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5 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1978–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rutgers v. Pilusogreen1 sentence2016The Court in County of Monroe relied on Rutgers State Univ. v Piluso (60 NJ 142, 153, 286 A2d 697, 703 [1972]), which held that “there will undoubtedly be cases . . . where the broader public interest is so important that immunity must be granted even though the local interests may be great.” The first County of Monroe factor is “the nature and scope of the municipality seeking immunity.” In this case, the instrumentality is the County seeking immunity from the Village’s zoning law, in order to comply with the State Commission of Correction’s mandate to build a new county jail. | 1 | 1 |
Crown Communication New York, Inc. v. Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2016The Court of Appeals further extends this immunity in the Matter of Crown Communication N.Y., Inc. v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y. ( 4 NY3d 159, 168 [2005]), where it held that a private telecommunications company was exempt from the regulations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, because “the licensing of space to commercial wireless providers is an integral component of the State’s plan of promoting public safety and reducing the proliferation of cellular towers, clearly salient public purposes.” Lower courts have employed the balancing of interests test in different ways and | 1 | 1 |
King v. County of Saratoga Industrial Development Agencygreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., King v. County of Saratoga Industrial Development Agency, 208 A.D.2d 194 , 200 (3d Dep't 1995) (applying Monroe test to Industrial Development Agency, a "body corporate and politic," General Municipal Law § 890-h , constituting a "public benefit corporation," General Municipal Law § 856 ). 7 Article X, including section 1003(2)(f) and section 1009(3)(e), was enacted by Act of July 12, 1984, ch. 363, § 14, 1984 McKinney's N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the County of Monroe
green
1 sentence2003Second, assuming the village enacted a local zoning or planning regulation of general applicability that fostered traditional land use planning objectives (such as regulation of traffic, noise, or compatibility with neighboring uses), its applicability to OTB non-simulcast facilities would be governed by the balancing of interests test adopted by the Court of Appeals in Matter of County of Monroe , 72 N.Y.2d 338 (1988). 6 That analysis begins with consideration of whether there is evidence of legislative intent that a particular governmental land use be subject to or exempt from local zoning. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1985As noted earlier, in the Watchtower case ( 297 NY 339 , cert denied 335 US 886 , supra), our Court of Appeals did not adopt a balancing of interests analysis. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1985As noted earlier, in the Watchtower case ( 297 NY 339 , cert denied 335 US 886 , supra), our Court of Appeals did not adopt a balancing of interests analysis. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Perry v. Fiumano
green
1 sentence1984Privileged communications should not be disclosed unless ‘[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications [is] greater than the benefit thereby [granted] for the correct disposal of litigation.’ (8 Wigmore, Evidence [McNaughton rev], § 2285, p 527; emphasis in original.)” (Perry v Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512, 517 .) Certainly, nothing is more critical to the proper disposition of a will contest involving testamentary capacity than a full disclosure of all relevant medical information. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Koump v. Smith
green
1 sentence1978Privileged communications should not be disclosed unless "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications [is] greater than the beneñt thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.” (8 Wigmore, Evidence [McNaughton rev], § 2285, p 527; emphasis in original.) Wigmore’s test surely has relevance in a custody proceeding, as does the language of Judge Scileppi in Koump v Smith ( 25 NY2d 287 ). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.