selective prosecution claim (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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selective prosecution claim in Ohio

40 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Armstronggreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 20 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1997–2023
2 sentences

2014Appellant argues the prosecutor discriminated against him based on his race because the prosecutor charged appellant but did not approve charges on his cross-complaint against the victim, a white male. {¶ 12} "A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203 (1998), citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). {¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio examined a selective prosecution claim in

2013Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463 . {¶27} To establish a selective prosecution defense, a criminal defendant must make a prima facie showing: (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government’s discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.

820
State v. Getsygreen
ohio · 1998 · cited in 22 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2023
2 sentences

2023Accord Michel at ¶ 9 . {¶ 16} “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.” State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203 , 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998).

2023Accord Michel at ¶ 9 . {¶ 16} “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.” State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203 , 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998).

722
State v. Flyntgreen
ohio · 1980 · cited in 23 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2014Appellant argues the prosecutor discriminated against him based on his race because the prosecutor charged appellant but did not approve charges on his cross-complaint against the victim, a white male. {¶ 12} "A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 203 (1998), citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). {¶ 13} The Supreme Court of Ohio examined a selective prosecution claim in

2013Thus, at the time of the charges the Park District had an agreement concerning the real property owned by Mrs. Taylor. {¶61} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134 , 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980) , 451 U.S. 619 , 101 S.Ct. 1958 , 68 L.Ed.2d 489 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the elements for establishing a selective-prosecution claim: To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) Holmes County, Case No. 12CA18 20 that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against be

523
United States v. Pablo Berriosgreen
ca2 · 1974 · cited in 14 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2020
2 sentences

2006Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an "independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St. 3d 180 , 203 ; see, also, Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463 . {¶ 17} To support a claim of selective prosecution, "`a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the

2003We disagree. {¶ 31} In State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180 , 203 , the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the selective prosecution test, stating: {¶ 32} "In State v. Flynt (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 132 , 134 , 17 Ohio Op.3d 81, 82 , 407 N.E.2d 15 , 17 , we adopted the following test with regard to selective-prosecution claims: {¶ 33} `To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the

514
City of Cleveland v. Trzebuckowskigreen
ohio · 1999 · cited in 7 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2001–2020
2 sentences

2016Examples of when such an allegation may be held to be justified are those situations in which selection is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d at 530, citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 , (1962). {¶49} As has been noted by both the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts, the burden in maintaining a selective prosecution claim is on the defendant as the prosecutor enjoys a presumption that his actions were non-discriminatory in nature.

2013Thus, at the time of the charges the Park District had an agreement concerning the real property owned by Mrs. Taylor. {¶61} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134 , 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980) , 451 U.S. 619 , 101 S.Ct. 1958 , 68 L.Ed.2d 489 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the elements for establishing a selective-prosecution claim: To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) Holmes County, Case No. 12CA18 20 that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against be

47
Oyler v. Bolesgreen
scotus · 1962 · cited in 8 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1999–2023
2 sentences

2016Examples of when such an allegation may be held to be justified are those situations in which selection is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d at 530, citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 , (1962). {¶49} As has been noted by both the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts, the burden in maintaining a selective prosecution claim is on the defendant as the prosecutor enjoys a presumption that his actions were non-discriminatory in nature.

2016Examples of when such an allegation may be held to be justified are those situations in which selection is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d at 530, citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 , (1962). {¶49} As has been noted by both the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts, the burden in maintaining a selective prosecution claim is on the defendant as the prosecutor enjoys a presumption that his actions were non-discriminatory in nature.

28
State v. Freemangreen
ohio · 1985 · cited in 7 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2001–2024
2 sentences

2024As the court stated in Armstrong, “the standard is a demanding one.” Id.

2018Freeman at 58, 485 N.E.2d 1043 . " 'Absent some demonstration of an invidious motive, [a] court will not presume intentional or purposeful discrimination from a mere showing of different treatment." LaMar at ¶ 46. {¶ 43} Furthermore, a "defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a selective prosecution defense unless he sets forth a prima facie claim." Powell at ¶ 23 ; citing Pepper Pike v. Dantzig , 8th Dist.

27
State v. LaMargreen
ohio · 2002 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2023
2 sentences

2020He also argued 7. that his conviction should have been vacated because the trooper vehicle was not in compliance with R.C. 4513.17(D), and therefore the trooper was not permitted to complete a stop of appellant. {¶ 22} In response, appellee argued that the motion was untimely and the prosecution of this matter was not selective or retaliatory because 26 other people were charged with the same charge before the trial court. {¶ 23} “Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an ‘independent assertion that the p

2014"Absent some demonstration of an invidious motive, [a] court will not presume intentional or purposeful discrimination from a mere showing of different treatment." State v. Lamar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 46 , citing Freeman at 58. {¶ 15} A trial court is required to grant an evidentiary hearing if the defendant demonstrates a "colorable entitlement" to a selective prosecution claim.

