selective prosecution claim in Connecticut

2017The defendant contends that the subpoena was "sufficiently particularized so that the documents sought may be readily identified"; Three S. Development Co. v. Santore , 193 Conn. 174 , 179, 474 A.2d 795 (1984) ; and that the materials were " 'highly relevant' " to his selective prosecution claim, which was part of his defense.

2017The defendant contends that the subpoena was "sufficiently particularized so that the documents sought may be readily identified"; Three S. Development Co. v. Santore , 193 Conn. 174 , 179, 474 A.2d 795 (1984) ; and that the materials were " 'highly relevant' " to his selective prosecution claim, which was part of his defense.

2017Furthermore, because the amount of evidence needed to support a selective prosecution claim on the merits is greater than that which justifies an evidentiary hearing, it necessarily follows that, when an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, a defendant's merits claim must also fail." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 20-21 , 917 A.2d 43 .

2017Furthermore, because the amount of evidence needed to support a selective prosecution claim on the merits is greater than that which justifies an evidentiary hearing, it necessarily follows that, when an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, a defendant's merits claim must also fail." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 20-21 , 917 A.2d 43 .

2007Moreover, there is nothing in the defendant’s offer of proof that indicates that he could have proven that his claimed “suspect classification” as a “converter of property” was an impermissible consideration for prosecution, which would be necessary to satisfy prong two of the selective prosecution test. 7 See State v. Delossantos, supra, 211 Conn. 287 -88. “[A]bsent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the *26 law is not in itself a constitutional violat

2007Moreover, there is nothing in the defendant’s offer of proof that indicates that he could have proven that his claimed “suspect classification” as a “converter of property” was an impermissible consideration for prosecution, which would be necessary to satisfy prong two of the selective prosecution test. 7 See State v. Delossantos, supra, 211 Conn. 287 -88. “[A]bsent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the *26 law is not in itself a constitutional violat

2007Even if his allegations that the salesmen improperly retained his alleged cash deposit and knew that he was not Paul Payne were true, these salesmen would not have been “persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 402 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L.

2007Even if his allegations that the salesmen improperly retained his alleged cash deposit and knew that he was not Paul Payne were true, these salesmen would not have been “persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 402 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L.

2007In State v. Perez, supra, 82 Conn. App. 100 , we stated that “[w]e believe that [n]o evidentiary hearing ... is required unless the [trial] court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the required prima facie showing has been made as to both elements of the [selective prosecution] test. . . . [Furthermore,] we [held] that an evidentiary hearing to prove selective prosecution is not a matter of right and is not available to every defendant, but rather is to be granted at the discretion of the trial court following a prima facie showing by the defendant that a legitimate claim exists wi

2007Even if his allegations that the salesmen improperly retained his alleged cash deposit and knew that he was not Paul Payne were true, these salesmen would not have been “persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 402 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L.

2007Even if his allegations that the salesmen improperly retained his alleged cash deposit and knew that he was not Paul Payne were true, these salesmen would not have been “persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 402 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L.

2007Even if his allegations that the salesmen improperly retained his alleged cash deposit and knew that he was not Paul Payne were true, these salesmen would not have been “persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 402 , 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 , 120 S. Ct. 1239 , 146 L.

1999A claim of selective prosecution or enforcement must contain two components: "`(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler , 230 Conn. 735 , 762 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994), quoting Leclair v. Saunders , 627 F.2d 606 , 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) see also State v. Delossantos , 211 Conn. 258 , 288 , 559 A.2d

1999A claim of selective prosecution or enforcement must contain two components: "`(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler , 230 Conn. 735 , 762 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994), quoting Leclair v. Saunders , 627 F.2d 606 , 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) see also State v. Delossantos , 211 Conn. 258 , 288 , 559 A.2d

1999A claim of selective prosecution or enforcement must contain two components: "`(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler , 230 Conn. 735 , 762 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994), quoting Leclair v. Saunders , 627 F.2d 606 , 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) see also State v. Delossantos , 211 Conn. 258 , 288 , 559 A.2d

1999A claim of selective prosecution or enforcement must contain two components: "`(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler , 230 Conn. 735 , 762 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994), quoting Leclair v. Saunders , 627 F.2d 606 , 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) see also State v. Delossantos , 211 Conn. 258 , 288 , 559 A.2d

1999A claim of selective prosecution or enforcement must contain two components: "`(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'" (Emphasis omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler , 230 Conn. 735 , 762 , 646 A.2d 152 (1994), quoting Leclair v. Saunders , 627 F.2d 606 , 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) see also State v. Delossantos , 211 Conn. 258 , 288 , 559 A.2d