numerosity requirement in Florida

2018Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906-07 (Fla. 2002) (stating that the appellate court will correctly refuse to affirm on an alternative theory not argued to the trial court where “the record does not reflect an evidentiary basis sufficient to permit” the appellate court to make a determination as to the alternative theory) (quoting State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel.

2018Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906-07 (Fla. 2002) (stating that the appellate court will correctly refuse to affirm on an alternative theory not argued to the trial court where “the record does not reflect an evidentiary basis 25 sufficient to permit” the appellate court to make a determination as to the alternative theory) (quoting State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel.

2018Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999)).8 The majority’s numerosity analysis refers to three groups that allegedly form the sufficiently numerous class: (1) thousands of owners charged a toll according to the MDX databases; (2) nine co-plaintiffs; and (3) what the majority refers to as “numerous corporate parties.” I have already addressed how the MDX databases led to a speculative and overbroad class definition, and it can hardly be said that the presence of the nine plaintiffs, comprised of one management company and its eight closely associated affiliates, justify a find

2018Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999)). 8 The majority’s numerosity analysis refers to three groups that allegedly form the sufficiently numerous class: (1) thousands of owners charged a toll according to the MDX databases; (2) nine co-plaintiffs; and (3) what the majority refers to as “numerous corporate parties.” I have already addressed how the MDX databases led to a speculative and overbroad class definition, and it can hardly be said that the presence of the nine plaintiffs, comprised of one management company and its eight closely associated affiliates, justify a fin

2018Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (stating that “the proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage”); Leibell, 84 So. 3d at 1083 (“[A] proposed class, even a moderately large one . . . , which appears to the naked eye to be ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’ still will fail if it is overbroad.”) (citation omitted); Ouellette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that the proposed class of “all current

2018Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (stating that “the proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage”); Leibell, 84 So. 3d at 1083 (“[A] proposed class, even a moderately 20 large one . . . , which appears to the naked eye to be ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’ still will fail if it is overbroad.”) (citation omitted); Ouellette v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that the proposed class of “all cur

2018Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (stating that “the proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage”); Leibell, 84 So. 3d at 1083 (“[A] proposed class, even a moderately large one . . . , which appears to the naked eye to be ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’ still will fail if it is overbroad.”) (citation omitted); Ouellette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that the proposed class of “all current

2018Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (stating that “the proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage”); Leibell, 84 So. 3d at 1083 (“[A] proposed class, even a moderately 20 large one . . . , which appears to the naked eye to be ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’ still will fail if it is overbroad.”) (citation omitted); Ouellette v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that the proposed class of “all cur

2018Leibell v. Miami-Dade Cty., 84 So. 3d 1078, 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Satisfaction of [the numerosity] prerequisite is not just a test of 20 numbers. . . . [I]t is a practicability requirement of which class size is but one inherent part.”).

2018Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (stating that “the proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage”); Leibell, 84 So. 3d at 1083 (“[A] proposed class, even a moderately large one . . . , which appears to the naked eye to be ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’ still will fail if it is overbroad.”) (citation omitted); Ouellette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that the proposed class of “all current

2016Although it is not necessary to “show the precise number of members in the class,” the party seeking class certification “still bears the burden of making some showing, affording the [trial] court the means to make a supported factual finding, that the class actually certified meets the numerosity requirement.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983)).

2016Although it is not necessary to “show the precise number of members in the class,” the party seeking class certification “still bears the burden of making some showing, affording the [trial] court the means to make a supported factual finding, that the class actually certified meets the numerosity requirement.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983)).

1991See, e.g., Riordan v Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60 (N.D.