25
State v. LaMargreen
ohio · 2002 · cited in 5 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2023
2 sentences

2020He also argued 7. that his conviction should have been vacated because the trooper vehicle was not in compliance with R.C. 4513.17(D), and therefore the trooper was not permitted to complete a stop of appellant. {¶ 22} In response, appellee argued that the motion was untimely and the prosecution of this matter was not selective or retaliatory because 26 other people were charged with the same charge before the trial court. {¶ 23} “Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an ‘independent assertion that the p

2020He also argued 7. that his conviction should have been vacated because the trooper vehicle was not in compliance with R.C. 4513.17(D), and therefore the trooper was not permitted to complete a stop of appellant. {¶ 22} In response, appellee argued that the motion was untimely and the prosecution of this matter was not selective or retaliatory because 26 other people were charged with the same charge before the trial court. {¶ 23} “Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an ‘independent assertion that the p

25
City of Pepper Pike v. Dantzig, Unpublished Decision (5-20-2004)green
ohioctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2018
2 sentences

2018Cuyahoga No. 83425, 2004-Ohio-2562 , 2004 WL 1119627 , ¶ 14.

2006See, e.g., Pepper Pike v. Dantzig, Cuyahoga App. No. 83425, 2004-Ohio-2562 , at ¶ 14 .

12

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Keene green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2016State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 653 , 693 N.E.2d 246 (1998).

1998[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 81 Ohio St.3d 646 .] THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KEENE, APPELLANT. [Cite as State v. Keene, 1998-Ohio-342 .] Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Selective-prosecution claim is not defense on the merits to criminal charge—Statistical evidence of racial disparity is insufficient to infer discriminatory purpose—Constitutional right to discovery not established, when—Purposeful discrimination not shown, when—Death penalty upheld, when.

71998–2016
State v. Lawson green
ohio · 1992
2 sentences

2003We disagree. {¶ 31} In State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180 , 203 , the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the selective prosecution test, stating: {¶ 32} "In State v. Flynt (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 132 , 134 , 17 Ohio Op.3d 81, 82 , 407 N.E.2d 15 , 17 , we adopted the following test with regard to selective-prosecution claims: {¶ 33} `To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the

2003We disagree. {¶ 31} In State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180 , 203 , the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the selective prosecution test, stating: {¶ 32} "In State v. Flynt (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 132 , 134 , 17 Ohio Op.3d 81, 82 , 407 N.E.2d 15 , 17 , we adopted the following test with regard to selective-prosecution claims: {¶ 33} `To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the

32000–2003
State v. Powell, Unpublished Decision (9-22-2006) neutral
ohioctapp · 2006
2 sentences

2018Scioto No. 05CA3024, 2006-Ohio-5031 , 2006 WL 2780112 , ¶ 20, this Court reasoned as follows: "We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss based upon a selective prosecution defense.

2014No. 05CA3024, 2006-Ohio-5031, ¶ 23 .

22014–2018
State v. Keene green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2013State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 653 , 1998-Ohio-342 , 693 N.E.2d 246 (1998).

1998[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 81 Ohio St.3d 646 .] THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KEENE, APPELLANT. [Cite as State v. Keene, 1998-Ohio-342 .] Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Selective-prosecution claim is not defense on the merits to criminal charge—Statistical evidence of racial disparity is insufficient to infer discriminatory purpose—Constitutional right to discovery not established, when—Purposeful discrimination not shown, when—Death penalty upheld, when.

21998–2013
State v. Wolery green
ohio · 1976
2 sentences

1999Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341 , 18 O.O.3d 503 , 415 N.E.2d 279 : “[The] selection is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Wolery at 325-326 , 75 O.O.2d at 372 , 348 N.E.2d at 358 , quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 453 . 3 See, also, 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 185-203, Section 13.4; Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; Supp.1998), 95

1999Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341 , 18 O.O.3d 503 , 415 N.E.2d 279 : “[The] selection is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Wolery at 325-326 , 75 O.O.2d at 372 , 348 N.E.2d at 358 , quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 453 . 3 See, also, 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 185-203, Section 13.4; Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; Supp.1998), 95

21999–1999
State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin green
ohio · 1980
2 sentences

1999Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341 , 18 O.O.3d 503 , 415 N.E.2d 279 : “[The] selection is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Wolery at 325-326 , 75 O.O.2d at 372 , 348 N.E.2d at 358 , quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 453 . 3 See, also, 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 185-203, Section 13.4; Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; Supp.1998), 95

1999Nagle v. Olin (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341 , 18 O.O.3d 503 , 415 N.E.2d 279 : “[The] selection is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Wolery at 325-326 , 75 O.O.2d at 372 , 348 N.E.2d at 358 , quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 453 . 3 See, also, 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) 185-203, Section 13.4; Annotation, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings (1979; Supp.1998), 95

21999–1999
State v. Metcalf, Unpublished Decision (8-8-2007) green
ohioctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2022Summit No. 23600, 2007-Ohio-4001, ¶ 6 . {¶12} “‘A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.’” State v. Sanchez, 9th Dist.

