numerosity requirement in Louisiana

2007Id.

2002There is no set number above which a class is considered to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. [1] Dumas, 635 So.2d 446 ; Billieson, 729 So.2d 146 ; Ducote, 670 So.2d 1378 ; Thomas, 683 So.2d 734 ; Cooper v. City of New Orleans, 01-0115 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01) ; 780 So.2d 1158 , writ denied, 01-0720 (La.5/11/01); 792 So.2d 734 .

2010Johnson v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 00-0825 — 00-0828, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/01), 790 So.2d 734, 741 .

2002In Johnson, 790 So.2d 734 , however, the court found the numerosity requirement was satisfied even though only one claimant out of a potential 1,000 had come forward at the time of certification.

2009Billieson v. City of New Orleans, 98-1232, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 146, 154 .

2002There is no set number above which a class is considered to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. [1] Dumas, 635 So.2d 446 ; Billieson, 729 So.2d 146 ; Ducote, 670 So.2d 1378 ; Thomas, 683 So.2d 734 ; Cooper v. City of New Orleans, 01-0115 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01) ; 780 So.2d 1158 , writ denied, 01-0720 (La.5/11/01); 792 So.2d 734 .

2009Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC, 03-0005, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/04), 864 So.2d 880, 887 .

2008Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC, 03-0005, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/14/04), 864 So.2d 880, 887 .

2002There is no set number above which a class is considered to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. [1] Dumas, 635 So.2d 446 ; Billieson, 729 So.2d 146 ; Ducote, 670 So.2d 1378 ; Thomas, 683 So.2d 734 ; Cooper v. City of New Orleans, 01-0115 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01) ; 780 So.2d 1158 , writ denied, 01-0720 (La.5/11/01); 792 So.2d 734 .

1998Ct.App. 3 Cir. 9/25/96), 683 So.2d 734 , the third circuit court of appeal held that 114 potential class members met the numerosity requirement because joinder of 114 persons would not be conducive to judicial economy.

1998Lewis , 96-1458 at p. 15; 698 So.2d at 1012 ( citing Becnel v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d 1155 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993)).

1998Becnel, 613 So.2d at 1158 .

1997Becnel v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d at 1158 , (citing Farlough v. Smallwood, 524 So.2d 201 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 526 So.2d 810 (La.1988)).

1994Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d 1152, 1154 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993), citing Farlough v. Smallwood, 524 So.2d 201 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 526 So.2d 810 (La.1988).

1997Becnel v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d at 1158 , (citing Farlough v. Smallwood, 524 So.2d 201 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 526 So.2d 810 (La.1988)).

1994Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d 1152, 1154 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993), citing Farlough v. Smallwood, 524 So.2d 201 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 526 So.2d 810 (La.1988).

2025AFFIRMED 17 In so finding, we note that the Supreme Court in Doe reversed the trial court’s ruling granting the motion to certify based solely on its finding that the Doe plaintiff failed to prove the numerosity requirement. 12-1566, 12-1572, 12-1580, p. 19, 112 So.3d at 835-36 . 19

2014The numerosity requirement does not have a strict numbers threshold, rather it is based on the facts and circumstances of each case and requires a showing that “joinder is impractical and there is a definable group of aggrieved persons.” Doe v. Southern, Gyms, LLC, 12-1566, p. 12 (La.3/19/13) 112 So.3d 822, 831 .

2019As noted by the supreme court in Baker , 167 So.3d at 542 , "many claims may be small or nominal in nature, rendering individual actions financially impractical, if not impossible." We find no manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that the numerosity requirement was met by Mr. Gibson.

2019As noted by the supreme court in Baker , 167 So.3d at 542 , "many claims may be small or nominal in nature, rendering individual actions financially impractical, if not impossible." We find no manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that the numerosity requirement was met by Mr. Gibson.

2005Dumas, 635 So.2d 446 ; Billieson, 729 So.2d 146 ; Ducote, 670 So.2d 1378 ; Thomas, 683 So.2d 734 ; Cooper v. City of New Orleans, supra .

2002There is no set number above which a class is considered to have satisfied the numerosity requirement. [1] Dumas, 635 So.2d 446 ; Billieson, 729 So.2d 146 ; Ducote, 670 So.2d 1378 ; Thomas, 683 So.2d 734 ; Cooper v. City of New Orleans, 01-0115 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01) ; 780 So.2d 1158 , writ denied, 01-0720 (La.5/11/01); 792 So.2d 734 .

