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5 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen2 sentences2018See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation , 107 N.J. 307 , 322, 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (finding "the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called *60 doctrine of legislative inaction. 'Legislative inaction has been called a "weak reed upon which to lean" and a "poor beacon to follow" in construing a statute' " (quoting 2A C. 2018See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation , 107 N.J. 307 , 322, 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (finding "the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called *60 doctrine of legislative inaction. 'Legislative inaction has been called a "weak reed upon which to lean" and a "poor beacon to follow" in construing a statute' " (quoting 2A C. | 3 | 5 |
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, New Jersey Department of the Treasurygreen2 sentences2001Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (stating that “where a statute or ordinance does not expressly address a specific situation, the court will interpret it ‘consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman had he anticipated the matter at hand’ ”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); cf. Amerada Hess Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 322 , 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (‘We find the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called doctrine of legislative inaction.”), aff'd, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 2001Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (stating that “where a statute or ordinance does not expressly address a specific situation, the court will interpret it ‘consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman had he anticipated the matter at hand’ ”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); cf. Amerada Hess Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 322 , 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (‘We find the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called doctrine of legislative inaction.”), aff'd, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.green2 sentences1995Rossiter ed. 1961), erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice____ [Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 , 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1472 , 94 L.Ed.2d 615, 656 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).] Here, as in the past, “[W]e find the doctrine of probable l 1995Rossiter ed. 1961), erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice____ [Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 , 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1472 , 94 L.Ed.2d 615, 656 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).] Here, as in the past, “[W]e find the doctrine of probable l | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad
green
2 sentences2001Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (stating that “where a statute or ordinance does not expressly address a specific situation, the court will interpret it ‘consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman had he anticipated the matter at hand’ ”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); cf. Amerada Hess Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 322 , 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (‘We find the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called doctrine of legislative inaction.”), aff'd, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 2001Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (stating that “where a statute or ordinance does not expressly address a specific situation, the court will interpret it ‘consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman had he anticipated the matter at hand’ ”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); cf. Amerada Hess Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 107 N.J. 307, 322 , 526 A.2d 1029 (1987) (‘We find the doctrine of probable legislative intent a more reliable guide than the so-called doctrine of legislative inaction.”), aff'd, 490 U.S. 66 , 109 S.Ct. 1617 , 104 | 1 | 2001–2001 |