12022–2022
Flynt v. Ohio green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

2013Thus, at the time of the charges the Park District had an agreement concerning the real property owned by Mrs. Taylor. {¶61} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134 , 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980) , 451 U.S. 619 , 101 S.Ct. 1958 , 68 L.Ed.2d 489 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the elements for establishing a selective-prosecution claim: To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) Holmes County, Case No. 12CA18 20 that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against be

2013Thus, at the time of the charges the Park District had an agreement concerning the real property owned by Mrs. Taylor. {¶61} In State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132, 134 , 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980) , 451 U.S. 619 , 101 S.Ct. 1958 , 68 L.Ed.2d 489 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the elements for establishing a selective-prosecution claim: To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) Holmes County, Case No. 12CA18 20 that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against be

12013–2013
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States green
scotus · 2005
1 sentence

2006Powell further asserts that he was entitled to present a "sloppy police work" defense in light of Arthur Anderson v. United States (2005), 544 U.S. 696 . {¶ 20} We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss based upon a selective prosecution defense.

12006–2006
United States v. Russell L. Larson green
ca8 · 1980
1 sentence

2006Rather, `[a] hearing is necessary only when the motion alleges sufficient facts to take the question past the frivolous state and raises a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose.' United States v. Larson, 612 F.2d 1301 , 1304-05 (8th Cir. 1980)." Thus, "[i]n order to warrant an oral hearing, the defendant must show sufficient facts to take the question past the frivolous state and raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's motive and purpose; the defendant must demonstrate a `colorable entitlement' to a selective prosecution claim." Spencer, supra; see, also, State v. Keene (Sept

12006–2006
State v. Getsy green
ohio · 1998
1 sentence

2005Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an `independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.' State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180 , 203 , 1998-Ohio-533 .

12005–2005
Cannon v. United States green
scotus · 1886
1 sentence

2004Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1 , 64 S.Ct. 397 , 88 L.Ed. 497 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 . {¶ 5} In establishment of a selective-prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

12004–2004
Yick Wo v. Hopkins green
scotus · 1886
2 sentences

2004Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1 , 64 S.Ct. 397 , 88 L.Ed. 497 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 . {¶ 5} In establishment of a selective-prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

2004Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1 , 64 S.Ct. 397 , 88 L.Ed. 497 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 . {¶ 5} In establishment of a selective-prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

12004–2004
Snowden v. Hughes green
scotus · 1944
2 sentences

2004Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1 , 64 S.Ct. 397 , 88 L.Ed. 497 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 . {¶ 5} In establishment of a selective-prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

2004Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 ; Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1 , 64 S.Ct. 397 , 88 L.Ed. 497 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 . {¶ 5} In establishment of a selective-prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and that the prosecution was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

12004–2004
United States v. Tucor International, Inc. green
ca9 · 1999
1 sentence

2004Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; United States v. Tucor Internatl., Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1998), 35 F.Supp.2d 1172 , affirmed on other grounds (C.A.9, 1999), 189 F.3d 834 .

12004–2004
United States v. Tucor International, Inc. green
cand · 1998
1 sentence

2004Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; United States v. Tucor Internatl., Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1998), 35 F.Supp.2d 1172 , affirmed on other grounds (C.A.9, 1999), 189 F.3d 834 .

12004–2004
JONES v. ABC-TV Et Al. green
scotus · 1996
1 sentence

1998Instead, his claim is that the death penalty may not be applied because the prosecutor sought it “for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.” Id. {¶ 29} We conclude that evidence relevant to a selective-prosecution claim is not “favorable to an accused [and] * * * material either to guilt or to punishment” within the meaning of Brady and Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f); therefore, such evidence is not discoverable under the rule. {¶ 30} Having rejected appellant’s state-law claim, we must assess appellant’s claim that the trial judge had a constitutional obligation to allow discovery. {¶ 31} In United Sta

11998–1998

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.05 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.02 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.03 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.25 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.27 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 40 (1997–2026) TX 35 (1994–2024) PA 8 (1991–2020) CO 7 (2009–2026) MS 7 (1998–2020) FL 6 (1990–2023) CT 5 (1999–2017) MA 5 (2001–2023) NC 5 (2005–2022) NJ 5 (1991–2022) VA 4 (2003–2004) NM 4 (1991–2012) MD 4 (1996–2012) VT 4 (1997–2016) CA 3 (2000–2022) WI 3 (2001–2019) DC 3 (1990–2001) SD 3 (1994–2003) KS 3 (2018–2022) DE 3 (2014–2024) IL 2 (2010–2010) ME 2 (1993–2001) PR 2 (2008–2008) AL 2 (2010–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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