safe rule in Texas

1949Stanchel v. State, 89 Tex. Cr.

1943Stanchel v. State, 89 Texas Crim.

1975The Court noted that such argument was invited and was in reply to statements made by the defense counsel when he argued: "(1) `* * * I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the information Mr. Whaley (prosecutor) had when he started this case, was completely different than what came out from the witness stand." "(2) `They (prosecutors) don't want to have a struggle inside the apartment, because that doesn't go along with whatever the story that you want to accept that the complainant has.'" Judge Hawkins, in Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548, 550 (1924), stated: "We think

1975See also Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Green v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 442 , 221 S.W.2d 612 (1949); Stovall v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 495 , 221 S.W.2d 278 (1949); Erisman’s Manual of Reversible Errors, First Edition, Sections 512, 513; and 5 Tex.Jur.2d, Section 436, page 657.

1975The Court noted that such argument was invited and was in reply to statements made by the defense counsel when he argued: "(1) `* * * I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the information Mr. Whaley (prosecutor) had when he started this case, was completely different than what came out from the witness stand." "(2) `They (prosecutors) don't want to have a struggle inside the apartment, because that doesn't go along with whatever the story that you want to accept that the complainant has.'" Judge Hawkins, in Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548, 550 (1924), stated: "We think

1975The Court noted that such argument was invited and was in reply to statements made by the defense counsel when he argued: "(1) ‘* * * I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the information Mr. Whaley (prosecutor) had when he started this case, was completely different than what came out from the witness stand.’ “(2) ‘They (prosecutors) don’t want to have a struggle inside the apartment, because that doesn’t go along with whatever the story that you want to accept that the complainant has.’ ” Judge Hawkins, in Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548, 550 (1924), stated: “We thin

1975The Court noted that such argument was invited and was in reply to statements made by the defense counsel when he argued: "(1) `* * * I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the information Mr. Whaley (prosecutor) had when he started this case, was completely different than what came out from the witness stand." "(2) `They (prosecutors) don't want to have a struggle inside the apartment, because that doesn't go along with whatever the story that you want to accept that the complainant has.'" Judge Hawkins, in Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548, 550 (1924), stated: "We think

1975The Court noted that such argument was invited and was in reply to statements made by the defense counsel when he argued: "(1) `* * * I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the information Mr. Whaley (prosecutor) had when he started this case, was completely different than what came out from the witness stand." "(2) `They (prosecutors) don't want to have a struggle inside the apartment, because that doesn't go along with whatever the story that you want to accept that the complainant has.'" Judge Hawkins, in Vineyard v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 401 , 257 S.W. 548, 550 (1924), stated: "We think

1975R. 495, 221 S.W.2d 278 (1949); Erisman's Manual of Reversible Errors, First Edition, Sections 512, 513; and 5 Tex.Jur.2d, Section 436, page 657.

1975See also Thompson v. State, 480 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Green v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 442 , 221 S.W.2d 612 (1949); Stovall v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 495 , 221 S.W.2d 278 (1949); Erisman’s Manual of Reversible Errors, First Edition, Sections 512, 513; and 5 Tex.Jur.2d, Section 436, page 657.

1961The court in its definition clearly followed the law as declared by the Commisson of Appeals in Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 , in which the court said: “It seems to us that the only safe rule, and the only one free from much confusion, is one which gives the oil to the man who owns the land upon which the well is located.” The effect of the holding in this case was that Pickens and Coffield, having been granted the well permit for the four lots, could legally produce the oil under the four lots, and under “the rule of capture” as defined above they owned all of the oil produced from the well.

1961The court in its definition clearly followed the law as declared by the Commission of Appeals in Japhet v. *810 McRae, 276 S.W. 669, 672 , in which the court said: "It seems to us that the only safe rule, and the only one free from much confusion, is one which gives the oil to the man who owns the land upon which the well is located." The effect of the holding in this case was that Pickens and Coffield, having been granted the well permit for the four lots, could legally produce the oil under the four lots, and under "the rule of capture" as defined above they owned all of the oil produced fro

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954It is, in any event, unjust to take away the property apparently belonging to one party and give it to another until it is shown that the latter party has been deprived of it. * * * It seems to us that the only safe rule, and the only one free from much confusion, is one which gives the oil to the man who owns the land upon which the well is located. clearly, it would not be right to award the oil to those who, like Keeble and McRae, offered no proof that any of it was drained from under their 5-acre tract.” (Emphasis added.) In accord with Japhet v. McRae is Hinds v. McCord, Tex.Civ.App., 45

1946Again it is said: “To determine whether or not a pleading presents a certain issue, it is a safe rule to look at the pleading from the standpoint of the party against whom it is exhibited, and ascertain if the allegations are sufficient to notify him that the evidence offered will be produced, or that he will be called upon to present evidence to meet it.” Ware v. Shafer, 88 Tex. 44 , 29 S.W. 756 , 757; 33 Tex.Jur. 654.

