co., 169 Mich. 665 ( 135 N. W. 951 ); Oiva v. Mining Co., 178 Mich. 645 ( 146 N. W. 181 ).

1910State v. Hartmann, 46 Wis. 248 ( 50 N. W. 193 ).