2003Dumas v. Angus Chemical Co., 25,632, p. 6-7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/30/94), 635 So.2d 446, 450 , writ denied, 94-1120 (La.6/24/94), 640 So.2d 1349 .

1997Dumas v. Angus Chemical Company, 25632 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/30/94); 635 So.2d 446, 450 , writ denied, 94-1120 (La.6/24/94); 640 So.2d 1349 ; Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Company, 613 So.2d 1152, 1154 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993).

2000Phillips v. Orleans Parish School Board, 541 So.2d 226 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989). |?On 24 March 1997, the parties filed a stipulation of amounts paid by the Board to plaintiffs from the fourth quarter of 1977 through 1996, subject to the Board’s objection that the relief, if any, to which plaintiffs are entitled would be for the period of 22 August through 8 September 1977.

1996Defendant cites Phillips v. Orleans Parish School Board, 541 So.2d 226 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989) and O'Halleron v. L.E.C., Inc., 471 So.2d 752 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985) in support of its argument that the numerosity requirement had not been met.

1996Defendant cites Phillips v. Orleans Parish School Board, 541 So.2d 226 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989) and O'Halleron v. L.E.C., Inc., 471 So.2d 752 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985) in support of its argument that the numerosity requirement had not been met.

1989Id. at 755 .

2025In so doing, we reasoned that “[b]ased on the evidence in the record, . . . a court cannot assume that all of the Sprint PCS wireless subscribers were unhappy with their service.” Id., 04-1433, p. 20, 921 So.2d at 120 .

2015As the Court stated in Price v. Martin, 11-853, p. 10 (La.12/6/11), 79 So.3d 960 , 969: The commonality prerequisite requires a party seeking class certification to show that “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.” La.

2014Without submitting any evidence at the hearing to establish that the members of the proposed class are so numerous that joinder in the instant case is impracticable, relying on this court’s decision in Vela v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 94-1161, 94-1162, 94-1163, 94-1164, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/29/95), 658 So.2d 46, 48 , the plaintiffs posited that the numerosity requirement was presumptively met and that joinder is impracticable solely on the basis that the proposed class is comprised of 366 litigants. 16 Consequently, on appeal, the plaintiffs aver that because “a proposed class of 366 litiga

2014First, the jurisprudence is conflicting as to whether a presumption arises that join-der is impractical based solely on the number of proposed litigants. | ^Summarizing the conflicting jurisprudence surrounding this issue, one legal commentator states the following: [I]n Vela , the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal certified a class, stating “A presumption arises that joinder is impractical if more than 40 class members exist.” This statement was unnecessary, however, for “the class range[d] somewhere between 150 and 600 members, if not more.” Id.

2014C.C.P. art. 591 based on a misapplication of this court’s prior reasoning set forth in Galjour v. Bank One Equity Investors-Bidco, Inc., 05-1360 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/06) , 935 So.2d 716 , and because, under the stipulated facts, 9 controlling precedent triggers a presumption that joinder is impracticable. (2) Under La.

2014In this [7case, the testimony and evidence show that the class is easily definable and that its members are easily identifiable and that there are a sufficient number of aggrieved parties such that joinder is impractical. [T]he predominance requirement is more demanding than the commonality requirement, because it “entails identifying the substantive issues that will control the outcome, assessing which issues will predominate, and then determining whether the issues are common to the class,” a process that ultimately “prevents the class from degenerating into a series of individual trials.” D

2013Concluding there was no error by the trial court in certifying the class, the appellate court found no merit to the defendants’ arguments and affirmed. 11 We consolidated and granted the defendants’ separate writ applications to review the judgments of the lower courts and, in particular, to examine whether those courts engaged in the rigorous analysis required to determine whether this action meets the requirements imposed by law for class action certification. 12 JüLAW General Class Actions Law In Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 1996-2913, p. 4 (La.9/9/97); 703 So.2d 542, 544 , we said: [t]

2011Edmonds , 39,893, p. 10, 910 So.2d at 1012 , and cases cited therein.

2009Pulver v. 1st Lake Properties, Inc., 96-248, 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/18/96), 681 So.2d 965, 968 .

2009Pulver v. 1st Lake Properties, Inc., 96-248, 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/18/96), 681 So.2d 965, 968 .

2006Id.

2006Mr. Galjour argues that certification is appropriate because *726 the class action device is particularly well-suited for these type of actions. "`Joinder impracticality (numerosity) is rarely contested in class actions brought on behalf of shareholders or traders in publicly owned corporations.'" Zeidman, 651 F.2d at 1039 (quoting 5 J.