1926This court, in the case of Panhandle Grain & Elevator Co. v. Dowlin, 247 S. W. 873 , quoting from the Supreme Court (Ware v. Shafer et al., 88 Tex. 44 , 29 S. W. 756 ), said: “The object of pleading is to notify the opposite party of what it is expected to prove as the ground of plaintiff’s action, or the defendant’s defense, so that he may prepare for the trial of the issues thus tendered. * * * To determine whether or not a pleading presents a certain issue, it is a safe rule to look at the pleading from the standpoint of the party against whom it is exhibited, and ascertain if the allegatio

1941Gilbert v. Parrott, 168 Ky. 599 , 182 S. W. 859, 861 ; Zielbold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349 , 24 S. W. 155 ; Post v. Wilkes-Barre R.

1941Gilbert v. Parrott, 168 Ky. 599 , 182 S. W. 859, 861 ; Zielbold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349 , 24 S. W. 155 ; Post v. Wilkes-Barre R.

1941Gilbert v. Parrott, 168 Ky. 599 , 182 S. W. 859, 861 ; Zielbold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349 , 24 S. W. 155 ; Post v. Wilkes-Barre R.

1941Gilbert v. Parrott, 168 Ky. 599 , 182 S. W. 859, 861 ; Zielbold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349 , 24 S. W. 155 ; Post v. Wilkes-Barre R.

1932Motives are not alwaysi readily justified to the public, even in cases where, they have been purest; and the safe rule for the public is that which protects its officers in acting fearlessly, so long- as they keep within the limits of their legal discretion,’ — citing in note 26 Sage v. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137 ; Cooley on Tax., 552.

1878Motives are not always readily justified to the public, even in cases where they have been purest; and the safe rule for the public is that which protects its officers in acting fearlessly, so long as they beep within the limits of their legal discretion; ”—citing in note 26 Sage v. Lanrain, 19 Mich., 137 ; Cooley on Tax., 552.

2010No. 156 v. United Somerset Corp. , 274 S.W.3d 133 , 138–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (breach of contract and quantum meruit claims based on inadequate reimbursement were not ripe because utility district had not yet decided how bond reimbursement proceeds would be distributed). [4] Thus, SAFE’s claim is not ripe and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address that claim.

1993To say the least of it, it will avoid questions for decisions on appeal without any necessity for such questions.” Id., 105 S.W. at 514 .

1993To say the least of it, it will avoid questions for decisions on appeal without any necessity for such questions.” Id., 105 S.W. at 514 .

1974It is the duty of a court to administer the law as it is written, and not to make the law; and however harsh a statute may seem to be, or whatever may seem to be its omission, courts cannot, on such considerations, by construction sustain its operation, *930 or make it apply to cases to which it does not apply, without assuming functions that pertain solely to the legislative department of the government.” Turner v. Cross (Tex.Sup.Ct.1892) 83 Tex. 218 , 18 S.W. 578, 579 .

1974It is the duty of a court to administer the law as it is written, and not to make the law; and however harsh a statute may seem to be, or whatever may seem to be its omission, courts cannot, on such considerations, by construction sustain its operation, *930 or make it apply to cases to which it does not apply, without assuming functions that pertain solely to the legislative department of the government.” Turner v. Cross (Tex.Sup.Ct.1892) 83 Tex. 218 , 18 S.W. 578, 579 .

1967In support thereof, they cite: Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 170 , no writ; Dellinger v. Skelly Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 675 , writ ref’d n. r. e.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, supra. These case are seismograph blasting cases.

1967In support thereof, they cite: Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 170 , no writ; Dellinger v. Skelly Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 675 , writ ref’d n. r. e.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, supra. These case are seismograph blasting cases.

1967In support thereof, they cite: Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 170 , no writ; Dellinger v. Skelly Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 675 , writ ref’d n. r. e.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, supra. These case are seismograph blasting cases.

1963(See Pruitt v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 336 S.W.2d 440 ).

1963(See Pruitt v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 336 S.W.2d 440 ).

1963Motives are not always readily justified to the public, even in cases where they have been purest; and the safe rule for the public is that which protects its officers in acting fearlessly, so long as they keep within the limits of their legal discretion.’ ” In Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532 , 342 S.W.2d 422 , Judge Calvert, speaking for our Supreme Court, stated as follows: “The same reasons underlying immunity of district judges from tort liability for acts performed or not performed in judicial proceedings require a conclusion that justices of the peace should enjoy like immunity when actin

1963Motives are not always readily justified to the public, even in cases where they have been purest; and the safe rule for the public is that which protects its officers in acting fearlessly, so long as they keep within the limits of their legal discretion.’ ” In Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532 , 342 S.W.2d 422 , Judge Calvert, speaking for our Supreme Court, stated as follows: “The same reasons underlying immunity of district judges from tort liability for acts performed or not performed in judicial proceedings require a conclusion that justices of the peace should enjoy like immunity when actin

1954The case of Nale v. Carroll, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 519 , is in some respects similar to the case at bar.

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes

1954In that case the Commission of Appeals approved as correct the following proposition of law: “Where the lessor of land for oil and gas, subsequently to the execution of the lease, but prior to the development of the land and the production of oil or gas under the lease, sells a portion or portions of the land to others, and oil and gas are thereafter produced under the lease from some portion of the leased premises, the royalties therefrom belong to the owner of the particular tract upon which the well is located, and the owner or owners of other portions of the leased premises have no interes